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Abstract
Grids are distributed systems that dynamically coordinate a large number of heterogeneous
resources to execute large scale projects involving collaborating teams of scientists, high-
performance computers, massive data stores, high bandwidth networking, and/or scientific
instruments like telescopes, and synchrotrons. Failure in grids is arguably inevitable due to
the massive scale and the heterogeneity of grid resources, the distribution of these resources
over unreliable networks, the complexity of mechanisms that are needed to integrate such re-
sources into a seamless utility, and the dynamic nature of the grid infrastructure that allows
continuous changes to happen. To make matters worse, grid applications are generally long
running, and these runs repeatedly require coordinated use of many resources at the same time.
Based on the traditional fault tolerance techniques that enable a system to complete its
function even though the system and/or the environment where the system operates are faulty,
the grid community has proposed various fault tolerance approaches for grid applications.
However, these approaches are limited in at least one of the following ways: a) the fault
tolerance support is directed to only grid applications whose execution units are independent
of each other, b) only reactive strategies are used, c) the execution of a proactive strategy is
not based on the current status of the computation and the current likelihood of failure in the
execution environment but rather on the history of grid resources or the load of the execution
environment, and d) fault tolerance strategies are applied at the application level.
In this thesis, we propose the Recovery-Aware Components (RAC) approach. The RAC
approach enables a grid application to tolerate failure reactively and proactively at the level
of the smallest and independent execution unit of the application. The approach also com-
bines runtime prediction with a proactive fault tolerance strategy. By managing failure at the
smallest execution unit, and combining runtime prediction with a proactive fault tolerance
viii
strategy, the RAC approach aims at improving the reliability of the grid application with the
least overhead possible. Moreover, to allow a grid fault tolerance manager fine-tuned control
and trading off of reliability gained and overhead paid, this thesis offers an architecture-aware
modelling and simulation of reliability and overhead. The thesis demonstrates for a few of a
dozen or so classes of application architecture already identified in prior research, that the typ-
ical architectural structure of the class can be captured in a few parameters. The work shows
that these parameters suffice to achieve significant insight into, and control of, such tradeoffs.
The contributions of our research project are a) the RAC approach, a prediction and an
architecture based hybrid fault tolerance support for grid applications, b) the study of the
usage of the RAC approach to improve the reliability of grid applications whose architecture
can be classified as MapReduce or Combinational Logic, c) Markov models that represent the
execution behaviour of MapReduce and Combinational Logic grid applications for reliability
and overhead analysis, d) in-depth analysis of the impact of prediction inaccuracy on the
reliability-overhead tradeoff of the RAC approach, and e) a parameterised experiment testbed
for simulating the execution of a grid application with fault tolerance support that adapts the
principles of the RAC approach.
We proposed the RAC approach, first and foremost, to improve the reliability of grid
applications with the smallest overhead possible. Since the exact reliability-overhead tradeoff
of the RAC approach depends on many factors, we evaluated the RAC approach by answering
a specific set of questions. What is the reliability-overhead tradeoff that is enabled by the RAC
approach for MapReduce and Combinational Logic grid applications? How sensitive is such
reliability-overhead tradeoff to a fault tolerance strategy and its parameters, and prediction
accuracy? Before embarking on answering these questions, we first define and formalize the
concept of the RAC approach. The results of the reliability-overhead tradeoff evaluations are as
follows. We have confirmed that, via simulated experiment, architecture based fault tolerance
support provides better reliability improvement and incurs higher overhead to grid applications
than the architecture unaware one. The degree of the superiority of the architecture aware fault
tolerance support depends on factors like the type of the fault tolerance strategy selected and
its parameters, and the accuracy of a predictor. Since runtime prediction is a central part of the
RAC approach, we also evaluated the impact of prediction accuracy on the reliability-overhead
tradeoff of the RAC approach. An increase in false positives, predicting the presence of a non-
existent failure, increases reliability improvement; whereas an increase in false negatives, not
predicting the presence of failure, decreases reliability improvement. The impact of prediction
accuracy on overhead depends on the type of the fault tolerance support.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“It is a tremendous act of violence to begin anything.
I am not able to begin.
I simply skip what should be the beginning.”
- Rainer Maria Rilke
The term “grid” was coined by Ian Foster and others in the nineties in analogy to the elec-
tric power grid [Foster and Kesselman, 1999, pp. 17−21] to designate a distributed computing
system for utility high-performance computing. Grids are concerned with “. . . coordinated re-
source sharing and problem solving in dynamic multi-institutional virtual organizations” [Fos-
ter et al., 2001]. In grids, massive resources are coordinated to execute large scale projects
involving collaborating teams of scientists, high-performance computers, massive data stores,
high-bandwidth networking, and/or scientific instruments like telescopes, synchrotrons and col-
lidors. Grid resources are geographically distributed and thus belong to various administrative
domains. Furthermore, these resources not only join and leave the grid network at any time
but also change their access policy without any notice. As grid computing enters the main-
stream and is applied in internet search, finance and banking, and large-scale engineering, the
key issues of distributed systems, such as interoperability, security and fault tolerance, grow in
importance. However, this research covers only fault tolerance.
The objective of this research is to improve the reliability of grid applications. Failure
in grids is arguably inevitable due to (a) the massive scale and the heterogeneity of grid
1
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resources, (b) the distribution of these resources over unreliable networks, (c) the complexity
of mechanisms that are needed to integrate such resources into a seamless utility, and (d) the
dynamic nature of the grid infrastructure which allows continuous changes to happen. To make
matters worse, grid applications are generally long running and involve coordinating many
resources simultaneously. Failure in such applications is therefore very costly as it requires
restarting and rerunning previously completed computations, holding many resources for a
long time repeatedly.
Various fault tolerance approaches have been proposed to increase the probability of success-
ful execution of grid applications. Traditional fault tolerance techniques such as restart [Dean
and Ghemawat, 2004], replication with/without voting [Chtepen et al., 2009, Budati et al.,
2007], checkpointing [Nazir et al., 2009], migration [Kandaswamy et al., 2008], N -version [Xu
et al., 2008], and a combination of these and other strategies [Hwang and Kesselman, 2003]
have been tried. There are also grid tools that have built-in fault tolerance support. Examples
of such tools include Condor-G, for managing a grid infrastructure [Frey et al., 2002], and
Taverna, for building a grid workflow [Oinn et al., 2006]. Yet existing fault tolerance solutions
are limited in such a way that they exhibit some of the following behaviours:
• Existing fault tolerance approaches either do not address the type of the grid application
for which they are providing fault tolerance support (e.g., [Nazir et al., 2009]) or are ex-
plicitly proposed for a grid application whose execution units are embarrassingly parallel
(e.g., [Chtepen et al., 2009]).
• Reactive strategies are primarily used for managing failure (e.g. [Dean and Ghemawat,
2004]). Reactive strategies attempt to recover a failed computation after the failure
occurs while proactive strategies attempt to either minimize or prevent the impact of
future failure on the overall computation before the failure occurs. Tolerating failure
using only a reactive fault tolerance strategy could be very costly, especially if the failure
occurs towards the end of a long running grid application execution.
• In cases where proactive fault tolerance strategies are used, existing fault tolerance ap-
proaches do not, in general, consider the current status of the computation and likelihood
of failure in the execution environment before executing a proactive strategy. Instead,
the history of grid resources and the load of the system are mainly used. For example,
multiple copies of an execution unit are simultaneously executed if the execution envi-
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ronment is known to be unreliable [Budati et al., 2007] or the load of the environment is
low [Silva et al., 2003].
• Fault tolerance strategies are employed at the application level. Though grid applications
are naturally composed of multiple and possibly long running execution units, this does
not mean that significantly many of them will fail. Therefore, since enforcing a fault
tolerance strategy at the application level will include the execution units that are not
going to fail, application level fault tolerance introduces an unnecessary overhead. Duan
et al. [2005], for example, showed the disadvantage of checkpointing the state of the entire
execution, and the intermediate output of the execution that are needed to resume the
computation in case of failure. The overhead of such type of checkpointing significantly
increases with the size of the intermediate output.
In light of the limitations, inexpensive fault tolerance support for grid applications, which
are composed of not only independent but also communicating execution units, is needed.
In this thesis, we propose the Recovery-Aware Components (RAC) approach. The RAC
approach enables a grid application to tolerate failure reactively and proactively. In order to
limit the extent of fault tolerance support overhead, which is the computational power that
would be consumed by either the application to recover from failure and/or the fault toler-
ance management, the approach handles failure at the level of the smallest and independent
execution unit of the grid application. The approach also combines runtime prediction with a
proactive strategy to further reduce the overhead of the fault tolerance support. The purpose
of the runtime prediction is to avoid an unnecessary execution of a proactive strategy. An exe-
cution unit will be replicated, for instance, only if either the unit or its execution environment
is predicted to fail.
In order to cater to the fault tolerance requirements of grid applications whose communi-
cation and computation pattern is not classified as embarrassingly parallel, the RAC approach
systematically uses the class of the architecture of the applications to provide customized fault
tolerance support. For this, the classification of parallel programs by Asanovic et al. [2006,
2008, 2009] is used. Asanovic et al. [2006] classified parallel programs into thirteen computa-
tional kernels, known as dwarfs. Each dwarf has a different kind of parallel coordination, i.e.
communication and computation pattern. For each coordination, one can assume a different
capability of utilising the parallel structure to increase reliability and decrease cost of fault
tolerance support. However, the actual reliability gain, cost reduction, and the constraints
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under which these can be achieved, if at all, are far from obvious and require some methodical
approach and evaluation.
We study the reliability-overhead tradeoff that is enabled by the RAC approach for a grid
application whose parallel coordination can be classified under either the MapReduce or the
Combinational Logic dwarf. The MapReduce dwarf represents grid applications that are ex-
ecuted in two distinct phases, identified as map and reduce. All execution units in the map
phase are embarrassingly parallel, while the executions in the reduce phase involve some com-
munication. Embarrassingly parallel grid applications are MapReduce applications without
the reduce phase. Google’s search is a notable example of a MapReduce application [Dean
and Ghemawat, 2004]. The Combinational Logic dwarf, on the other hand, represents grid
applications that involve dataflow networks of functions that operate on streams of very large
amounts of data. These applications are common in cyclic redundancy checks, weather fore-
casting, logistics or content-based network routing, e.g. [NIST, 1999, 2001, Kuntschke et al.,
2006, Wang and Rundensteiner, 2009].
The contributions of our research project are a) the RAC approach, a prediction and an
architecture-based hybrid fault tolerance support for grid applications; b) the study of the
usage of the RAC approach to improve the reliability of grid applications whose architecture
can be classified as MapReduce or Combinational Logic; c) Markov models that represent the
execution behaviour of MapReduce and Combinational Logic grid applications for reliability
and overhead analysis; d) in-depth analysis of the impact of prediction inaccuracy on the
reliability-overhead tradeoff of the RAC approach; and e) a parameterised experiment testbed
for simulating the execution of a grid application with fault tolerance support that adapts the
principles of the RAC approach.
The results of our research project are as follows. Via simulated experiment, we have con-
firmed that architecture-based fault tolerance support provides better reliability improvement,
although with higher overhead, to both MapReduce and Combinational Logic grid applications
than the architecture-unaware one. The degree of the superiority of the architecture-aware fault
tolerance support depends on factors like the type of the fault tolerance strategy selected, e.g.,
checkpointing, and its parameters, e.g., cost of a checkpoint, and the accuracy of a predictor,
i.e. false positives and false negatives. Since runtime prediction is a central part of the RAC ap-
proach, we also evaluated the impact of prediction accuracy on the reliability-overhead tradeoff
of the RAC approach. An increase in false positives, predicting the presence of a non-existent
failure, increases reliability improvement; whereas an increase in false negatives, not predicting
the presence of failure, decreases reliability improvement. The impact of prediction accuracy
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on overhead depends the type the fault tolerance support.
1.1 Research Questions
We propose the RAC approach, first and foremost, to improve the reliability of the grid appli-
cations with the smallest overhead possible. Therefore, we study the degree of the reliability
improvement that would be achieved by adapting the RAC approach, and the overhead of such
improvement by addressing the following research questions:
i. What is an adequate formal representation of the RAC approach for making reliability
and overhead analyses?
ii. What is the reliability-overhead tradeoff that is enabled by the RAC approach for
a) MapReduce grid applications?
b) Combinational Logic grid applications?
iii. How sensitive is the reliability-overhead tradeoff of the RAC approach to
a) the parameters of the fault tolerance strategy with which the RAC is paired, e.g.
the impact of the probability of unrecoverable failure and the overhead of a single
checkpoint in restart-based and checkpointing-based fault tolerance support, respec-
tively?
b) prediction accuracy, i.e. false positives and false negatives?
1.2 Overview of Our Research Methodology
Our research methodology includes three elements: modelling, simulations, and real runs.
Figure 1.1 shows the interaction between these elements and the tools that are used in each:
i. Modelling. We use Discrete Time Markov Chains (Section 3.4.1) to model the behaviour
of a grid application execution that tolerates failure according to the RAC approach. Our
formal models are parameterised and based on the concept of Bulk Synchronous Parallel
computing (Section 4.2). PRISM [Kwiatkowska et al., 2011] and Matlab [MathWorks
Website] are used for model checking.
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Figure 1.1: Dataflow between the three elements of our research methodology
ii. Simulations. The reliability-overhead tradeoff of the RAC approach is evaluated using
experiments. For such evaluations, we designed and developed an experiment testbed.
The testbed executes a grid application in either virtual or real time. During execution,
the testbed provides a simulated fault tolerance support, which is based on the principles
of the RAC approach, to the grid application. When the execution of the grid application
is completed, the testbed outputs simulated reliability, simulated execution time, which
is the real time that would have been elapsed from the start to end of the computation,
and simulated overall cost of the execution, which is the total CPU time that would
have been consumed by the computation. The experiment testbed is parameterised in
order to allow the user to simulate the execution of a grid application with various fault
tolerance strategies and configurations. In our evaluation, we obtained the values of some
parameters, such as the time needed to complete an execution unit, from the output of
real runs. Chapter 8 discuses the experiment design in detail.
iii. Real runs. We execute real applications to collect data for our evaluation. The data
that we collect are the cost of communication, the time that is needed to complete an
execution unit, the execution time of the overall computation, the cost of a fault tolerance
strategy and others. These data, except for the overall execution time, are used as initial
inputs during empirical evaluations. The overall execution time is used to evaluate the
accuracy of our formal models and experiment testbed with respect to estimating the
total time that is needed to complete the execution of a grid application. Our execution
platforms are Xgrid, Condor, and Sun HPC clusters.
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1.3 Thesis Scope
The scope of the thesis is as follows:
• We limit this study to only MapReduce and Combinational Logic grid applications ig-
noring the other eleven dwarfs for simplicity. This limitation does not restrict the gen-
erality of our approach, but would require further studies to confirm the exact nature of
reliability-overhead tradeoffs for the other typical dwarfs underlying grid application not
falling into these two classes of architecture.
• Estimating the effort that is required to implement a fault tolerant grid application based
on the principles of the RAC approach is not part of the research project.
• In this thesis, as far as prediction is concerned, we focus on the impact of prediction
accuracy on reliability and overhead, given a predictor. We explicitly exclude the study
of prediction methods themselves. There exist extensive surveys about failure prediction,
for example, by Salfner et al. [2010].
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized into three parts:
• Part I
– Chapter 2 introduces the reader to grid computing.
– Chapter 3 discusses reliability and related topics.
– Chapter 4 introduces software architecture, dwarfs, bulk synchronous parallel com-
puting, the need for fault tolerance support in grids, existing fault tolerance ap-
proaches for grids and their limitations, and finally how these limitations could be
addressed.
• Part II
– Chapter 5 introduces the RAC approach and its architecture. In this chapter, we
discuss how the different aspects of the RAC architecture are realised in a grid.
We also present the abstract representation of the behaviour of the RAC architec-
ture with respect to fault management. Such behaviour is formally modelled using
Markov Chains.
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– Chapter 6 refines the RAC architecture to incorporate the requirements of a grid
application based on the classification of the application’s architecture. We study
the customization of the RAC architecture for MapReduce or the Combinational
Logic grid applications. The behaviour of the modified RAC architecture is formally
modelled using Markov Chains.
• Part III
– Chapter 7 presents our experiment testbed.
– Chapter 8 describes our experiment design.
– Chapter 9 presents the reliability-overhead tradeoffs that are enabled by the RAC
architecture, and then shows how these tradeoffs are affected by the choice of a fault
tolerance strategy, the parameters of the selected fault tolerance strategy, and the
predictor’s accuracy and interval.
– Chapter 10 summarises our findings, and then indicates future research directions.
1.5 Summary
In this chapter, we motivated and introduced the research problem, that is, inexpensive fault
tolerance support for a grid application that is composed of not only independent but also
communicating execution units. We highlighted the limitations of existing fault tolerance
approaches for grids, and then introduced the reader to our novel fault tolerance approach,
which we refer to as the RAC approach. We also presented the research questions that we
aim to answer at the end of this thesis. We provided readers a bird’s-eye-view of our research
methodology. We defined the scope of our research project. Finally, we briefly summarized
the content of each chapter in the thesis. In the next part, Part I, we will introduce readers
to the field of grid computing, reliability, and software architecture. Then, we will discuss our
research problem and related issues in detail.
Part I
Background
“What you see is news, what you know is background, what you feel is opinion.”
- Lester Markel
In this Part, we present the background theory that is related to our research project. The
background theory is organised in three chapters. Grid computing is introduced in Chapter 2.
Reliability and related topics are presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we discuss software
architecture, dwarfs, bulk synchornous parallel model, the need for fault tolerance support in
grids, existing fault tolerance approaches for grids, the limitations of these approaches, and
finally how these limitations could be addressed.
Chapter 2
Grids
A grid [Foster et al., 2001, Foster, 2002] is a distributed system that dynamically coordinates
a large number of heterogeneous resources, which are not under centralized control, using
standard, open and general-purpose protocols and interfaces to provide desired qualities of
service. Examples of grids are DAS-4 [DAS4 Website], DataTAG [DataTAG Website], and EU
DataGrid [DataGrid Website]. Grid computing [Foster et al., 2001] is a large-scale distributed
computing paradigm that is concerned with highly controlled and dynamically coordinated
sharing of heterogeneous resources in multiple organizations.
Constituent resources of a grid, hereafter referred to as grid resources, come in many forms.
Computers with various OS, programs, data, catalogues, code repositories, networks, sensors,
HPC accelerators, and specialized equipments like synchrotrons [Australian Synchrotron, 2012]
are all grid resources. Grid resources are owned by multiple individuals and/or organizations,
and thus belong to various administrative domains. Grid resources are coordinated based on
open and general-purpose protocols and interfaces that address the issues of authentication,
authorization, resource discovery and resource access. Such protocols and interfaces enable
the sharing of grid resources among collaborative individuals and/or organizations in a highly
controlled manner.
Sharing in a grid is not limited to file exchange. Users have direct, but controlled, access
to resources. A grid arranges the sharing of resources based on the specification of resource
providers about “. . . what is shared, who is allowed to share, and the conditions under which
sharing occurs” [Foster et al., 2001]. The sharing of resources in a controlled manner among
different organizations and/or individuals, which aim to achieve a common goal, creates a
virtual organization. Despite the resources in a virtual organization residing in multiple ad-
ministrative domains, they can be discovered and accessed as though they all belong to a single
10
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administrative domain.
Examples of a virtual organization include a common computational infrastructure for as-
tronomers in multiple universities, heterogeneous and multi-organizational archival storage sys-
tems for large-scale multimedia content analysis, and a distributed platform to access weather
models in different sites by a crisis management team to respond to an emergency situation.
These and other virtual organizations differ from each other in terms of their purpose, scope,
size and type of shared resources, structure, community and duration of their existence. De-
spite such disparity, virtual organizations share the following concerns and requirements [Foster
et al., 2001]:
i. Flexible sharing relationships: In a virtual organization, sharing relationships change
dynamically. Resources may leave an organization without any notification. The type of
access to a particular set of resources or authorization methods may change. Therefore,
there is a need to develop mechanisms for recognizing the current state of the virtual
organization at any point of time.
ii. Control over the usage of the shared resources: Shared resources must be used according
to the access policies of their providers. Therefore, there should be a mechanism to
control what is shared, who is allowed to access the shared resources and in what way
the shared resources are used.
iii. Sharing of heterogeneous resources: In a virtual organization, access to different types
of resources is required. The heterogeneity in grid resources comes not only from their
types but also from their configurations, architecture, and also access policies; for instance
computers with Linux, Windows or Mac OS, and Windows laptops with AMD or intel
processors.
iv. Diverse usage mode: Some grid resources participate in multiple sharing arrangements.
Suppose a resource participates in two sharing arrangements: providing idle computing
cycles to all members of a virtual organization, and allowing only members of a particular
group a write access to its hard disk. If a resource is part of multiple sharing arrange-
ments, it is not known how the resource will be used at a particular time. Therefore,
there is a need for performance and other quality metrics to determine the exact usage
of the resource.
A grid [Foster et al., 2001] uses protocols and services to address the above concerns and
requirements of virtual organizations. Information protocols are used to learn the current
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sharing relationship in a virtual organization. Security and management protocols control
how, by whom and under which circumstances the shared resources are accessed. Job and
data management protocols enable access to computing and data resources, respectively. These
protocols ensure that the usage of a resource meets its quality metrics.
2.1 Grid Architecture
According to Foster et al. [2001], a grid architecture identifies system components that are
needed to create, manage and exploit virtual organization sharing relationships among any
potential members. A grid architecture also specifies the purpose of the components and their
interactions. In this section, we study the Grid Protocol Architecture (Section 2.1.1) and the
Open Grid Services Architecture (Section 2.1.2).
2.1.1 The Grid Protocol Architecture
The Grid Protocol Architecture is proposed by Foster et al. [2001]. The components of the
architecture are protocols, which define the basic mechanisms to manage, discover, monitor,
and access resources in a virtual organization. Figure 2.1∗ shows the Grid Protocol Architec-
ture and its relationship with the Internet Protocol Architecture. The protocols of the Grid
Protocol Architecture are divided into five layers: Fabric, Connectivity, Resource, Collective
and Application.
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Figure 2.1: The layered Grid Protocol Architecture and its relationship with the Internet
Protocol Architecture. This figure is adapted from Foster et al. [2001].
∗Figure 2.1 is reprinted from International Journal of High Performance Computing Applications, 15, I.
Foster, C. Kesselman, and S. Tuecke, The Anatomy of the Grid: Enabling Scalable Virtual Organizations,
200-222, 2001, with permission from Sage Publications.
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2.1.1.1 The Fabric Layer
The Fabric layer [Foster et al., 2001] provides access to grid resources that will be shared by
members of a virtual organization. The sharing of these resources is mediated by grid protocols.
Each resource is expected to at least implement enquiry and resource management mechanisms.
Enquiry mechanisms are needed to obtain information about resources’ structure and state,
which include OS version, hardware configuration, available disk space, and network load. The
resource management mechanisms control the quality of service that is provided by resources.
Grid resources are mostly administrated by local resource managers, such as SGE, PBS [Bode
et al., 2000] and Condor [Thain et al., 2005]. However, external managers are also used to add
extra capability to resources. For example, GARA (Globus Architecture for Reservation and
Allocation) [Foster et al., 1999] adds advance reservation capability to resources.
2.1.1.2 The Connectivity Layer
The Connectivity layer [Foster et al., 2001] provides communication and authentication pro-
tocols. The communication protocols are needed for exchanging data between grid resources.
Therefore, these protocols support transport, routing, and naming. The communication pro-
tocols are assumed to come from the TCP/IP protocol stack.
The authentication protocols securely confirm the identity of users and resources. Authenti-
cating users and resources in a virtual organization is characterized by single sign on: once users
successfully sign in, they should have access to multiple resources without any further authen-
tication; delegation: there should be a mechanism for users to let a program access resources
on which the users have authorization; integrations with local security solutions: grid security
solutions should find a way to seamlessly work with local security solutions; and user-based
trust relationships: if users have access to resources from different administrative domains, the
user should be able to access the resources without the need for interaction among the security
administrators of the domains.
2.1.1.3 The Resource Layer
The Resource layer [Foster et al., 2001] is concerned with individual grid resources. This layer
provides information and management protocols. Information protocols are for learning about
a resource’s configuration, load, usage policy, and other state and structure related information.
Management protocols, on the other hand, are for negotiating access to a resource based on
usage policy, instantiating sharing relationships, and monitoring and controlling the status of
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the computation on the resource. Information and management protocols use Fabric layer
functions to get information about a resource and manage the resource.
2.1.1.4 The Collective Layer
The Collective layer [Foster et al., 2001] is concerned with the global state of grid resources.
Component of the Collective layer build on Resource and/or other Collective layers. The
protocols and the services of this layer provide a range of sharing behaviours. Examples
for sharing behaviours that are enabled by the components of the Collective layer abound.
Members of a virtual organization can check the existence of resources via directory services.
Members can also request a set of resources to be assigned for a particular purpose through
co-allocation services. Monitoring and diagnostic services allow the user to oversee the health
status of resources (alive vs. dead). Accounting services are used for billing. Collaboratory
services facilitate information exchange among large groups of users.
2.1.1.5 The Application Layer
The Application layer [Foster et al., 2001] is the last and the top-most layer. This layer con-
tains a program, hereafter referred to as a grid application, that users execute on the platform
that is provided by virtual organizations. Examples of grid applications are image rendering,
simulating the flow of blood through human arteries, large-scale multimedia content analysis,
managing large datasets generated by particle accelerators, and visualizing earthquake simu-
lation data. Since grid applications are executed in a distributed environment, their execution
is naturally composed of multiple computations which potentially interact with each other.
Hereafter, we refer to the smallest and independent computation unit of a grid application as
an activity of a grid application.
2.1.2 The Open Grid Services Architecture
The Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) [Foster et al., 2002, 2005] is a service-oriented
architecture that combines grid and Web Services technologies to define a set of service in-
terfaces which are needed to create a standard-based grid. OGSA also defines semantics to
specify the basic behaviours of a service, which include service creation, service naming, life-
time management, and communication. OGSA, however, does not impose the use of a specific
programming language or execution environment during the implementation and execution
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of services. We refer to a service whose interface and semantics are defined by OGSA as an
OGSA service.
OGSA services integrate and manage heterogeneous resources within an organization and
across multiple organizations. They also ensure that the desired quality of services are met
during grid application execution in the presence of distributed and diverse resources. OGSA
services are broadly categorised into six groups: execution management, data, resource man-
agement, self-management, security, and information.
Execution Management Services (OGSA-EMS) are concerned with managing computations.
OGSA-EMS are in charge of finding and selecting resources that are suitable for the compu-
tation, setting up the execution environment, and initiating and overlooking the computation.
OGSA data services are concerned with managing data access and movement. These ser-
vices use a virtualization interface, which obscures the difference between heterogeneous en-
tities, to manipulate diverse data resources. OGSA data services transform data from one
format to another, provide mechanisms to update data resources, and ensure a certain level
of quality of service with respect to data delivery and integrity are met. OGSA data services
also put an effort to minimize unnecessary data movement and duplication.
The Resource Management Services (OGSA-RM) look after grid resources in three ways.
First, each resource is managed as an independent entity; for instance rebooting a computer.
Second, resources are managed for being part of a grid. Under this management, OGSA-RM
monitors and controls resources, and enables advance reservations whenever possible. The last
management is concerned with the OGSA infrastructure; OGSA-RM monitors OGSA services
like a registry service.
The Security Services are used for verifying the identity of users, identity mapping, con-
trolling access to resources, ensuring privacy, and recording security-related events.
The purposes of Self-Management Services are to minimize the cost of owning grid resources
and to simplify resource administration. These services are needed to make grid resources
self-configuring: adapt to dynamic changes in their environment, self-healing: identify and
resolve problems without disrupting their environment, and self-optimizing: adjust themselves
to perform at a level where they can satisfy users’ constraints.
The Information Services, the last category of OGSA services, are used for obtaining infor-
mation about grid applications, grid resources and services. According to Foster et al. [2005],
information refers to any logged data, and dynamic data and events that reveal the status of
computations, resources and services.
Overall, OGSA services work together to provide a highly secured, controlled and seamless
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environment for executing grid applications.
2.2 Grid Infrastructures
A grid Infrastructure is an environment where heterogeneous resources that reside on different
administrative domains are dynamically shared in a highly controlled manner. Various tools
are available in academic institutions, industries and other organizations for building a grid
infrastructure. In this section, we highlight selected grid infrastructure tools, discuss the Globus
Toolkit [Foster, 2006], which is arguably the most popular grid infrastructure tool, and finally
define the Grid.
Tools like Alechmi, ALiCE, JCGrid, Condor-G, Nimrod/G, Oracle Grid Engine and Xgrid
build a grid infrastructure where only computing power is shared. Alchemi [Luther et al., 2005]
based grid infrastructures coordinate the sharing of computers with Windows OS. ALiCE [Teo
and Wang, 2004] and JCGrid [Bucciarelli, 2012] are Java-based tools that build platform inde-
pendent grid infrastructures. Condor-G [Frey et al., 2002] and Nimrod/G [Abramson et al.,
2000, Buyya et al., 2000] are extended from their respective predecessors, Condor [Litzkow
et al., 1997, Thain et al., 2005] and Nimrod [Abramson et al., 1995], by services that securely
discover, access and manage resources in multiple administrative domains. Condor-G manages
computation based on the mechanisms of its predecessor. Nimord/G [Abramson et al., 2000,
Buyya et al., 2000] manages computation based on computational economy. In Nimrod/G,
users are able to specify the deadline for completing the execution of their application and/or
the price the users are willing to pay for the computation. Open Grid Engine [Ora, 2010]
uses Service Domain Manager software to enable the sharing of computational resources among
multiple administrative domains. In Open Grid Engine, computers with Windows OS, Mac OS
X and Linux OS can be shared. Xgrid [App, 2009] provides an environment where computers
with Mac OS X can be shared. Some works has been done to include non-Mac computers in
Xgrid managed virtual organizations [Cote, 2004, Campbell, 2005].
DSpace, Gfarm, iRODS and OODT are tools for building a grid infrastructure for se-
cure and controlled sharing, management and access of data across multiple collaborators.
DSpace [The DSpace Developer Team, 2011] enables data sharing among collaborators over
the web. Gfarm [Tatebe et al., 2010] based grid infrastructure coordinates local file systems on
computers to enable data sharing. In order to improve I/O performance during the execution
of data-intensive applications, Gfarm ensures that data access is either from local file system or
from the nearby data storage. iRODS [iRODS Website] facilitates policy-based organization,
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sharing, protection, and preservation of up to hundreds of millions of files. It also supports
high-performance network data transfer. iRODS infrastructure can be built on Windows (with-
out logical name-space), Linux, Unix, and Mac computers. OODT [OODT Website] based
grid infrastructure enables collaborative data management and archiving. The infrastructure
enables users to store data, and then search, retrieve and/or analyse the stored data. OODT
is used in projects like the Early Detection Research Network [EDR, 2008], NASA’s Planetary
Data System [Jet, 2010] and the Orbiting Carbon Observatory [Crisp et al., 2003].
GLIDE and Globus are used to build grid infrastructures where multiple types of resources
can be shared. GLIDE [Mattmann et al., 2005], which is the successor of OODT, allows build-
ing a grid infrastructure where both data and computational resources are shared. Globus,
which provides de facto standard for building a grid infrastructure, creates an environment
where computational, data and specialized resources are shared among multiple organizations.
2.2.1 The Globus Toolkit
The Globus Toolkit [Foster, 2006, Globus Website] is a collection of software libraries and
services that provide support for developing grid applications, building grid infrastructures,
and producing other support services. The Globus Toolkit is widely used in many successful
projects like visualizing data at the Southern California Earthquake Center, simulating the
flow of blood through human arteries at Brown University, and managing data at CERN and
the Earth System Grid. The latest version of the Globus Toolkit, GT 5.2, was released on
December 15th, 2011.
Services in the Globus Toolkit follow the principles of OGSA. The core roles of these services
include providing access to and managing computational and data resources, discovering re-
sources that satisfy users’ requirement, monitoring resources for detecting problems, controlling
specialised equipments, transferring large data, authentication, authorization, and delegation.
The libraries and the services of the Globus Toolkit are categorized as job management compo-
nents, data management components, information services components, security components,
and common runtime components.
Job management components are concerned with providing access to resources, and manag-
ing and monitoring executions on those resources. The Grid Resource Allocation and Manage-
ment (GRAM) service, the Work Management Service (WMS), and the Grid Teleoperations
Control Protocol (GTCP) service are job management components. GRAM provides interfaces
for enabling access to, initiating executions on, and managing computational resources that
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are located on remote sites. WMS provides the capability to dynamically generate execution
sandboxes. GTCP provides interfaces for controlling specialised equipments like wave tanks.
Data management components are concerned with providing access to and transferring large
datasets. Data management components of the Globus Toolkit are GridFTP, the Reliable File
Transfer (RFT) service, the Replica Location Service (RLS), the Data Replication Service
(DRS) and Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) tools. GridFTP transfers large data
between local and remote data storages at a high speed securely and reliably. RFT provides
interfaces for reliable administration of more than one GridFTP transfer. RLS looks after
and provides access to information about the storage sites of replicated data. DRS provides
interfaces to manage data replication using GridFTP and RLS. OGSA-DAI provides a set of
tools for accessing and processing relational and XML data.
Information services components, also known as the Monitoring and Discovery System
(MDS), are concerned with providing information about the status and availability of grid
resources. Index service, Trigger service, and WebMDS are information components. Index and
Trigger services are aggregators that monitor resource and collect information. The two services
differ the way they make information accessible. While Index service publishes the collected
information at a specific location, Trigger service is event-driven and thus provides information
only if the collected information satisfies a specific rule. WebMDS presents information via a
web browser.
Security components, also known as the Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI), provide tools
like MyProxy, GSI-OpenSSH and SimpleCA, and services like the Delegation service and the
Community Authorization Service (CAS) for authentication, authorization, message protec-
tion, and delegation. These components provide message-level and transport-level security
based on X.509 credentials. Message-level security is also provided using username-password
combination. MyProxy enables users to securely get credentials whenever the need arises. GSI-
OpenSSH facilitates the use of proxy credentials for single sign-on and file transfer. SimpleCA
implements a certificate authority that issues X.509 certificates to users as well as services of
the Globus Toolkit. The Delegation service is for delegating resources on the user’s behalf and
for credential renewal. CAS enables members of a virtual organization to make fine-grained
policy about the usage of resources that are located in multiple sites.
The last set of components are common runtime components. These components are used
for constructing containers that host Java, C, and Python web services.
Though the Globus Toolkit provides numerous tools for constructing a grid infrastructure,
it is limited with respect to coordinating computations, data transfers and other activities.
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However, higher-level coordination tools, which use the components of the Globus Toolkit for
laying the foundation of the grid infrastructure, can be built. Nimrod/G and Condor-G are
examples of such tools.
2.2.2 The Grid
Grid infrastructure development tools mostly use open and general-purpose but not standard
protocols to build a grid. Due to the lack of standard “InterGrid” protocols, grids that are
built using different technologies do not interoperate. Though Globus Toolkit protocols are
considered de facto standard due to their widely usage, the issue of interoperability is not yet
fully resolved. The grid community, in particular the Open Grid Forum [OGF], is actively
working on the standardization of grid protocols. Once such standardization is completed,
as Foster [2002] pointed out, any interested party that can speak standard grid protocols can
join the Grid in the same way any computing machine that speaks internet protocols can be
on the Internet. The Grid is, therefore, a distributed system that coordinates grid resources,
which are under multiple administrative domains, using open, general-purpose and standard
protocols to provide desired qualities of service.
2.3 Workflow in Grids
Some occasions necessitate the execution of multiple grid applications or services in a certain
sequence, as requested by the user, to achieve a given goal. We refer to the execution of
each grid application or service in such arrangement as a task. The output of a given task
may be used as an input to another task. Some tasks are mutually exclusive, hence they
run in parallel. The rest depend on one or more tasks, hence they run when the tasks on
which they depend on are completed. The partially or fully automated execution of multiple
tasks, where data is transferred between tasks when necessary, to reach the target goal is
known as a Workflow [Hollinsworth, 1994]. By taking into consideration the current state of
scientific workflows, which are described using sophisticated tools rather than complex shell
scripts, and the current context of a grid, where services are increasingly being used to build
its infrastructure, Fox and Gannon [2006] define a Grid Workflow as follows:
“The automation of the processes, which involves the orchestration of a set of grid
services, agents and actors that must be combined together to solve a problem or
to define a new service”.
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Suppose a scientist wishes to render satellite images. In addition to executing the task
that renders images, pre-rendering and post-rendering tasks need to be executed. The pre-
rendering tasks include collecting images from satellite, filtering the images, and moving the
filtered images to an accessible storage. Once the images are stored, they will be rendered.
After rendering is completed, post-rendering tasks, such as data analysis and visualization,
are executed. In this scenario, the grid workflow starts by collecting images from the satellite
and ends by visualizing the rendered images. It is important to note that the scientist should
explicitly specify which tasks are needed to achieve her goal, and in what order the tasks
should be executed. The scientist may use either scripts or grid workflow management tools,
like DAGMan [Couvares et al., 2007] and Taverna [Oinn et al., 2006], to express the dependency
between her tasks.
2.3.1 Types of Grid Workflows
Grid workflows are classified into five groups based on their complexity [Fox and Gannon, 2006]:
i. Linear workflows: This is the least complex workflow. Tasks in this workflow are
executed one after another. When a task is completed, its output will be transferred to
the next task. If the execution time of all tasks in the workflow is small, simple scripts
can be used to describe the workflow.
ii. Acyclic graph workflows: Acyclic graph workflows describe the execution order of
tasks using graphs. The nodes of a graph represent tasks. The edges of a graph represent
the execution order dependency between tasks. Some tasks are independent of other
tasks, while others need to wait for one or more tasks to complete before they can be
executed. Tools like DAGMan [Couvares et al., 2007] are used to describe an acyclic
graph workflow. Since acyclic graph workflows represent the execution order of tasks,
they are sometimes referred to as composition in time.
iii. Cyclic graph workflows: Cyclic graph workflows describe the dataflow dependency
between services or component instances using graphs. It is possible for the services or
component instances to stream data iteratively. Hence, the workflow is represented by
cyclic graphs. The nodes of a cyclic graph represent a service, a component instance or
an abstract model. The edges of a cyclic graph represent the message or the data to be
passed between the nodes. Tools like Taverna [Oinn et al., 2006] are used to describe
Workflow in Grids 21
a cyclic graph workflow. Due to the structuring of the workflow based on dataflow
dependencies, a cyclic graph workflow is also referred to as composition in space.
iv. A workflow of workflows: If the structure of a workflow is too large and/or complex,
describing the workflow using a graph may not be efficient. One way of representing a
large and complex workflow is to decompose the workflow into smaller connected work-
flows, and then use a graph to show the dependency between the smaller workflows.
The nodes and the edges of such graph represent a workflow and the (computation or
data) dependency between the decomposed workflows, respectively. DAGMan and Ke-
pler [Ludscher et al., 2006] allow the construction of a workflow of workflows. As pointed
out by Fox and Gannon [2006], the complexity of workflows may arise due to change
in the workflow during runtime, for instance removing a service (a node) in autonomic
systems for optimization. Thus, mechanisms to intelligently deal with such situations are
needed.
v. Implicit graph workflows: Implicit graph workflows are expressed in terms of desired
outcomes. Any computational and/or data movement can be followed as long as the
intended outcome is achieved.
2.3.2 Grid Workflow Management Systems
Grid Workflow Management Systems are software systems that coordinate the execution of
multiple tasks on a grid infrastructure. These systems enable users to describe the dependency
between the tasks using either plain text (e.g., DAGMan) or visual representation (e.g., Kepler).
DAGMan [Couvares et al., 2007], Askalon [Fahringer et al., 2005], Pegasus [Deelman et al.,
2005], Kepler [Ludscher et al., 2006], Taverna [Oinn et al., 2006], GridAnt [Amin et al., 2004],
Triana [Taylor et al., 2007], and Gridbus workflow [Pandey et al., 2009] are examples of grid
workflow management systems. In this section, we discuss DAGMan and Taverna.
DAGMan (Directed Acyclic Graph Manager) is a software system that manages the exe-
cution order of tasks, which correspond to either computation or data placement, on Condor
infrastructure. While Condor and Stork are responsible for managing computational and data
tasks, respectively, DAGMan ensures that each task is scheduled in an order as specified by
the user. Users describe the dependency between tasks using scripts. DAGMan is suitable to
manage plain and nested acyclic graph workflows. During the execution of a workflow, DAG-
Man records the progress of the computation. This enables users to monitor the execution
Grid Computing vs. Cloud Computing 22
of their workflow from the log files. Similar to Condor and Condor-G, DAGMan is from the
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Taverna is a Java-based workflow management system, from the myGrid Project [myGrid
Website], that provides a domain independent platform to design, build and execute scientific
workflows. Taverna enables users to build a workflow which is composed of services with
iteration, and thus it is suitable to manage cyclic workflows. Taverna provides command-line
tools, and a rich and sophisticated graphical user interface for performing a wide range of
activities, which include describing dependencies between services, validating and debugging
dependencies, compositing multiple workflows, and pausing/resuming and tracking the progress
of a workflow execution. Taverna is widely used in life science applications.
An extensive survey about more than a dozen grid workflow management systems is con-
ducted by Yu and Buyya [2005]. The study compares and contrasts each system based on issues
like workflow design, information retrieval, scheduling, fault tolerance and data movement.
2.4 Grid Computing vs. Cloud Computing
It has been and still is a hot topic, grid computing vs. cloud computing. People are still
stumbling to understand the difference between the two worlds. Blogs, panel discussions (IEEE
e-Science 2010 Conference), and peer-reviewed papers [Foster et al., 2008, Brandic and Dustdar,
2011] are dedicated to clarify what each world promises and delivers.
Both grid computing and cloud computing represent a large-scale distributed computing
paradigm. They have a shared vision and common concerns. The ultimate goal behind these
technologies is minimizing the cost of computing, data access, and data storage. Since both
technologies enable multiple users to access a common pool of resources, they need to deal with
privacy, confidentiality and resource management issues. Though grid computing and cloud
computing are similar because of the paradigm they represent, the vision they share and the
issues they are concerned with, as extensively discussed by Foster et al. [2008], each have their
own business model, architecture, application model, security model, resource management,
and programming model. Of the areas that separate the two technologies, we believe, the core
difference between the two comes from their business models.
Grid computing is about controlled and coordinated dynamic resource sharing among mul-
tiple organizations, while cloud computing [Armbrust et al., 2010] is about providing highly
scalable resources on-demand. In grid computing, the resources that are shared by users are
owned by either the users or the organizations that the users represent; and each resource is
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shared according to the usage policy of its owner. If new users (organizations) wish to access
the resources in a given virtual organization, they are expected to bring new resources into
the virtual organization. This way, the existing members of the virtual organization will have
access to the resources of the new members, and vice versa. In cloud computing, however, an
independent party, such as Amazon [EC2] and Google [Google App Engine], provides resources
to users. All that is required to access resources is a credit card and an email address. Since
users are charged based on their usage, they are free to either increase or decrease their usage at
any time. In cloud computing, resources appear to be ‘infinite’. Thus, no advance reservations
are needed for provisioning.
The President and the CEO of the Open Grid Forum, Craig Lee, while responding to the
untimely publication of the obituary of grid computing, summarised the difference between
the two technologies as “To sum it all up in one phrase - grids are about federation; clouds are
about provisioning”.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, grid computing is introduced. We distinguished between a grid, grid computing
and the Grid. We discussed the grid user concerns requirements that are addressed by grids. We
presented two grid architectures, the Grid Protocol Architecture and the Open Grid Services
Architecture (OGSA). Following this, we defined a grid infrastructure, gave some examples,
and discussed the Globus Toolkit. We then introduced grid workflows, and briefly discussed
workflow management systems. Finally, we presented the similarity and difference between
grid computing and cloud computing.
Chapter 3
Reliability
Reliability is one of the attributes for measuring the degree to which a system can be trusted
to carry out its intended function [Avizienis et al., 2004]. Reliability is a well-studied quality
of a system. Reliability, according to the IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering
Terminology [IEEE, 1990], is
“The ability of a system or component to perform its required functions under
stated conditions for a specified period of time.”
The quantitative definition of Reliability is as follows:
“Software reliability is the probability of failure-free operation of a computer pro-
gram for a specified time in a specified environment.” [Musa et al., 1990, pp. 15],
The reliability of a software and a hardware system is affected by the environment under
which each system operates. However, the principal cause that affects the reliability of each
system is not the same. Design faults in a software system, and physical deterioration in a
hardware system lead to reduced reliability. Despite the difference between the two systems,
Musa [1998, pp. 35−36] argued that one can develop equivalent reliability theory for both
systems. This is why the reliability of a software system can be measured using standard
hardware combinatorial techniques.
3.1 Failure, Error, Fault
Failure, error and fault are dubbed as the “threats” to reliability of a system [Avizienis et al.,
2004]. Despite the significance of these terms in reliability theory, they are sometimes sources
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of confusion. Therefore, we distinguish these terms from each other using the standard IEEE
definitions [IEEE, 1990], and the discussion of Avizienis et al. [2004].
A failure is the behaviour of a system that represents the deviation of the system from
performing its required functions. Avizienis et al. [2004] defined failure as “. . . an event that
occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct service”. An error is the difference
between the observed condition of a system when a failure occurs, and the correct condition
of the system. Avizienis et al. [2004] defined error as the deviation of “. . . at least one (or
more) external state of the system . . . from the correct service state”. A fault is a defect
whose execution triggers an error. Avizienis et al. [2004] defined fault as the “. . . adjudged or
hypothesized cause of an error”. Failure is a user-oriented concept, and fault is a developer-
oriented concept.
Here, we use an example to understand the difference between failure, error and fault.
Suppose a robot should take five steps forward whenever a button is pressed. However, when
the button is pressed, the robot takes only three steps. Since the robot does not move according
to the specification, then pressing the button leads to a failure. The error in this scenario is
the missing two steps. The fault is the line of code where the number of steps of the robot is
incorrectly calculated.
3.2 Reliability Improvement Techniques
Numerous techniques are available to improve the reliability of a system. These techniques are
broadly classified into four groups: fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal, and fault
forecasting [Avizienis et al., 2004]. These techniques are also used to improve other system
quality attributes like availability and safety.
Fault prevention techniques [Avizienis et al., 2004] are concerned with preventing the
introduction of faults into a system. Fault tolerance techniques [IEEE, 1990] enable a system
to perform its required function despite the presence of faults either in the system or in the
environment where the system operates. Fault removal techniques [Avizienis et al., 2004]
aim to remove as many exiting faults of a system as possible. Finally, fault forecasting
techniques [Avizienis et al., 2004] predict existing and future faults of a system, and their
consequences.
Each reliability improvement technique is broad and deserves to be explored further. How-
ever, since the main focus of the thesis is on fault tolerance, we investigate only fault tolerance
techniques in detail.
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3.3 Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance is concerned with enabling a system to complete its function even though the
system and/or the environment where the system operates are faulty. The goal of fault toler-
ance is, in other words, to avoid the failure of a system despite the presence of faults [Jalote,
1994, pp. 7]. According to the IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminol-
ogy [IEEE, 1990], fault tolerance is
“The ability of a system or component to continue normal operation despite the
presence of hardware or software faults.”
We refer to a system that performs its required function despite failure in some of its parts
as a fault tolerant system. In general, any fault tolerant system manages faults in four phases:
error detection, damage confinement and assessment, error recovery, and fault treatment and
continued system service [Jalote, 1994, pp. 8−17].
i. Error detection [Jalote, 1994, pp. 8−14]: The first activity of a fault tolerant system
is to detect an error. Error detection implies the presence of fault either in the sys-
tem or in the environment where the system operates, and the failure of one or more
components of the system. This is why the error detection phase is also known as the
fault/failure detection phase. An error is detected by, for instance, comparing the out-
puts of equivalent system components, checking whether the time constraints are met,
examining the internal structure of data, and checking whether the value of the output of
a component is within an acceptable range. The effectiveness of a fault tolerant system
highly depends on how good the error detection mechanism is. An ideal error detection
mechanism should use the specification not the internal design of the system for detecting
errors, detect all errors that the fault tolerant system intends to handle, never detect a
non-existent error, and have a failure mode independent of the system. In practice, error
detection mechanisms do not fully exhibit the characteristics of the ideal error detection
mechanism.
ii. Damage confinement and assessment [Jalote, 1994, pp. 14]: Once the error is
detected, the next phase is identifying the extent of its damage to the overall system
computation. Since there is a delay between the time the system has failed and the time
the error is detected, the error might propagate to other system components. In addition
to the component from which the error is originated, the computation of other system
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components could be jeopardized. Therefore, the extent of error propagation should be
assessed either dynamically or statically. Dynamic assessment involves examining the
information flow between components. Static assessment assumes the system to have
barriers, beyond which no information flows. For instance, if an error is detected, then
the extent of the damage is confined within two barriers.
iii. Error recovery [Jalote, 1994, pp. 15−16]: Once the error is detected and the extent of
its damage is known, the next phase is to reach an error-free system state. This is achieved
by removing the detected error by using either backward or forward recovery techniques.
Backward error recovery restores the system to a known stable state. Forward error
recovery, on the other hand, takes the computation forward by correcting the damage
that is caused by the error to the overall system computation. If the cause of the error
is a transient fault, a fault that exists for a bounded time, then it is expected that the
fault will be gone by the time the error is successfully removed. On such occasions, no
further fault tolerance management activities, such as fault treatment, are needed.
iv. Fault treatment and continued system service [Jalote, 1994, pp. 16−17]: The
activities in this phase should be carried out if the cause of the error is a permanent
fault, a fault that exists for unlimited duration. Even though the erroneous state of the
system is corrected and the system is restarted from error-free state, if the cause of the
error is a permanent fault, the error will re-occur unless the component which “hosts”
the fault is bypassed. Therefore, in this phase, once the exact location of the fault is
identified, the system will be repaired. System repair involves either not using the faulty
component at all or substituting the faulty component by another component that could
carry out the functions of the faulty component.
All activities in each phase should be done on-line. If there is manual intervention, then
the system is not a fault tolerant system. The computation of a fault tolerant system could
potentially be interrupted, especially when the system is being repaired in the fourth phase.
Nonetheless, upon the completion of the fourth phase, or the third phase if the cause of the error
is a transient fault, the system will continue its computation as if nothing had happened [Jalote,
1994, pp. 16].
Fault Tolerance 28
3.3.1 Fault Tolerance Strategies
A fault tolerance strategy is a technique that a fault tolerant system uses either for error recov-
ery, system repair or minimizing the impact of future failure on the overall system computation.
We discuss widely-used fault tolerance strategies below.
• Restart: This is the simplest fault tolerance strategy. Restart resets a computation
from the beginning when an error is detected. Restart can be applied locally or globally.
Local restarts reset only the computation of system components that are affected by the
error, while global restarts reset the entire computation of the system.
• Checkpointing: Checkpointing [Jalote, 1994, pp. 15] regularly saves the state of a
system computation on a stable storage at predetermined intervals. This strategy is
usually combined with other strategies like roll-back and migration.
• Roll-back Roll-back is used in conjunction with checkpointing. If the state of a system
computation is checkpointed before an error is detected in the computation, then the
computation will be rolled-back to the last stable checkpoint [Jalote, 1994, pp. 15].
• Roll-forward: Roll-forward takes the computation of a failed system forward by correct-
ing the damage that is caused by an error(s) to the overall system computation [Jalote,
1994, pp. 15−16]. Roll-forward is also known as forward error recovery.
• Migration: Migration is combined with checkpointing and roll-back. When an event
that may lead to error is detected in a checkpointed system, then the computation of the
system will be migrated to a new execution environment [Litzkow et al., 1997]. In the new
environment, the computation of the system will be restored from the last checkpoint.
• Rejuvenation: Rejuvenation is concerned with gradually terminating the computation
of a system and then restarting or rolling-back the system immediately at potentially
fault-free state [Huang et al., 1995]. The objective of rejuvenation is to minimize the
impact of transient faults on the computation of a system.
• Replication: Replication is concerned with simultaneously executing multiple identical
replicas of a system [Guerraoui and Schiper, 1997]. Replication serves two purposes: it
almost guarantees at least one of the replicas will complete, and it enables voting based
error detection mechanism by comparing the results of multiple replicas.
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• Redundancy: Redundancy manages failure using primary-backup approach. Each sys-
tem, usually a service or hardware, has a primary replica, and one or more backup repli-
cas. During computation, the primary replica regularly sends its status to the backup
replicas. In the event of the primary replica failure, one of the backup replicas takes
the role of the primary replica. Redundancy is also known as primary-backup replica-
tion [Guerraoui and Schiper, 1997],
• Standby spare: Standby spare uses alternative or standby system components to ensure
the computation of a system ends in success [Jalote, 1994, pp. 16]. If a system component
fails, then it will be replaced by a component that can carry out the functions of the failed
component.
• N-version: In the N -version fault tolerance strategy, the function of a system is im-
plemented using N different methods [Avizienis, 1985]. All versions of the system are
executed simultaneously. Then, the outputs of all or a subset of these executions will be
examined to determine whether the system completes successfully or not.
3.3.2 Classification of Fault Tolerance Strategies
Fault tolerance strategies are broadly classified into reactive and proactive [Huang et al., 1995].
• Reactive fault tolerance strategies attempt to recover a failed system after the failure
occurs. Restart and rollback are reactive fault tolerance strategies.
• Proactive fault tolerance strategies attempt to either minimize or prevent the impact of
future failure on the overall system computation before the failure occurs. Checkpointing,
replication, migration, and N -version are proactive fault tolerance strategies. These
strategies are not executed to recover a failed system: checkpointing the state of a system
minimizes the loss of computation time if the system fails later; replication and N -version
increase the chance of successful system computation by executing multiple instances of
the system, and migration takes the system to a new environment where the system could
potentially complete its execution in success.
Redundancy and standby spare have both reactive and proactive elements. In redundancy,
the backup replicas are executed to tolerate possible future failures. This action is a proactive
technique. However, taking the role of the primary replica by one of the backup replicas is a
reactive technique. This is because such activity occurs after the failure of the primary replica.
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Similarly, in standby spare, incorporating alternative components into the fault tolerant system
is a proactive action; however executing one of the alternatives in place of a failed component
is a reactive action.
3.4 Reliability Prediction
Predicting the reliability of a software system has been studied for quite a while [Moranda, 1975,
Cheung, 1980, Schmidt, 2003, Reussner et al., 2003, Brosch et al., 2011]. A software system
is a collection of logically independent entities, known as components, that perform certain
tasks [IEEE, 1990, Szyperski, 2002]. Components of a system are composed and coordinated
solely via their interfaces or service contracts, which are accessible at run-time and distinguish
required and provided services. Components have replaceable and independently deployable
realizations.
Reliability prediction is concerned with estimating the reliability of a system under the
context of certain usage profile and/or execution environment. The usage profile of a system
describes the input parameters to the components of the system, how frequently each compo-
nent is executed, and the interaction between the components [Reussner et al., 2003, Brosch
et al., 2011]. If a component that is prone to failure is used frequently, for instance, then the
likelihood of system failure increases. In addition to the usage profile, the reliability of a system
is affected by its execution environment. Any external party, hardware or software, which the
system interacts with could potentially cause failure in the system.
For predicting the reliability of a system, the operational behaviour of the system needs
to be represented in a certain way. It is common to model the behaviour of a system using
Markov chains [Cheung, 1980, Reussner et al., 2003, Wang et al., 2006, Cheung et al., 2008] or
UML-like notations [Cortellessa et al., 2002, Brosch et al., 2011]. We refer to a system model
that is primarily designed to predict reliability as a reliability model. If the reliability model of
a system is a Markov chain (Section 3.4.1), then formal reliability analysis is performed using
equations which describe the various behaviours of Markov chains. If the reliability model is
a UML diagram [Booch et al., 2005], then the model is first transformed into an equivalent
formal model, like Markov models, and then the reliability analysis is done using the formal
model. The transformation of a UML-based reliability model to an equivalent formal model
is in large part hidden from the user. Tools, such as PRISM [Kwiatkowska et al., 2011],
Matlab [MathWorks Website] and RADL [Schmidt, 2003, 2007, Peake and Schmidt, 2011],
provide an environment for analysing system reliability.
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Due to the popularity of Markov chains for modelling system reliability and the need to
ultimately transform UML-based models to equivalent formal models, we chose Markov chains
for modelling the behaviour of a fault tolerant grid system in Chapters 5 and 6. Therefore, we
introduce Markov chains to the reader in Section 3.4.1, and then discuss how Markov chains
are used for reliability analysis in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Markov Chains
A Markov chain is a stochastic process that has a discrete state space, and possesses the Markov
property [Stewart, 2009, pp. 193−195].
Definition 3.1 (Stochastic process). A collection of random variables {Xt, t ∈ T} that are
defined on some probability space is called a stochastic process [Stewart, 2009, pp. 194]. The
set T is called the index set or the parameter space of the process, and T ⊆ R. The parameter t
represents time. Xt is the state of the process at time t.
Definition 3.2 (Discrete state space). In a stochastic process {Xn, n ∈ R}, the set of all
possible states creates the state space of the stochastic process. If all states in the state space
are discrete, then the process is called a chain and the state space is called a discrete state
space [Stewart, 2009, pp. 194]. The elements of a discrete state space are identified by natural
numbers. Let S denote a discrete space, S ⊆ N0.
Definition 3.3 (The Markov property). The Markov property [Stewart, 2009, pp. 193] states
that, given the current state of a process, the future state of the process is conditionally
independent of the previous states of the process. The future state of the process depends only
on the current state of the process.
Definition 3.4 (Discrete-Time Markov Chains). A Markov chain in which a transition between
two states occurs or fails to occur at discrete time steps, which are considered to be one
unit apart, is called a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) [Stewart, 2009, pp. 195]. The
parameter space of a DTMC, denoted by T , is discrete, and thus T = {0, 1, 2, . . . }.
A DTMC is, therefore, a stochastic process {Xn, n ∈ N0} that has a discrete state space
S = {s0, s1, s2 . . . }, and satisfies the Markov property. Let Xn = sin denote a DTMC in state
si at time n, thus the Markov property of the DTMC is expressed as follows:
P{Xn+1 = sin+1 |Xn = sin , Xn−1 = sin−1 , . . . , X0 = si0} = P{Xn+1 = sin+1 |Xn = sin} (3.1)
Reliability Prediction 32
Definition 3.5 (Time-Homogeneous Markov Chains). A Markov chain is said to be time-
homogeneous if the transition probability between two states is independent of the time the
transition is started. The transition probability from state si to state sj in a time-homogeneous
Markov chain is expressed as follows:
P{Xn+1 = sjn+1 |Xn = sin} = P{Xn+m+1 = sjn+m+1 |Xn+m = sin+m},
for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . and m ≥ 0
(3.2)
Notation:
• We assume time-homogeneous DTMCs for modelling the behaviour of a fault tolerant
system in Chapters 5 and 6. Therefore, unless otherwise specified, any reference to a
Markov chain is a reference to a time-homogeneous DTMC throughout the thesis.
• Since our models contain a finite number of states, we limit our discussion to Markov
chains with finite state space.
• Hereafter, a state of a Markov chain is identified by a single letter like i instead of by si.
Definition 3.6 (Transition Matrix). The transition probabilities between the states of a
Markov chain are arranged in a matrix. The ijth element of such matrix represents the tran-
sition probability from state i to state j. This matrix is called the transition matrix [Stewart,
2009, pp. 195].
Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain. The ijth element of P is given by
Equation (3.3).
P (i, j) = P{Xn+1 = j|Xn = i} (3.3)
P has the following two properties:
i. The entries in the transition matrix are probabilities. Therefore, 0 ≤ P (i, j) ≤ 1.
ii. Each row in the transition matrix represent the transition probability distribution of a
state in the Markov chain. Therefore, for all i,
∑
all j P (i, j) = 1.
Equation (3.4) shows the transition matrix of a Markov chain with m states, m ≥ 1.
Definition 3.7 (Transition Diagram). A transition diagram [Stewart, 2009, pp. 197] depicts a
Markov chain in a graphic form. The states of the Markov chain are represented by circles with
labels, and the transitions between the states are represented by arrows, which are decorated
with transition probabilities. Figure 3.1 shows equivalent representation of a Markov chain by
a transition matrix and a transition diagram.
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P =

0 1 2 . . . . . . m− 1
0 P(0,0) P(0,1) P(0,2) . . . . . . P(0,m-1)
1 P(1,0) P(1,1) P(1,2) . . . . . . P(1,m-1)
2 P(2,0) P(2,1) P(2,2) . . . . . . P(2,m-1)
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
m− 1 P(m-1,0) P(m-1,1) P(m-1,2) . . . . . . P(m-1,m-1)

(3.4)
P =

0 1 2 3
0 0 0.45 0.35 0.2
1 0.3 0 0 0.7
2 0 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 1

0
3
10.45
0.3
0.70.2
1
2
0.35
1
Figure 3.1: Equivalent Markov chain representation by a transition matrix and a transition
diagram
Definition 3.8 (k-step transition probability). The transition probability of entering state j
from state i after k intermediate transitions is called the k-step transition probability [Stewart,
2009, pp. 204]. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain. P (i, j)(k) is the k-step
transition probability from state i to j, and is shown in Equation (3.5).
P (i, j)(k) = P{Xn+k = j|Xn = i}, for k > 0 (3.5)
P (i, j)(1), or just P (i, j), is called the single-step transition probability.
Example 3.1 (Weather Prediction). Suppose the daily weather pattern of Melbourne is mod-
elled using a Markov chain. The weather in Melbourne has three types, i.e. windy, chilly and
sunny, and we assume each weather type is observed for full day. Therefore, the state space is
S = {windy, chilly, sunny}. The transition matrix, denoted by P , with single-state transition
probabilities is shown in Equation (3.6).
P =

windy chilly sunny
windy 0.25 0.4 0.35
chilly 0.3 0.3 0.4
sunny 0.2 0.05 0.75
 (3.6)
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From P , we observe that a windy day is followed by another windy day with 0.25 probability,
or a chilly day with 0.4 probability, or a sunny day with 0.35 probability. However, what if we
would like to know the probability of the weather to be sunny after two days, given today is
windy? In order to answer questions like this, the Chapman-Kolmogorov Equations are used.
Definition 3.9 (Chapman-Kolmogorov Equations). The Chapman-Kolmogorov equations [Stew-
art, 2009, pp. 202−206] provide a method, shown in Equation (3.7), to compute the k−step
transition probabilities.
P (i, j)(k) =
∑
all r
P{Xl = r|X0 = i} × P{Xk = j|Xl = r}
=
∑
all r
P (i, r)(l) × P (r, j)(k−l), for 0 < l < k
(3.7)
Let P (k) be the transition matrix of a Markov chain after k transitions. The matrix notation
of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations is given in Equation (3.8).
P (k) = P k, for 0 < k (3.8)
Recall our question in Example 3.1, what is the probability of the weather to be sunny after
two days, given today is windy? To answer this question, we set k = 2, and compute P (2). The
result is shown in Equation (3.9). The answer is 0.51.
P (2) =

windy chilly sunny
windy 0.25 0.24 0.51
chilly 0.245 0.23 0.525
sunny 0.22 0.13 0.65
 (3.9)
Definition 3.10 (Transient and Recurrent States). Let F (j, j) be the probability of ever re-
turning to state j after leaving it. If F (j, j) < 1, then state j is called a transient state. If
F (j, j) = 1, then state j is called a recurrent state [Stewart, 2009, pp. 208−209].
There is a non-zero probability for the Markov chain to never to return to a transient state.
Therefore, transient states are visited finite number of times, Equation (3.10). In Figure 3.1,
states 0 and 1 are transient. ∞∑
k=0
P (j, j)(k) <∞ (3.10)
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The Markov chain certainly returns to a recurrent state. Therefore, recurrent states are
visited infinitely often, Equation (3.11). In Figure 3.1, states 2 and 3 are recurrent.
∞∑
k=0
P (j, j)(k) =∞ (3.11)
Definition 3.11 (The Potential Matrix). Consider matrix R. The ijth element of R is the
expected number of times that the Markov chain visits state j, provided that state i is the first
state of the Markov chain. R is called the potential matrix [Stewart, 2009, pp. 218−221].
Suppose T denotes the transition matrix of a Markov chain, and the ijth element of T
denotes the transition probability from transient state i to transient state j, for all transient
states i and j in the Markov chain. The expected number of visits to the transient states of
the Markov chain is computed as shown in Equation (3.12).
R = (I − T )−1 (3.12)
T and R of the Markov chain in Figure 3.1 are given in Equations (3.13) and (3.14).
T =
( 0 1
0 0 0.45
1 0.3 0
)
(3.13)
R =
( 0 1
0 1.16 0.52
1 0.35 1.16
)
(3.14)
Consider R(i, j). If state j is a recurrent state, the expected number of visits to state j
from state i is shown in Equation (3.15).
R(i, j) =
∞, if P (i, j)(k) > 0 and k > 00, otherwise (3.15)
Definition 3.12 (Absorbing States). An absorbing state [Stewart, 2009, pp. 207] is a recurrent
state in which the Markov chain remains forever after the initial visit. Given an absorbing
state i, P (i, i) = 1. In Figure 3.1, states 2 and 3 are absorbing states.
Definition 3.13 (The Absorption Probability Matrix). Consider matrix A. The ijth element
of A is the probability of ever reaching absorbing state j from transient state i. A is called the
absorption probability matrix [Stewart, 2009, pp. 223−226].
Suppose B denotes the transition matrix of a Markov chain, and the ijth element of B
denotes the transition probability from transient state i to absorbing state j, for all transient
states i and all absorbing states j in the Markov chain. The probability of ever reaching an
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absorbing state from transient states of the Markov chain is computed as shown on Equa-
tion (3.16).
A = R×B, for R in Equation (3.12) (3.16)
B and A of the Markov chain in Figure 3.1 are given in Equations (3.17) and (3.18).
B =
( 2 3
0 0.35 0.2
1 0 0.7
)
(3.17)
A =
( 2 3
0 0.4 0.6
1 0.12 0.88
)
(3.18)
3.4.2 Reliability Prediction with Markov Chains
Markov chains are one of the methods for modelling the behaviour of a system. Here, we use a
classical reliability model, which was proposed by Cheung [1980], to discuss how the behaviour
of a system with respect to reliability can be constructed and analysed using Markov chains.
The properties of the Cheung reliability model are given below:
• The reliability model represents the components of a given system by transient states.
For a system with n components, there are n transient states. The execution of the
system commences in the entry state, and ends in the exit state.
• The reliability model has two absorbing states C and F . State C represents successful
execution of the system, while state F represents failure in the execution. If any of the
components fails, the entire system computation is considered as failed.
• The arrow between states represents the direction of the flow of the computation.
• For all states i and j, let Pij be the probability of executing the component in state j
right after the component in state i completes execution, and Ri be the reliability of the
component in state i. The probability of transiting from state i to state j is Pij ×Ri.
• For all states i, since the failure of one component is suffice for the entire system to fail,
there is a transition from state i to state F with the probability of 1−Ri.
• Given an exit state j, the system enters state C from state j with the probability of Rj .
• The reliability of the system is the probability of transiting from the entry state i to
state C in the absorption probability matrix of the reliability model.
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Example 3.2 (The Cheung Reliability Model). Suppose a system has four components, and
the behaviour of this system with respect to reliability is modelled using a Markov chain. The
reliability model of the system, denoted by M , has the properties of the Cheung reliability
model. Figure 3.2 and Equation (3.19) show the transition diagram and the transition matrix
of M , respectively.
0.35 x R1 0.2 x R2
1-R1
0.65 x R1
1-R2
0.8 x R2
1-R0
0.5 x R0
0.5 x R0 R3
1-R3
2 31
F
C0
Figure 3.2: Example: Reliability model
M =

0 1 2 3 F C
0 0.5×R0 0.5×R0 0 0 1−R0 0
1 0 0.65×R1 0.35×R1 0 1−R1 0
2 0 0.8×R2 0 0.2×R2 1−R2 0
3 0 0 0 0 1−R3 R3
F 0 0 0 0 1 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 1
 (3.19)
• The transient states of M are states 0, 1, 2 and 3. States 0 and 3 are the entry and the
exit states, respectively.
• The absorbing states of M are states C and F . The selfloop transition of the absorbing
states is removed, and these states are represented with double circles.
• The reliability of state i is denoted by Ri. For all states i and j, the probability of
executing the component in state j right after the execution of the component in state i
is given with concrete numbers. For example, the probability of transiting from state 1
to state 2 is 0.35×R1.
• All of the transient states of M transit to state F .
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• The successful execution of the system is represented by the transition from state 3 to
state C.
• Let R0 = 0.95, R1 = 0.98, R2 = 0.96 and R3 = 0.99. The reliability of the system,
which is the transition from state 0 to state C in the absorption probability matrix of M ,
is 0.59. The absorption probability matrix of M is shown in Equation (3.20).
A =

F C
0 0.41 0.59
1 0.35 0.65
2 0.31 0.69
3 0.01 0.99
 (3.20)
3.5 Recovery-Oriented Computing
The last reliability topic we introduce the reader to is Recovery-Oriented Computing (ROC).
Despite the topic not being directly related to reliability, ROC focuses on system availability,
the principle behind ROC is valuable and could be used to improve system reliability with
relatively small cost.
Availability is the probability that a system is operational and accessible when it is needed
[IEEE, 1990, Jalote, 1994, pp. 37−38]. Equation (3.21) shows the availability of a system,
which is computed from the mean time to failure (MTTF) and the mean time to repair (MTTR)
of the system.
Availability =
MTTF
MTTF +MTTR
(3.21)
Recovery-Oriented Computing is concerned with increasing the availability of a system by
decreasing the mean time to repair [Patterson et al., 2002, Fox and Patterson, 2005]. As
evidenced by Equation (3.21), the availability of a system can be improved by either increasing
the mean time to failure or decreasing the mean time to repair. The reason for the ROC to
focus on MTTR rather than on MTTF is the belief that “. . . hardware faults, software bugs,
and operator errors are facts to be coped with, not problems to be solved” [Patterson et al.,
2002]. No matter how big MTTF is, system failure is inevitable.
Fast recovery after failure, in addition to increasing system availability, decreases revenue
lost due to downtime. Furthermore, fast recovery reduces total cost of ownership of systems.
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Patterson et al. [2002] argued that, since system administrators spend significant amount
of time repairing systems, being able to repair failed systems quickly decreases the cost of
administration.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, reliability and related topics are presented. We defined reliability; distinguished
between failure, error and fault; and then presented the four techniques for improving the
reliability of a system. The four techniques are fault prevention, fault removal, fault tolerance
and fault forecasting. We then dived deep into fault tolerance. We discussed the four phases
that a fault tolerant system goes through to manage failure. We presented the common fault
tolerance strategies and their classifications, i.e., reactive and proactive. We also showed
fault tolerance strategies, such as redundancy, that have both reactive and proactive aspects.
Following this, we discussed how to predict system reliability, introduced Markov chains, and
presented the Cheung reliability model. Finally, we presented Recovery-Oriented Computing.
Chapter 4
Reliable Grid Software Design
Software architecture was recognised as being one of the fundamental disciplines of software
engineering in the 1990s [Garlan and Shaw, 1994]. This discipline is concerned with high-level
organization of the components of a software system. Such high-level system description allows
study of the behaviour of a system with respect to, for instance, performance, reliability, and
availability [Gokhale et al., 1998, Reussner et al., 2003, Brosch et al., 2011].
Garlan and Shaw [1994] and the IEEE Recommended Practice for Architectural Description
of Software-Intensive Systems [IEEE, 2000] define Software Architecture as follows:
“a collection of computational components—or simply components—together with
a description of the interactions between these components—the connectors”
Garlan and Shaw [1994]
“The fundamental organization of a system embodied in its components, their
relationships to each other, and to the environment, and the principles guiding its
design and evolution.” [IEEE, 2000]
Software architecture is in particular needed in systems in which a large number of compo-
nents are integrated to complete certain tasks. This is because the main design challenges of a
complex system come from neither algorithms nor data structures, but rather from the struc-
turing of the components of the system. Such challenges include, but are not limited to, iden-
tifying components and their interactions, selecting communication and data access protocols,
integrating components in a scalable manner, avoiding performance bottlenecks, and selecting
the right design pattern from available architectural choices [Shaw and Garlan, 1996, pp. 1].
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Architectural
Style
Computational Model Component Connector Invariant Advantages Disadvantages
1. Pipes and
Filters [Garlan
and Shaw, 1994]
A component reads streams of
data, processes the data
incrementally, and then
outputs the (partial) result.
Example: Unix programs,
parsing in traditional compilers
Filters Pipes - Filters are independent units,
and are oblivious about the
identity of other filters;
- The correctness of execution
output is independent of the
order of filters’ incremental
processing
- Understanding the overall
system behaviour is possible
due to the simplicity of filter
composition;
- Adding new filters or
substituting old filters with
new ones is easy,
- Support reuse and concurrent
execution.
- Not good for interactive
programs
- Performance loss if filters
maintain communication
between related streams or
data transmission is based on
the lowest common
denominator protocol.
2. Data
Abstraction
and Object-
Oriented
Organiza-
tion [Garlan
and Shaw, 1994]
A component encapsulates
data and procedures, provides
interfaces though which other
components can invoke its
procedures.
Example: Enterprise
JavaBeans (EJB), CORBA
Objects Function
and
procedure
invocation
- An object manages its
internal structure;
- The internal structure of an
object is not visible to other
objects.
- Changing the internal
structure of an object will not
affect other objects.
- An object must know the
identity of other objects in
order to interact with them
- Change in the identity of an
object necessitates the
modification of all other objects
that interact with the object.
3.
Event-based,
Implicit
Invocation
[Garlan and
Shaw, 1994]
The invocation of a procedure
is associated with a specific
event. When a component
announces an event, all
procedures that are associated
with that event will be invoked.
Example:
Model-View-Controller
Modules
with a set
of events
and
procedures
Procedure
calls, event
and
procedure
call
bindings
- Event announcers are oblivi-
ous about which and how other
modules will be affected by the
announced event
- Reuse. Any module can be
part of the system by
registering to a specific event.
- Replacing a module by
another one does not affect
other modules in the system.
- An event announcer does not
have any control over the order
of procedure invocation, and
does not know when a
procedure is completed.
- Sharing a repository among
modules has performance and
resource handling implications
4. Layered
Systems [Gar-
lan and Shaw,
1994]
Components are placed on top
of each other. A component
provides a service to the
adjacent component above, and
is served by the adjacent
component below.
Example: Grid protocol
architecture, OSI protocol suite
Layers Protocols - Layers interact only with
adjacent layers (top and
bottom).
- Enable to decompose complex
problems, and rearrange in
order of increasing complexity
- Modifying a layer affects only
its adjacent layers.
- Changing the internal
implementation of a layer does
not affect other layers
- Hard to structure systems in
layered style
- Hard to find the right
abstraction. Higher level
functions, when implemented,
may span multiple layers.
Table 4.1: Examples of Architectural Styles
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Some systems have similar types of components, and component interactions—and there-
fore share common architectural design. A family of systems that share a set of components,
connectors, and constraints, which define the interactions among components, is called an
architectural style [Garlan and Shaw, 1994]. In addition to components, connectors and con-
straints, an architectural style is identified by its underlying computational model, invariants,
advantages, disadvantages, and common examples and specializations [Garlan and Shaw, 1994].
Some software systems have heterogeneous architecture, which is composed of more than one
architectural style. Pipes and filters, data abstraction and object-oriented organization, event
based implicit invocation, and layered systems are examples of architectural styles. Table 4.1
summarizes the properties of these architectural styles.
4.1 Dwarfs
A dwarf, also known as a motif [Asanovic et al., 2008], is a high level algorithmic abstraction
that captures the pattern of communication and computation of parallel applications [Asanovic
et al., 2006]. Parallel applications that belong to a specific dwarf have similar structure of
computation and data movement, but possibly different implementations and computations.
Inspired by the work of Phil Colella [Colella, 2004], who identified seven numerical methods for
scientific computing, researchers at the UC Berkeley categorized existing parallel applications
into thirteen dwarfs. The researchers proposed the use of these dwarfs to evaluate future
parallel programming models and hardware architectures instead of traditional benchmarks
such as SPEC (Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation) [SPE] or SPLASH (Stanford
Parallel Applications for Shared Memory) [Woo et al., 1995]. Each dwarf is briefly explained in
Table 4.2, which is based on discussions by Asanovic et al. [2006] and in Dwarf Mine Website.
Note that the word “Grid” in the context of this section refers to a set of lines that cross with
each other to form rectangles.
Some parallel applications are composed of multiple dwarfs [Asanovic et al., 2006]. Route
lookup, for instance, is composed of the Graph Traversal and the Combinational Logic dwarfs.
For an application with multiple dwarfs, the computation is distributed either temporally or
spatially. In temporal distribution, computation is done as a sequence of dwarfs. The dwarfs
are executed one after another, and all available resources are allocated to the currently run-
ning dwarf. In spatial distribution, the dwarfs communicate while running concurrently. On
such scenarios, available resources are divided among the dwarfs. A dwarf could be executed
using both types of distributions, for instance pipeline parallelism in the Combination Logic
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dwarf (Section 6.2.1.1.2).
Table 4.2: The thirteen dwarfs of parallel applications. This table is based on discussions
by Asanovic et al. [2006] and in Dwarf Mine Website.
Dwarf Description Example
1. Dense Linear
Algebra
- Data are dense matrices or vectors in 3 levels: vector-vector,
matrix-vector and matrix-matrix. Row and column data are read
using unit-stride memory accesses and strided accesses, respectively.
Video
compression
2. Sparse Linear
Algebra
- Matrix-based applications with many zeros; data can be compressed
by removing the zero entries for efficient use of storage and bandwidth.
Spring
models
3. Spectral
Methods
- Data are in frequency domain; use multiply butterfly stages; some
stages are local while others are global with all-to-all communication.
Spectral
clustering
4. N-Body
Methods
- Computations depend on interactions between discreet points in a
grid. In particle-particle methods, every point depends on every other
point on the grid; and in hierarchical methods, forces are combined
from many, but not from all, points.
Molecular
dynamics
5. Structured
Grids
- Data are arranged in a regular grid. Points are updated together
using values from their immediate neighbours. Updates could be
in-place, 2 version or alternate like red-black pattern. Has spacial
locality; a subgrid can be executed on a separate processing element.
Finite element
methods
6. Unstructured
Grids
- Data are arranged in a mesh, which is composed of points, edges,
faces and/or volumes. Each mesh element is updated together.
Updating a mesh element necessitates identifying its neighbours and
loading the neighbour’s values. Due to the diversity of mesh elements,
each element should be represented unambiguously.
Belief
propagation
7. MapReduce - MapReduce applications have two sets of computations: map,
processes input data and produces an intermediate data, and reduce,
processes the intermediate data and produces the final output.
Computations are embarrassingly parallel.
NB: Asanovic et al. [2009] reclassified MapReduce as a structural
pattern, rather than a computational pattern.
Google’s search
8. Combinational
Logic
- Carry out simple functions, such as boolean operations, on a large
set of data. Resembles Multiple-Instruction-Single-Data of Flynn’s
Taxonomy [Flynn, 1972]
Route lookup
9. Graph
Traversal
- Main functionality is to walk through elements of a dataset and
inspect the features of the elements. Minimal computations.
Decision trees
continued . . .
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. . . continued
Dwarf Description Example
10. Dynamic
Programming
- Build the optimal solution to a problem from the optimal solutions of
simpler overlapping subproblems.
Query
optimization
11. Backtrack and
Branch-and-
Bound
- The goal is to find a globally optimal solution by searching
intractably large spaces. Divide and conquer is used to partition the
search space, and explore each region independently.
Chess
12. Graphical
Models
- Construct graphs, where the nodes and the edges represent random
variables and conditional dependencies, respectively.
Bayesian
Networks
13. Finite State
Machine
- Consists of a set of states. Computation progresses by transiting from
one state to another. Computations are embarrassingly sequential.
Text
processing
4.2 Bulk Synchronous Parallel Model
Inspired by the von Neumann model of sequential computation, Valiant [1990] proposed the
Bulk Synchronous Parallel (BSP) model, which serves as a bridge between software and hard-
ware, for parallel computation. As the von Newmann model was able to unify the diverse
software and hardware world of sequential computing, the purpose of the BSP model is to
achieve such unity in the world of parallel computing. This way, hardware manufacturers can
focus on developing BSP computers without being concerned about the type of programs that
run on their machines. Likewise, software developers write parallel programs without explicitly
considering the type of hardware on which their program runs, other than the hardware being
a BSP computer.
Valiant [2011] extended the basic BSP model, which does not impose any memory restric-
tions, to include multiple memory and cache levels. Nonetheless, further discussions are based
on the basic BSP model.
A BSP computer has three attributes: components that engage in processing and memory
functions; a router that transports messages between components; and synchronising facilities
that coordinate all or some of the components at a regular interval. In a BSP computer, a
computation is modelled as a sequence of supersteps. Each superstep, as shown in Figure 4.1, is
composed of local computations, global communications and a barrier synchronisation [Valiant,
1990, Skillicorn et al., 1997].
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Local Computations
Global Communicaitons
Barrier Synchronisation
 Virtual Processors 
Figure 4.1: A superstep. This figure is adapted from Skillicorn et al. [1997].
The local computations in a superstep are independent of each other, and therefore can
be executed in any order. During execution, the BSP components use only the data that is
locally available to them. Therefore, before the start of a superstep, the required data for the
local computations should be stored in a place to which the BSP components have access.
Once all of the local computations in a superstep are completed, then the BSP compo-
nents communicate and exchange information, as needed. Each BSP component has incoming
and outgoing messages. In a superstep, if the maximum number of messages that are either
incoming to or outgoing from a BSP component is h, then the communication pattern of the su-
perstep is known as an h-relation. The superstep in Figure 4.1∗ has a 2-relation communication
pattern.
The last element of a superstep is a barrier synchronisation. The barrier synchroniser,
upon the completion of all global communications, makes the data that is needed for the next
superstep available in the local memory of the BSP components.
4.2.1 The BSP Cost Model
The execution time of a BSP program, as shown on Equation (4.1), is the sum of the execution
time of its supersteps. The execution time of a superstep, as shown on Equation (4.2), is
∗Figure 4.1 is reprinted from Scientific Programming, 6, D. Skillicorn, J. Hill, and W. McColl, Questions
And Answers About BSP, 249-274, 1997, with permission from IOS Press.
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constructed from the execution time of the longest local computation, the cost of the global
communication of an h-relation, and the cost of the barrier synchronisation [Skillicorn et al.,
1997].
Let
• S: the total execution time of a BSP program
• si: the execution time of superstep i
• wi,j : the execution time of a local computation j in superstep i
• hi: the h-relation of superstep i
• g: the transmission capacity of the network to deliver data
• b: fixed (amortised) cost of synchronisation
S =
k∑
i=1
si
for k total supersteps in S
(4.1)
si =
n
max
j=1
wi,j + hi × g + b
for n local computations in superstep i
(4.2)
Equation (4.2) shows the standard BSP cost model. However, other cost models are also
available. For example, in Equation (4.3), local computation is merged with the cost of com-
munication. However, Skillicorn et al. [1997] argued that using such finer cost models would
not change the final result by more than a small constant factor.
si =
n
max
j=1
(wi,j , hi,j × g) + b
for n local computations in superstep i, and
hi,j is h-relation of local computation j in superstep i
(4.3)
4.3 Reliable Grid Computing
In a grid, a large number of computational and data resources are dynamically coordinated
to execute large scale projects involving collaborating scientists, high-performance computers,
massive data stores, and large scale scientific instruments. Grids such as those run by CERN
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and other flagship research environments today routinely process terabyte to petabyte-scale
event data. As grid computing enters the mainstream and is applied in internet search, finance,
large-scale engineering design and other domains, key issues like interoperability, security, and
fault tolerance grow in importance. Since the objective of this research is to improve the
reliability of grid applications, further discussions are limited to fault tolerance.
4.3.1 The Need for Fault Tolerance
Failure in grids is arguably inevitable due to
• the heterogeneity and the massive scale of grid resources,
• the distribution of such resources over unreliable networks,
• the complexity of mechanisms that integrate these resources into a seamless utility, and
• the dynamic nature of the grid infrastructure which allows continuous changes to happen.
Hundreds and thousands of machines are coordinated to execute a grid application. Even
when a grid infrastructure is composed of highly reliable resources, which is not always the
case, due to the sheer scale of grid resources, it is highly likely for some of these resources to
fail while a computation is in progress.
Grid resources that are exchanging a bulk of data should be able to establish and maintain
a network session for an extended period of time. For this, many network components are
involved in routing data from the source to destination. Due to the size of the transferred data
and the involvement of many network components, failure during data transmission does not
come as a surprise in grids.
The core grid services play a vital role in enabling highly secure and dynamic sharing of
thousands of heterogeneous resources among multiple collaborators. However, the complexity
of the responsibilities of such services, coupled with the services not being 100% reliable, is yet
another reason for a failure to occur in grids.
In grids, constant change is the norm rather than the exception. Grid resources may join
and leave the resource pool of a virtual organization at any time, or an administrative domain
may change its security policy without notifying any concerned parties. If any of these or
other similar events happen during the execution of a grid application, the execution fails. For
example, if a resource which is assigned to execute an activity of a grid application suddenly
disappears from the resource pool, the application will be waiting forever to get the output of
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that activity. Similarly, if access to specific files is blocked during execution or a major software
upgrade is performed that might cause incompatibility with the current execution, then the
execution will fail.
The cause of failure in grids comes not only from grid resources and services but also from
grid applications themselves. Grid applications are often long running. Since the activities of
a grid application and their execution environment are not necessarily fault free, the longevity
of a grid application execution increases the chance for some of the faults to cause errors before
the execution is completed.
Multiple factors almost make the occurrence of a failure during the execution of a grid
application a practical certainty. Therefore, fault tolerance support is needed to guarantee the
successful completion of a grid application execution in the face of many threats.
4.3.2 The State-of-the-Art
The grid community has proposed various fault tolerance approaches, which are based on
traditional fault tolerance techniques (Section 3.3), to increase the probability of successful
execution of grid applications. Many of these approaches are focused on either improving
the reliability of a single grid application or the reliability of multiple grid applications in a
workflow. Therefore, we broadly classify fault tolerance solutions for grids into two categories:
application/service-based and workflow-based. In Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2, we discuss the
the general direction that is taken to provide fault tolerance support to grid applications in
each category.
4.3.2.1 Application/Service-Based Fault Tolerance Solutions
Checkpointing and replication are popular fault tolerance strategies that are used extensively
for providing fault tolerance support to grid applications and services. These strategies are
used as foundations of many grid-based fault tolerance researches [Silva et al., 2003, Budati
et al., 2007, Nazir et al., 2009, Chtepen et al., 2009]. The difference between these researches
mainly comes from how each research exploits the parameters of the fault tolerance strategies,
such as checkpointing interval and the number of replicas, to achieve highly reliable compu-
tation. Other fault tolerance strategies like N -version [Xu et al., 2008] and restart [Dean and
Ghemawat, 2004] are also used.
Nazir et al. [2009] and Chtepen et al. [2009] proposed adaptive checkpointing to manage
the failure of activities during the execution of a grid application. Both researches, though in a
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different manner, use the performance of grid resources to adjust checkpointing interval. Nazir
et al. [2009] evaluates the performance of a resource based on how often the resource completes
the execution of an activity within the deadline. If a resource is known to be prone to failure,
i.e., the resource does not complete activity execution within the deadline more often than
not, then the activities that are executed on the resource will be checkpointed frequently, and
vice versa.
Chtepen et al. [2009], on the other hand, combines the failure frequency of a resource with
the execution time of an activity to adjust checkpointing interval or determine the need to
checkpoint at runtime. If the resource is either stable or the activity is about to complete, then
the checkpointing interval is increased to minimize checkpointing frequency, and vice versa.
On occasions when the checkpointing interval is fixed, activities are checkpointed only if their
execution environment is considered to be unstable. Otherwise, the checkpointing is skipped.
Chtepen et al. [2009] also proposed adaptive replication. The execution of the replica of an
activity is determined based on the load of the grid infrastructure. If resources are not available
to execute all replicas of an activity, for instance during peak hours, then the execution of some
or all of the replicas will be postponed. .
Earlier works, such as by Li and Mascagni [2003], Silva et al. [2003] and Budati et al. [2007],
also proposed replication-based fault tolerance approaches for grids. Li and Mascagni [2003]
assumed computational grid resources to be unlimited, and thus they proposed replicating
each activity of a grid application n times irrespective of the current status of the execution
environment. However, they acknowledged that using arbitrarily large number of replicas
would not necessarily lead to a better reliability, and the execution of unnecessary replicas
would significantly increase system workload. Therefore, they proposed an analytical model,
which takes into account the performance and the availability of grid resources, to determine
the minimum number of replicas that could satisfy performance requirements.
The replication-based fault tolerance support by Silva et al. [2003], unlike by Li and
Mascagni [2003], does not assume ‘infinite’ grid resources. Once all activities of a grid ap-
plication are allocated an execution environment, each activity is replicated up to a threshold
only if there are idle resources to execute the replicas. This replication approach is similar
to the one proposed by Chtepen et al. [2009], the difference being Chtepen et al. [2009] do
not wait until all activities of the grid application are allocated an execution environment
before replicating activities. All of the replication-based fault tolerance approaches that we
have discussed, when one replica completes successfully, terminate the executions of all other
replicas.
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Chtepen et al. [2009], Li and Mascagni [2003] and Silva et al. [2003] use replication to
guarantee the completion of the execution of an activity. Nevertheless, Budati et al. [2007]
replicate activities not only to increase the chance of completion but also to ensure that the
output of each execution is correct. For this, they combine replication with voting. The
execution of an activity is completed when the required number of replicas reach consensus on
the final result. In this work, the performance of resources is used to determine the number of
required replicas that guarantee correct and timely execution of activities. The performance
of each resource is evaluated by the correctness of the output of activities that the resource
hosted, and the ability of the resource to complete execution within expected time frame.
Xu et al. [2008] took advantage of the opportunity that is presented by the Service-Oriented
Architecture [Papazoglou and Heuvel, 2007] for dynamically locating multiple equivalent ser-
vices, and proposed N -version with voting to manage failure of grid services. For this, they
provide the FT-Grid service that searches multiple equivalent services to achieve a given goal.
The FT-Grid service invokes services that are selected by its client, collects the outputs from
these services, and finally returns the consensus result to the client. Other research work for
managing failure of grid services include by Zhang et al. [2004], Jurgen and Thomas [2008]
and Cesario and Talia [2011]. Zhang et al. [2004] and Cesario and Talia [2011] manage failure
by primary-backup approach, while Jurgen and Thomas [2008] focus on tolerating the failure
of a grid service due to a byzantine fault, a fault that causes the service to behave arbitrarily.
The last research work that we will discuss is concerned with MapReduce applications
from Google Inc. Though Dean and Ghemawat [2004] did not explicitly state whether the
MapReduce applications at Google are executed on a grid infrastructure or not, the work is
highly relevant to our research due to its focus on one of the dwarfs that we will study later
in detail. According to the discussion by Dean and Ghemawat [2004], the failure of map and
reduce activities are tolerated mostly by restart and on occasion by replication. If the execution
environment of map activities fails, all map activities that are allocated to that resource will
be re-executed. Even though some of the map activities may complete before the failure of
their execution environment, they will be re-executed. This is because the output of each
map activity is kept in a local disk, which becomes inaccessible when the resource fails. If the
execution environment of reduce activities fails, on the other hand, only the ones that have
not completed will be restarted. This is because the output of reduce activities are kept in a
global file system. When the majority of the activities are completed, the rest, also knows as
the stragglers, are replicated to speed up their completion. Though the primary purpose of
the replication is not to tolerate failure, it serves a double purpose especially if some of the
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stragglers fail.
4.3.2.2 Workflow-Based Fault Tolerance Solutions
Workflow-based fault tolerance solutions aim to improve the reliability of a grid workflow
execution. Research works by, for example, Hwang and Kesselman [2003], Kandaswamy et al.
[2008] and Zhang et al. [2009] focus on tolerating task failures at the workflow and task levels.
There are also workflow management systems, such as DAGMan, ASKALON, Taverna and
Kepler, that provide fault tolerance support to grid workflows. Below, we discuss representative
research works and workflow management systems that give the overall picture about workflow-
based fault tolerance handling in grids.
The Grid Workflow System framework (Grid-WFS) was proposed by Hwang and Kesselman
[2003] for handling task failures during the execution of acyclic grid workflows. Grid-WFS pro-
vides fault tolerance support using restart, checkpointing, replication, standby spare, N -version
and the combination of these strategies (e.g., replication with restart). The framework also en-
ables users to define what a task failure is in their workflow, which is referred to as user-defined
exception, and how to handle that failure.
Zhang et al. [2009] proposed combining existing scheduling algorithms with replication
and checkpointing to tolerate task failures in an acyclic grid workflow. In this work, tasks
on which other tasks depend are replicated multiple times. The number of replica of each
task is determined by performance and reliability constraints. Upon the completion of a task
execution, the output of the execution is checkpointed. Zhang et al. [2009] also proposed
replicating the entire workflow onto several clusters.
Kandaswamy et al. [2008] introduced a fault tolerance and recovery service (FTR) for
improving the reliability of grid workflows using replication or migration. The decision of
which fault tolerance strategy to use is based on parameters such as estimation of task execution
time on a particular resource, expected queue and data transfer times, deadline and success
constraints of the user, reliability models and availability of core grid services.
DAGMan [Couvares et al., 2007] uses a rescue file to tolerate failure of workflows. During
the execution of a workflow, the status of each task, completed or failed, is recorded. In the
event that the workflow fails, the user is able to recover the workflow using the rescue file.
The rescue file ensures that only the tasks that are failed will be re-executed. Successfully
completed tasks will not be re-executed. DAGMan can be configured in such a way that a
failed task is repeatedly restarted up to a threshold before the status of the task is recorded as
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failed.
ASKALON [Duan et al., 2005] checkpoints the state of the workflow as a whole and all
intermediate data. Therefore, the executions of all tasks are suspended when a workflow is
checkpointed. ASKALON checkpoints a workflow at predefined events, for example, when one
of the tasks in the workflow fails or when a portion of the workflow execution is completed.
In ASKALON, the failure of a task is tolerated by restart, while the failure of the entity that
oversees the execution of the workflow is tolerated by redundancy.
Kepler [Crawl and Altintas, 2008] handles the failure of tasks during the execution of a
workflow in similar manner as exception handling. If a task failure is detected, which is based
on user-defined criteria, the recovery of the failed task is attempted either locally or at a higher
level. Kepler uses restart and standby spare strategies to manage the failure of tasks. Kepler
repeatedly attempts to restart the failed task or initiate the execution of the substitute task
up to a threshold.
Similar to Kepler, Taverna [Oinn et al., 2006] uses restart and standby spare strategies to
manage failure during a workflow execution. Taverna uses multiple restarts, with increasing
delay intervals between restarts, to recover a failed task. If an alternative task is available,
then the failed task will be substituted by its alternative. In Taverna, alternative tasks can be
supplied statically before the execution of the workflow commences or dynamically while the
execution is in progress.
Overall, workflow-based fault tolerance solutions, whether they are proposed by researchers
or they are already part of workflow management systems, mainly apply fault tolerance strate-
gies at the task level. Even the ones that provide workflow-level fault tolerance support also
handle failures at the task level. For instance, ASKALON checkpoints at the workflow-level
but restarts at the task level.
4.3.3 The Gap
Existing fault tolerance solutions offer various techniques for managing failure in grid applica-
tions, and services and workflows. However, these solutions lack one or more of the following
features:
• Architecture consideration. Architecture-based fault tolerance support for grid applica-
tion is not a well-studied subject. Despite the existence of numerous research effort for
providing fault tolerance support in grids, we observe the lack of exploitation of the archi-
tecture of the application to improve reliability. Existing fault tolerance approaches are
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either do not address the type of the grid application for which they are providing fault
tolerance support (e.g., [Nazir et al., 2009]), or explicitly proposed for grid applications
whose activities are embarrassingly parallel (e.g., [Chtepen et al., 2009]).
• Proactive fault tolerance support. Proactive fault tolerance strategies minimize the impact
of the failure of an activity on the overall computation. They are especially useful if the
failure occurs towards the end of a long running computation. Restarting such computa-
tion could be very costly. Although the fault tolerance support that is discussed by Dean
and Ghemawat [2004] considers the architecture of the application, (i.e., MapReduce),
failure of a map or reduce activity is in large part managed by restart.
• Runtime prediction. In cases where proactive fault tolerance strategies are used, existing
approaches do not assess the current status of the computation or the current likelihood
of failure in the execution environment at runtime before executing a proactive strategy.
Instead, the history of grid resources and the load of the system are used in some of the
approaches. Multiple copies of an activity are simultaneously executed, for instance, irre-
spective of the current status of the computation and the execution environment [Hwang
and Kesselman, 2003], if the execution environment is known to be unreliable [Budati
et al., 2007] or if the load of the environment is low [Silva et al., 2003].
• Activity-level fault tolerance support. This is commonly observed among workflow-based
fault tolerance solutions. Recall that the tasks in a grid workflow represent grid appli-
cations or services (Section 2.3). Grid applications are naturally composed of multiple
activities. Therefore, the cost of applying a fault tolerance strategy at the task level
could be very high depending on the number of activities of the grid application, which
is represented by the task, the execution time of each activity, and also the size of the
intermediate output of each activity. In our workflow example in Section 2.3, restarting
the image rendering task is potentially very expensive, especially if the failure occurs after
most of the images are rendered. Since the overhead of workflow-level checkpointing sig-
nificantly increases with the size of the intermediate output of a workflow execution [Duan
et al., 2005], checkpointing the entire computation, as in the case in ASKALON, may
introduce an unacceptably high cost.
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4.3.4 The Solution
Each fault tolerance solution, whether application/service based or workflow based, plays a
significant role in making grids reliable computing environment. However, in light of our
discussion about the limitations of existing fault tolerance approaches in grids, a new com-
plementary approach that addresses these limitations, if possible fully otherwise partially, is
needed:
i. The new approach should systematically consider the architecture of grid applications.
Since there are thousands of grid applications, it is tedious, if not impossible, to consider
the architecture of all grid applications. Therefore, as a compromise, the class of a grid
application should be taken into account to provide architecture-specific fault tolerance
support. The class of a grid application can be determined by examining its commu-
nication and computation pattern. Luckily, based on such criterion, we will have only
thirteen classes of grid applications (Section 4.1).
ii. The new approach should use both proactive and reactive strategies, as needed. Further-
more, proactive fault tolerance strategies should be executed based on runtime prediction.
Other than on occasions when correctness validation is needed [Budati et al., 2007], ex-
ecuting multiple replica of an activity will most certainly waste resources. Though some
claims about grid resources being infinite, for example by Li and Mascagni [2003], this
is simply not the case. Resources are limited and some type of cost is associated with
their usage. Therefore, the fault tolerance approach should make all possible effort to
limit unnecessary resource utilisation. One way of doing this is, instead of using fixed
number of replicas, an activity should be replicated only if the failure of the activity
is imminent. Similar approach is taken by Chtepen et al. [2009] to dynamically omit
unnecessary checkpointing.
iii. The new approach should execute a fault tolerance strategy at the activity level. As
discussed in Section 4.3.3, the workflow-based solutions are penalized with respect to
performance and cost for applying a fault tolerance strategy at the workflow-level, or
at the task level provided that each task is composed of multiple activities. Even if a
grid environment is prone to failure, it does not necessarily mean that significantly many
activities will fail. Therefore, the target should be to limit recovery actions to failed
activities, and proactive actions to activities that are likely to fail.
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Using the above three points as guidelines, we propose a novel fault tolerance approach for
grid applications. We refer to this approach as the Recovery-Aware Components approach.
4.4 Summary
This chapter presents the background theory that is related to design and reliable grid com-
puting. We first defined software architecture. We discussed architectural styles, and then
described four architectural styles in detail. For each architectural style, we presented the
computational model, components, connectors, invariants, advantages, disadvantage and ex-
amples. Following this, we introduced the thirteen dwarfs, highlighted the unique features of
each dwarf, and presented the Bulk Synchronous Parallel (BSP) model. In Section 4.3, the last
section of this chapter, we discussed the need for fault tolerance support in grids, existing fault
tolerance approaches for grids, the limitations of these approaches, and how these limitations
could be addressed. Finally, we briefly introduced our novel fault tolerance approach for grids,
the Recovery-Aware Components approach.
Part II
Recovery-Aware Component-Based
Architecture
“I had a mother who taught me there is no such thing as failure.
It is just a temporary postponement of success.”
- Buddy Ebsen
In this Part, we propose a novel fault tolerance approach, known as the Recovery-Aware Compo-
nents approach, for grids. The Recovery-Aware Components approach is an architecture-based
fault tolerance approach that is concerned with managing failure in a grid application execution
reactively, and proactively—based on runtime prediction, at the activity level. In Chapter 5, we
discuss how the different aspects of the approach are realized in a grid, and formally model the
behaviour of a fault tolerant grid system that realizes the approach. In Chapter 6, we study how
to manipulate the structural, computational and communicational pattern of a grid application
to provide higher reliability improvement. Of the thirteen dwarfs, we study the customization of
the Recovery-Aware Components approach for grid applications whose architecture is classified
as either MapReduce dwarf or Combinational Logic dwarf.
Chapter 5
Recovery-Aware Components
The Recovery-Aware Components (RAC) approach is an architecture-based fault tolerance
approach that is concerned with managing failure in a grid application execution reactively,
and proactively—based on runtime prediction, at the activity level. The RAC approach is
influenced by the principle of Recovery-Oriented Computing, which increases system availabil-
ity and decreases cost of system ownership by decreasing the recovery time of failed systems
(Section 3.5). The RAC approach aims to improve the reliability of a grid application execu-
tion and decrease the overhead of fault tolerance support by managing failure reactively and
proactively at the smallest execution unit of the grid application.
The fundamental principles of the RAC approach are as follows.
i. Faults are identified and impending failures are predicted at runtime.
ii. The impact of the impending failures on the currently running grid application is either
averted or minimized by proactive fault tolerance strategies.
iii. Where impending failures are not predicted or the failure aversion attempt is unsuccessful,
failed activities are recovered by reactive fault tolerance strategies.
iv. Both reactive and proactive strategies are executed at the activity level: recovery actions
are limited to failed activities while proactive actions are limited to activities that are
predicted to fail.
v. The class of a grid application’s architecture is taken into consideration, whenever possi-
ble, to provide customized fault tolerance support.
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Runtime prediction plays an important role to provide a cost effective fault tolerance sup-
port to grid applications. In the RAC approach, a proactive fault tolerance strategy is executed
only if the failure of activities is predicted to be imminent. By limiting the frequency a proac-
tive strategy execution, we expect the overhead of the fault tolerance support to decrease
without compromising reliability.
During a grid application execution, the hosts of the activities of the grid application are
monitored for possible failure. If a host is predicted to fail, then a proactive strategy, such as
checkpointing, migration and replication, is executed to tolerate the failure of the activities on
that host. It is important to note that neither predicting all impending failures nor successfully
averting the predicted ones all the time is a realistic expectation. Despite the pairing of runtime
prediction with a proactive strategy, there is a non-zero probability for some activities to fail.
On such occasions, failed activities are recovered by a reactive strategy like restart.
On occasions when a proactive strategy is successfully executed, the impact of the im-
pending failure is either fully avoided or minimized. For example, if the activities are either
migrated to or replicated on a different host, then the impending failure is fully averted. On
the other hand, if the activities are checkpointed, the activities will fail along with their host.
However, since checkpointed activities are rolled-back to their last stable state, and not started
from the beginning, the impact of the failure is minimized due to the checkpointing strategy.
The RAC approach provides cost-effective fault tolerance support to grid applications by
not only pairing proactive strategies with runtime prediction but also managing failure at the
activity level. Handling failures at the activity level presents an opportunity to confine failure
locality, extent of recovery actions and thus fault tolerance overheads at user-defined granular-
ity. Despite grids being failure prone execution environment, it does not necessarily mean that
significantly many activities of a grid application will fail. Therefore, in the RAC approach, re-
covery actions are confined to failed activities, and proactive actions encompass only activities
that are vulnerable to failure. We refer to a component that encapsulates the functionality of
an activity of a grid application and has an interface through which fault tolerance support can
be projected to the activity as a recovery-aware component. Fault tolerance managers monitor
and interact with activities of grid applications via component interfaces. A grid application
that is composed of recovery-aware components is referred to as a RAC-based grid application.
The RAC approach also provides customized fault tolerance support by manipulating the
structural, computational and communicational pattern of grid applications. Further discus-
sion about customized fault tolerance support is available in Chapter 6.
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5.1 Recovery-Aware Component-Based System
A Recovery-Aware Component-Based System (RACS) is a fault tolerant grid system that real-
izes the RAC approach. A RACS provides fault tolerance support to RAC-based grid applica-
tions. It also provides an experiment testbed for evaluating the reliability of RAC-based grid
applications. Figure 5.1 shows a UML [Booch et al., 2005] component diagram of a RACS refer-
ence architecture, which describes not only the structural relationship between the components
of a RACS but also their mappings into a grid infrastructure. The components of a RACS are
Head Manager, Compute Manager, Predictor, Injector, and Recovery-aware component. The
roles of these components, their interactions, and their deployment on a grid infrastructure are
discussed in subsequent sections.
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Figure 5.1: RACS Reference Architecture
In the RACS reference architecture, a grid infrastructure is depicted as being an execution
environment with one head node and multiple compute nodes. By representing a grid infras-
tructure in this way, we are implying neither the compute nodes are under the management
of the head node nor the compute nodes are homogeneous. The head node represents an en-
tity, such as Xgrid controller, that is in charge of allocating the required grid resources to the
activities of a grid application. A compute node represents any computing grid resource.
5.1.1 Roles
The roles of the components of a RACS are as follows.
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5.1.1.1 Recovery-aware component
A recovery-aware component, as introduced previously, is a normal grid application component
that has an additional interface for controlling some aspects of its fault tolerance affairs.
5.1.1.2 Injector
An injector introduces simulated and real faults into recovery-aware components and their
execution environment. The injector is activated if a RACS is to be used as a fault tolerance
testbed. The scope of fault injection is limited by the required type of failure simulation.
For simulating a host crash, for example, the injector kills all currently running recovery-
aware components on a given compute node. On the other hand, a CPU failure in a multi-core
compute node is simulated by randomly choosing and terminating a recovery-aware component
that is being executed.
5.1.1.3 Predictor
A predictor assesses the health of the currently running grid application and its environment,
and then forecasts impending failures. A prediction has four possible outcomes (the sum of
the probability of the prediction outcomes is 1):
i. True Negative: Failure is not imminent and is predicted to be non-imminent.
ii. False Negative: Failure is imminent but is predicted to be non-imminent.
iii. True Positive: Failure is imminent and is predicted to be imminent.
iv. False Positive: Failure is not imminent but is predicted to be imminent.
5.1.1.4 Compute Manager
A compute manager is responsible for starting predictors and injectors, and deciding when and
how to take action to recover from or proactively prevent failure. The compute manager sets
the frequency of failure prediction and fault injection, and notifies injectors the scope of fault
introduction (simulating node failure vs. CPU failure). When a predictor makes a positive
failure prediction, the compute manager either warns affected recovery-aware components to
take necessary action or executes a proactive fault tolerance strategy on their behalf. The
compute manager expects regular health updates from the recovery-aware components that
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are under its management. If some of the recovery-aware components fail to send health
updates, the compute manager marks those components as failed and executes a reactive fault
tolerance strategy.
5.1.1.5 Head Manager
The head manager is responsible for starting compute managers. It also prepares detailed fault
tolerance policies based on which compute managers make fault tolerance decisions. A fault
tolerance policy includes the types of reactive and proactive strategies to be executed, the fre-
quency of prediction and heart beat monitoring, and other fault tolerance related instructions.
These policies can either be provided during the configuration of the head manager, system
FT policy, or the submission of a grid application for execution, user FT policy.
5.1.2 Interactions
The head manager is the starting point for activating all parties that are involved in making a
grid application fault tolerant. There are different ways to start the head manager: the head
node starts the head manager whenever there is a submission of a RAC-based grid application,
or the application itself directly initializes the head manager. Either way, the head manager
commences execution and starts compute managers. The head manager sends a fault tolerance
policy to the compute managers during their initialization.
Once the initialization of all available compute managers is completed, the grid application
execution starts. During execution, one might choose for compute managers to send infrequent
health updates to the head manager. This way, the head manager will be able to track any
failed compute managers. If a particular compute manager fails to submit its health update,
for example, the head manager assumes the compute manager has failed and attempts to
recover it.
Predictors send warning messages to their respective compute managers when they predict
failure in the near future. Depending on how accurate each predictor is, predictors make false
positive predictions from time to time. This may subsequently lead compute managers to
execute a proactive strategy unnecessarily.
If the injection interval and scope are included in the fault tolerance policy, compute man-
agers pass this information to injectors when they initialize their respective injectors. However,
if the value for these parameters is not provided, injectors use the default values of injection
interval and scope.
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Recovery-aware components register with their local compute manager prior to executing
their main task. If a recovery-aware component fails to register, its manager does not provide
any fault tolerance related service to the component either in the event of failure prediction
or failure of the component. Recovery-aware components send regular health updates to their
local compute manager until their execution is successfully completed or terminated. If the
execution is completed successfully, they notify their local compute manager the end of the
computation so that the manager no longer inspects these recovery-aware components. If a
registered recovery-aware component does not notify the completion of its computation, its
manager will wrongly conclude the component has failed (since health updates are no longer
sent once a computation is completed) and then execute a reactive FT strategy.
5.1.3 Deployment
The head manager resides only on the head node. The primary role of the head manager
is to configure and initialize compute managers when a grid application is submitted to the
head node (see Section 5.1.1.5). The head manager does not have an active role during the
execution of the grid application except when compute managers are required to send health
updates. Thus, we argue, if the head manager fails, using reactive fault tolerance strategies
such as restart is an acceptable way of handling its failure. Nevertheless, if compute managers
need to send health updates, one might choose to place a redundant head manager on the head
node.
On each compute node, there is at most one compute manager, one predictor, and one
injector. A compute manager can oversee recovery-aware components deployed on many com-
pute nodes. Since it is not unusual for a grid application to be executed in more than one
cluster, a compute manager could be assigned to look after all recovery-aware components
that run on a specific cluster. We expect deploying a predictor on each compute node to
be useful since this allows provision of proactive fault tolerance support to all recovery-aware
components. Each available core is allocated a maximum of one recovery-aware component.
5.1.4 The RAC Approach in the Context of Grids
The RAC approach is specifically applicable to the grid context through its design for local
failure management, which addresses issues relating to heterogeneity and dynamic change. The
activities of a grid application are executed on distributed resources, which potentially reside
in multiple organizations. Since one of the key features of a grid is controlled sharing, some
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resources may be off-limit for any purpose, other than regular activity execution, to non-local
grid users. Therefore, it becomes difficult to provide fault tolerance support to activities that
are being executed on such resources. However, such type of problems are bypassed in the RAC
approach. The RAC approach advocates local failure management. As shown on the reference
RACS architecture, Figure 5.1, and also discussed in Section 5.1.1.4, the compute managers
are the ones that will do the heavy lifting, and the expectation is that each organization will
have at least one compute manager. These local managers are, of course, not subjected to the
same condition as the external ones.
5.2 Formal RACS Models
We formally model the global behaviour of a RACS by a finite-state DTMC (see Section 3.4.1).
The RACS model is a parameterised Markov model. The parameterisation of the RACS model
is in line with parameterised contracts and protocols aiming at providing accurate analysis
about reusable components for specific deployment environments [Reussner et al., 2002]. There-
fore, the RACS model is used to predict the reliability improvement a grid application would
gain by adapting the RAC architecture, under various execution scenarios at a higher architec-
tural level. The model is also used to estimate the overhead of such reliability improvement.
The global behaviour of a RACS is defined by the behaviours of individual predictors
and recovery-aware components. In our RACS model, we exclude the behaviour of the head
manager, compute managers and injectors. This is because the roles of the head and the
compute managers are limited to facilitating the fault tolerance support, and therefore they
are idle for the large part of the computation. The compute manager, for example, initiates the
execution of a proactive strategy. Of course, the initialisation takes time; however, we assume
that the time that is needed for such initialisation is significantly less than the execution of the
proactive strategy itself. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we do not include such state in
the RACS model. We followed the same reasoning to exclude the head manager’s initialisation
of compute managers and preparation of a fault tolerance policy. As for the injectors, their
main purpose is to aid experiments, and thus are not the functional part of a RACS.
The current state of all recovery-aware components and predictors together define the
current global state of a RACS. An individual RAC or predictor is in exactly one state at any
given time. A predictor has two states, either it is predicting an impending failure, predict
state, or doing nothing, idle state. A RAC, on the other hand, has seven states: compute,
failed, react, tp avert, fp avert, success and fatal error. When the execution of a RAC is in
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progress, the RAC is said to be in compute state. If the execution ends successfully, then the
RAC is said to be in success state. Otherwise, the RAC is considered to be in failed state.
Whenever a RAC fails, a recovery attempt is made. While the recovery attempt is in progress,
the RAC stays in react state. If the recovery is successful, then the RAC returns to compute
state. Otherwise, the RAC is assumed to fail beyond recovery, and this is called fatal error
state, hereafter referred to as error state. During the execution of a RAC, a positive prediction
will make the RAC be in tp avert state if the prediction is true or fp avert state if the prediction
is false.
In the RACS model, failed and idle states are omitted. A recovery attempt will eventually
be made to recover a failed RAC. Therefore, in the model, this is equivalent to transiting from
failed state to react state with the transition probability of 1. Since such transition will not
affect the reliability analysis, failed state is removed. With regards to idle state, this state
is indirectly represented in the RACS model. If the RACS model is in any state other than
predicting state, then it is effectively in the idle state. Therefore, there no need to explicitly
include the idle state in the RACS model.
5.2.1 Global States
A RACS is modelled based on a strict reliability assumption. The execution of a RAC-based
grid application is successful, i.e., the RACS is in a global success state, only if all of the
recovery-aware components in the application complete their execution. If all uncompleted
recovery-aware components are computing, no predictions are being made, and there are no
failed recovery-aware components, then the system is considered to be in a global compute state.
If any of the recovery-aware components fails, the system is in a global react state. In the react
state, an attempt is made to recover the failed recovery-aware component(s). If the recovery
attempt is successful, then the system will once again be in the compute state. Otherwise,
the system is considered as failed beyond recovery, and this behaviour is referred to as a global
error state. If predictions are being made and there are no failed recovery-aware components,
then the system is said to be in a global predict state. After the prediction, if a proactive fault
tolerance strategy is executed due to true positive prediction, then the system is said to be in
a global tp avert state. However, if the prediction is false positive, then the system is said to
be in a global fp avert state.
The global behaviour of a RACS is formally defined below.
• For every recovery-aware component x in a RACS, the DTMC states for x are labelled
Formal RACS Models 65
as follows: x.e for error state, x.s for success state, x.c for compute state, x.r for react
state, x.t for tp avert state, and x.f for fp avert state.
• For every predictor y in a RACS, the DTMC state for y is labelled as y.p for predict
state.
• Suppose g be a RACS, the DTMC states for g are labelled as follows: g.e for global error
state, g.s for global success state, g.c for global compute state, g.r for global react state,
g.t for global tp avert state, and g.f for global fp avert state. Equation (5.1) defines the
global state interpretation of g.
g =

g.e iff ∃x x.e
g.r iff ∀x ¬x.e ∧ ∃x x.r
g.t iff ∀x ¬x.e ∧ ∀x ¬x.r ∧ ∃x x.t
g.f iff ∀x ¬x.e ∧ ∀x ¬x.r ∧ ∀x ¬x.t ∧ ∃x x.f
g.p iff ∀x ¬x.e ∧ ∀x ¬x.r ∧ ∀x ¬x.t ∧ ∀x ¬x.f ∧ ∃x y.p
g.c iff ∀x ¬x.e ∧ ∀x ¬x.r ∧ ∀x ¬x.t ∧ ∀x ¬x.f ∧ ∀x ¬y.p ∧ ∃x x.c
g.s iff ∀x x.s
(5.1)
5.2.2 The Reactive RACS Model
We first introduce a simple RACS model in which failure is managed by only reactive fault
tolerance strategies. We refer to this model as the Reactive RACS model. The reactive RACS
model has only compute, react, error and success states. Therefore, the global state interpre-
tation of a RACS in Equation (5.1) is updated by Equation (5.2).
g =

g.e iff ∃x x.e
g.r iff ∀x ¬x.e ∧ ∃x x.r
g.c iff ∀x ¬x.e ∧ ∀x ¬x.r ∧ ∃x x.c
g.s iff ∀x x.s
(5.2)
The global behaviour of a reactive RACS is modelled by a parameterised DTMC. The model
is a matrix of rank 4, and is denoted by GR. Figure 5.2 and Equation (5.3) show the transition
diagram and the transition matrix of GR, respectively. On the diagram, solid arrows represent
a parameter entry in the underlying symbolic transition matrix. Non-absorbing states have
exactly one outgoing dashed arrow, representing the symbolic probability (expression) enforcing
that row sums of GR equal 1. The labels of the transition diagram map states and transitions
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to GR. Each state label i : a indicates its index 0 ≤ i < 4 in the transition matrix, and also
an abbreviation a for the full state name: s for success, c for compute, r for react, and
e for error.
σ ρ ε
c ers
Parameters σ, ρ,  ∈ [0, 1]
(i)→ (j) Description
GR(i, j) is a free variable
GR(i, j) = 1−∑k(k 6=j) GR(i, k)
Figure 5.2: The parameterised DTMC of a reactive RACS (GR)

e s c r
e 1 − − −
s − 1 − −
c − σ 1 - σ - ρ ρ
r  − 1 -  −
 (5.3)
The parameters of GR are σ: probability of successful completion, ρ: probability of failure
and : probability of unrecoverable failure, under the given constraint. To be more pre-
cise, the parameterised Markov model is GR(σ, ρ, ) and returns a concrete Markov model
when a concrete combination of probabilities (constants) is substituted for the parameters.
Thus, GR acts as a function from actual parameter values (within the parameter constraints
specified) to concrete a Markov model (with constant probability matrices). For example in
GR(0.0001, 0.00001, 0.001), the grid application has a low termination probability (i.e. long run-
ning) together with a five-nine reliability in its deployment resource context and a three-nine
reliability of recovering from failure.
5.2.2.1 States and Transitions
The functional behaviour of a RAC-based grid application can be considered as a refinement
state machine of compute. With probability σ, the execution of the application completes
successfully in state success. A failure occurs during the execution with probability ρ, and
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this causes the transition of GR from compute to react. If the recovery attempt in react is
successful, then GR returns to compute. Otherwise, with probability , GR terminates with a
catastrophic failure in error.
If a failure occurs during execution, we assume that the fault tolerance management always
gets control on failure and attempts recovery. Hence, there is no direct transition from compute
to error. In a sequential setting, this is not always realistic. A hardware failure, for example,
could end the entire computation including the ability to manage faults. However, for a
distributed grid application, without loss of generality, we assume that failures are recognised,
and at least a recovery attempt is possible, such as bypassing faulty hardware or software.
5.2.2.2 Reliability Prediction
We use GR to predict the reliability of a RAC-based grid application to which a reactive RACS
provides fault tolerance support. The properties of GR are given below:
• compute and react are transient states.
• compute is the entry and the exit state.
• success and error are absorbing states.
• The reliability of the grid application is the transition probability of GR from compute to
success in the underlying absorption probability matrix.
We used MATLAB [MathWorks Website] to symbolically derive the absorption probability
matrix of GR. Equation (5.4) shows the reliability of a reactive RACS, denoted by RelR.
RelR =
σ
σ + × ρ for (σ + × ρ) > 0 (5.4)
5.2.2.3 Overhead
We use GR to estimate the overhead of the fault tolerance management of a reactive RACS.
In the reactive RACS, the overhead comes from executing a reactive strategy. Therefore, the
overhead of a reactive RACS is the product of the total number of times GR visits react
during the course of the grid application execution, and the overhead of a single visit to react.
The total number of visits to react is the transition of GR from compute to react in its
potential matrix.
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Let PR be the potential matrix of GR, and O.r be the overhead of a single visit to react.
Equation (5.5) shows the overhead of a reactive RACS, denoted by OR.
OR = PR(c, r)×O.r (5.5)
5.2.3 The RACS Model
The global behaviour of a RACS is modelled by a parameterised DTMC. The model is a
matrix of rank 12, and is denoted by G. G includes all states of GR and additional states that
represent the proactive extension of GR: p for predict, TN for true negative, FN for false
negative, TP for true positive, and FP for false positive; and intermediate computations:
c1 for compute1, c2 for compute2, and c3 for compute3. Figure 5.3 and Equation (5.6) show
the transition diagram and the transition matrix of G, respectively.
σ ρ ε
π
1 α
θ
ϕ1 ϕ0
τ11
ρ 1
c ers
p
TP
FP
TN
FN c2
c3c1
1
Parameters σ, ρ, , pi, τ 1 , φ1 , φ0 , α, θ ∈ [0, 1]
(i)→ (j) Description
G(i, j) is a free variable
G(i, j) = 1−∑k(k 6=j) G(i, k)
Figure 5.3: The parameterised DTMC of a RACS (G)
The parameters of G extend those of GR by pi: the probability of prediction, τ 1 : the probabil-
ity of true positive prediction, φ1 : the probability of false positive prediction, φ0 : the probability
of false negative prediction, α: the probability of the impending failure not occurring while
proactive strategy execution is in progress, and θ: the probability of successful failure aversion.
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
e s c r p TN FN TP FP c1 c2 c3
e 1 − − − − − − − − − − −
s − 1 − − − − − − − − − −
c − σ 1-σ-pi-ρ ρ pi − − − − − − −
r  − 1- − − − − − − − − −
p − − − − − 1-φ0-τ 1-φ1 φ0 τ 1 φ1 − − −
TN − − − − − − − − − 1 − −
FN − − − ρ − − − − − − 1-ρ −
TP − − − 1-α − − − − − − − α
FP − − − − − − − − − 1 − −
c1 − − 1 − − − − − − − − −
c2 − − − 1 − − − − − − − −
c3 − − θ 1-θ − − − − − − − −

(5.6)
5.2.3.1 States and Transitions
success, compute, react and error states are discussed in Section 5.2.2.1. A RACS makes
prediction in predict. The prediction is either true negative, false negative, true positive
or false positive (Section 5.1.1.3). After each respective prediction, G transits from predict
to true negative with 1- φ0-τ 1- φ1 probability, false negative with φ0 probability, true
positive with τ 1 probability, and false positive with φ1 probability.
In G, normal computation is represented by four states: compute, compute1, compute2,
and compute3. The need to add three more states to represent computation arises due to
the impact of prediction outcomes on subsequent transitions and the memoryless property of
Markov models. When G enters compute state for the first time after visiting predict, the
next transition depends on the most recent prediction outcome. For example, if the prediction
is false negative, the next transition after compute state is react. However, if the prediction
is true negative, G stays in compute state. Since the next transition depends not only on
the current state but also on a previous state, this behaviour violates the Markov property.
The next transition should depend only on the current state, i.e. compute state, not on any
previous state, i.e. any of the prediction outcomes states. Therefore, we add intermediate
compute states to clearly show the subsequent transitions of G after visiting predict without
violating the Markov property. We discuss how the transition proceeds after negative and
positive predictions in Sections 5.2.3.1.1 5.2.3.1.2, respectively.
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5.2.3.1.1 True and False Negative Predictions
When negative failure predictions are made, the fault tolerance management of a RACS will not
intercept the computation of a grid application to execute a fault tolerance strategy. Therefore,
no actual computation occurs in both true negative and false negative states. These
states are there to show how the computation proceeds after either a true or a false negative
prediction is made.
A true negative prediction confirms absence of failure before the next prediction. When a
true negative prediction is made, G transits to compute1with probability 1. Since there is no
impending failure, G then transits to compute with probability 1, i.e., the system by definition
will continue computing.
A false negative prediction confirms the presence of failure before the next prediction. When
such prediction is made, the fault tolerance management of a RACS will not have a chance to
initialise a proactive strategy execution. If the failure occurs right after the prediction, then
G directly transits from false negative to react. Otherwise, G first transits to compute2,
i.e. the computation will continue for a while, and then when the computation fails, G transits
from compute2 to react. Either way, when a false negative prediction is made, G eventually
transits to react with probability φ0 .
5.2.3.1.2 True and False Positive Predictions
Regardless of the correctness of the predictor, if a positive prediction is made, the fault tolerance
management of a RACS intercepts the computation of a grid application and initialises a
proactive strategy execution. The proactive strategy execution is carried out in either true
positive for a correct prediction or false positive for an incorrect prediction.
After a true positive prediction, the impending failure will occur with 1 − α probability
while the proactive strategy is being executed—G(TP, r). If the proactive strategy execution is
completed before the impending failure occurs—G(TP, c3), the impact of the impending failure
on the overall computation will successfully be minimized or averted with θ probability.
Despite the absence of an impending failure, a false positive prediction causes a proactive
strategy execution. Since there is no impending failure, after the completion of a proac-
tive strategy, the transition probability distribution of G is the one after a true positive pre-
diction. Therefore, after a proactive strategy is executed—G(FP, c3), the system continues
computing—G(c3, c).
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5.2.3.2 The Simplified RACS Model
The RACS model provides a detailed information about what the behaviour of a RACS looks
like, in particular after a prediction is made. However, since the main motivation for con-
structing the model is to analyse the reliability improvement a grid application would gain by
adapting the RAC architecture and the overhead of such improvement, this level of detail is
unnecessary. Therefore, some of the states can be removed without affecting the reliability and
cost analyses, provided that their transition probabilities are preserved.
The simplified RACS model is constructed by removing true negative, false negative,
compute1, compute2, and compute3 from G. These states play an important role in clearly
showing the possible transitions of G after a prediction. However, keeping the states in the
model does not add any value for reliability and cost analysis as long as the transitions from
and to these states are preserved. The preservation of the transition probabilities ensures G
and its simplified model give identical reliability and cost analyses.
The simplified RACS model is a parameterised DTMC. The model is a matrix of rank 7, and
is denoted by GS. Note that in order for their names to reflect the behaviour of the RACS when
GS transits to true positive and false positive, the corresponding states are renamed
as tp avert and fp avert, respectively. For the sake of uniformity, i.e. labelling all states
with a single letter, the abbreviations of these states are changed from TP and FP to t and
f, respectively. Figure 5.4 and Equation (5.7) show the transition diagram and the transition
matrix of GS, respectively. In addition to the type of arrows in Figure 5.3, the transition
diagram has a dotted arrow whose transition probability is expression in free variables. The
states of GS are identical to the ones introduced in Section 5.2.1. For pi = 0, GS and GR are
identical.
5.2.3.2.1 Preserving Transition Probabilities
The transition probabilities of the removed states are preserved in GS as follows.
• Suppose a true negative prediction is made. Equation (5.8) shows the probability of GS
to transit from predict to compute.
GS(p, c) =G(p, TN)× G(TN, c1)× G(c1, c)
=(1− φ0 − τ 1 − φ1)× 1× 1
(5.8)
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π
σ ρ ε
ϕ1
τ1
ϕ0
c ers
pf
t1
Parameters σ, ρ, , pi, τ 1 , φ1 , φ0 , α, θ ∈ [0, 1]
(i)→ (j) Description
GS(i, j) is a free variable
GS(i, j) = 1−∑k(k 6=j) GS(i, k)
GS(i, j) is an expression in free variables
Figure 5.4: The parameterised DTMC of a simplified RACS (GS)

e s c r p f t
e 1 − − − − − −
s − 1 − − − − −
c − σ 1-σ-ρ-pi ρ pi − −
r  − 1- − − − −
p − − 1-φ0-τ 1-φ1 φ0 − φ1 τ 1
f − − 1 − − − −
t − − αθ 1− αθ − − −

(5.7)
• Suppose a false negative prediction is made. Equation (5.9) shows the probability of GS
to transit from predict to react.
GS(p, r) =G(p, FN)× (G(FN, r) + G(FN, c2)× G(c2, r))
=φ0 × (ρ+ ((1− ρ)× 1))
=φ0
(5.9)
• Suppose a true positive prediction is made. Equations (5.10) and (5.11) show the prob-
ability of GS to transit from tp avert to compute and react, respectively.
GS(t, c) =G(TP, c3)× G(c3, c)
=α× θ
(5.10)
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GS(t, r) =G(TP, c3)× G(c3, r) + G(TP, r)
=α× (1− θ) + (1− α)
=1− θ × α
(5.11)
• Suppose a false positive prediction is made. Equation (5.12) shows the probability of GS
to transit from fp avert to compute.
GS(f, c) =G(FP, c1)× G(c1, c)
=1× 1
(5.12)
5.2.3.3 Reliability Prediction
We use GS to predict the reliability of a RAC-based grid application to which a RACS provides
fault tolerance support. The properties of GS are given below:
• compute, react, predict, fp avert and tp avert are transient states.
• compute is the entry and the exit state.
• success and error are absorbing states.
• The reliability of the grid application is the transition probability of GS from compute to
success in the underlying absorption probability matrix.
We used MATLAB [MathWorks Website] to symbolically derive the absorption probability
matrix of GS. Equation (5.13) shows the reliability of a RACS, denoted by RelH.
RelH =
σ
x
for x =σ + × ρ+ × φ0 × pi + × pi × τ 1 − α× × pi × θ × τ 1 ,
x >0
(5.13)
5.2.3.4 Overhead
We use GS to estimate the overhead of the fault tolerance management of a RACS. In the
RACS, the overhead comes from executing a reactive strategy, a proactive strategy and making
predictions. Therefore, the overhead of a RACS is the weighted sum of the expected number of
visits from compute to react, predict, tp avert and fp avert. The total number of visits
to each of these states is weighted by the overhead of a single visit to each state. The expected
number of visits are obtained from the potential matrix of GS.
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Let PS be the potential matrix of GS, and O.i be the overhead of a single visit to state i.
Equation (5.14) shows the overhead of a RACS, denoted by OS.
OS = PS(c, r)×O.r + PS(c, p)×O.p
+ PS(c, t)×O.t + PS(c, f)×O.f
(5.14)
5.3 BSP-Based RACS Models
The previous RACS models represent the entire grid application execution by one state, i.e.,
compute. Here, we modify the reactive and the simplified RACS models to provide a high-
level abstraction of a grid application execution according to the principles of Valiant’s BSP
model (Section 4.2). We assume a grid application as being a sequence of supersteps. There-
fore, we refine compute into three states that represent local computation (cl), global commu-
nication (cg), and barrier synchronisation (cb).
5.3.1 The Reactive RACS Model and BSP
We first refine the reactive RACS model (Section 5.2.2) based on the principles of the BSP
model. We refer to the refined reactive RACS as the BSP-based reactive RACS model. The
BSP-based reactive RACS model is a parameterised DTMC. The model is a matrix of rank 8,
and is denoted by GRbsp. In GRbsp, each new compute state (cl, cg, and cb) has a corresponding
react state (rl, rg, and rb). The parameters of GRbsp are σb , ρl , ρg , ρb , l , g , and b .
Figure 5.5 and Equation (5.15) show the transition diagram and the transition matrix of
GRbsp, respectively.
5.3.1.1 States and Transitions
GRbsp transits from cl to rl with probability of ρl in the event of failure in the local computa-
tions, and from cl to cg when all local commutations successfully complete. Once in cg, GRbsp
transits to cb if all communications are carried out with success. Otherwise, with probability
of ρg , GRbsp transits from cg to rg. After transiting to cb, there is ρb chance for GRbsp to
transit to rb. Otherwise, GRbsp return to cl to commence the next superstep. This continues
until all supersteps are successfully completed. Upon successful completion of all supersteps,
GRbsp transits from cb to s with the probability of σb . The transitions between cl and cg, cg
and cb, and cb and cl represent the selfloop compute state transition of GR (see Figure 5.2).
For simplicity, we assume that the failure probability of each component of a superstep
is similar in all supersteps. For instance, the probability of transiting from cl to rl is ρl in
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σ b
ρ l ε l
ρ g
ρ b
ε g
ε b
(i)→ (j) Description
GRbsp(i, j) is a free variable
GRbsp(i, j) = 1−∑k(k 6=j) GRbsp(i, k)
= a transition to the next superstep, and
GRbsp(i, j) = 1−∑k(k 6=j) GRbsp(i, k)
Figure 5.5: A BSP-based reactive RACS model (GRbsp)

e s cl cg cb rl rg rb
e 1 − − − − − − −
s − 1 − − − − − −
cl − − − 1-ρl − ρl − −
cg − − − − 1− ρg − ρg −
cb − σb 1-ρb-σb − − − − ρb
rl l − 1-l − − − − −
rg g − − 1-g − − − −
rb b − − − 1-b − − −

(5.15)
all supersteps. However, one might unfold the current model without difficulty and assign
to the three components of a superstep different transition probabilities in each superstep.
Figure 5.6 shows the BSP-based reactive RACS model of a grid application execution that
has two supersteps. The model transits from cl to rl with the probability of ρl1 and ρl2 in
supersteps 1 and 2, respectively.
5.3.1.2 Reliability Prediction
We use GRbsp to predict the reliability of a RAC-based grid application to which a reactive
RACS provides fault tolerance support. The properties of GRbsp are given below:
• cl, cg, cb, rl, rg and rb are transient states.
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= a transition to the next superstep, and
GRbsp(i, j) = 1−∑k(k 6=j) GRbsp(i, k)
Figure 5.6: Example: a BSP-based reactive RACS model with 2 supersteps
• cl is the entry state and cb is the exit state.
• s and e are absorbing states.
• The reliability of the grid application is the transition probability of GRbsp from cl to s
in the underlying absorption probability matrix.
We used MATLAB [MathWorks Website] to symbolically derive the absorption probability
matrix of GRbsp. Due to the size of the reliability equation, we do not show the equation here.
5.3.1.3 Overhead
We use GRbsp to estimate the overhead of the fault tolerance management of a reactive RACS.
In the reactive RACS, the overhead comes from executing a reactive strategy. Therefore, the
overhead of a reactive RACS is the weighted sum of the expected number of visits from cl to
rl, rg, and rb. The total number of visits to each of these states is weighted by the overhead
of a single visit to each state. The expected number of visits are obtained from the potential
matrix of GRbsp.
Let PRbsp be the potential matrix of GRbsp, and O.i be the overhead of a single visit to
state i. Equation (5.16) shows the overhead of a RACS, denoted by ORbsp.
ORbsp = PRbsp(cl, rl)×O.rl + PRbsp(cl, rg)×O.rg
+ PRbsp(cl, rb)×O.rb
(5.16)
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5.3.2 The RACS Model and BSP
We refine the RACS model (Section 5.2.3.2) based on the principles of the BSP model. The
refined model is called The BSP-based RACS model. The BSP-based RACS model is a pa-
rameterised DTMC. The model is a matrix of rank 17, and is denoted by Gbsp. Gbsp extends
GRbsp by predict, tp avert and fp avert. In Gbsp, each new compute state (cl, cg, and
cb) has a corresponding react state (rl, rg, and rb), predict state (pl, pg and pb), tp avert
(tl, tg or tb) state and fp avert state (fl, fg and fb). The parameters of Gbsp are σb , ρl , ρg ,
ρb , l , g , b , pil , pig , pib , τ 1 , φ1 , φ0 , α and θ. Figure 5.7 shows the transition matrix of Gbsp.
π l
ϕ0
σ b
ρ l ε l
ρ g
ρ b
ε g
ε bcb
cl
cg
rb
rl
rg e
s
pf t
pf t
pf t
ϕ0
ϕ0
ϕ1 τ1
ϕ1 τ1
ϕ1 τ1
π b
π g
1
1
1
(i)→ (j) Description
= a transition to the next superstep, and
Gbsp(i, j) = 1−∑k(k 6=j) Gbsp(i, k)
Figure 5.7: A BSP-based RACS model (Gbsp)
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5.3.2.1 States and Transitions
When a prediction is made, Gbsp transits from the current compute state (cl, cg, or cb) to
corresponding predict state (pl, pg or pb). If the prediction is correct, Gbsp transits from
predict to respective tp avert state (tl, tg or tb). Otherwise, Gbsp transits to respective
fp avert state (fl, fg or fb). The transitions between cl and cg, cg and cb, and cb and cl
represent the selfloop compute state transition of GS (see Figure 5.4).
Gbsp is simplified by the following assumptions:
i. Proactive fault tolerance strategies are provided only for local computation. Thus, failure
prediction is required only when Gbsp is in cl.
ii. Failure in communication and barrier synchronisation is tolerated by only reactive fault
tolerance strategies. Therefore, pg, pb, tg, tb, fg, and fb are removed.
iii. The failure probability of each component of a superstep is similar in all supersteps.
Figure 5.8 and Equation (5.17) show the transition diagram and the transition matrix of
the simplified Gbsp, respectively. The simplified Gbsp is denoted by GSbsp. For pil = 0, GSbsp
and GRbsp are identical.
5.3.2.2 Reliability Prediction
We use GSbsp to predict the reliability of a RAC-based grid application to which a RACS
provides fault tolerance support. The properties of GSbsp are given below:
• cl, rl, pl, fl, tl, cg, rg, cb and rb are transient states.
• cl is the entry state and cb is the exit state.
• s and e are absorbing states.
• The reliability of the grid application is the transition probability of GSbsp from cl to s
in the underlying absorption probability matrix.
We used MATLAB [MathWorks Website] to symbolically derive the absorption probability
matrix of GSbsp. Due to the size of the reliability equation, we do not show the equation here.
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(i)→ (j) Description
GSbsp(i, j) is a free variable
GSbsp(i, j) = 1−∑k(k 6=j) GSbsp(i, k)
GSbsp(i, j) is an expression in free variables
= a transition to the next superstep,
GSbsp(i, j) = 1−∑k(k 6=j) GSbsp(i, k)
Figure 5.8: A simplified BSP-based RACS model (GSbsp)
5.3.2.3 Overhead
We use GS to estimate the overhead of the fault tolerance management of a RACS. In the
RACS, the overhead comes from executing a reactive strategy, a proactive strategy and making
predictions. Therefore, the overhead of a RACS is the weighted sum of the expected number
of visits from cl to rl, rg, rb, fl, tl and pl. The total number of visits to each of these states
is weighted by the overhead of a single visit to each state. The expected number of visits are
obtained from the potential matrix of GSbsp.
Let PSbsp be the potential matrix of GSbsp, and O.i be the overhead of a single visit to
state i. Equation (5.18) shows the overhead of a RACS, denoted by OSbsp.
OSbsp = PSbsp(cl, rl)×O.rl + PSbsp(cl, rg)×O.rg + PSbsp(cl, rb)×O.rb
+ PSbsp(cl, fl)×O.fl + PSbsp(cl, tl)×O.tl + PSbsp(cl, pl)×O.pl
(5.18)
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
e s cl cg cb rl rg rb pl fl tl
e 1 − − − − − − − − − −
s − 1 − − − − − − − − −
cl − − − 1-ρl-pil − ρl − − pil − −
cg − − − − 1-ρg − ρg − − − −
cb − σb 1-σb-ρb − − − − ρb − − −
rl l − 1-l − − − − − − − −
rg g − − 1-g − − − − − − −
rb b − − − 1-b − − − − − −
pl − − 1-φ0-τ 1-φ1 − − φ0 − − − φ1 τ 1
fl − − 1 − − − − − − − −
tl − − αθ − − 1-αθ − − − − −

(5.17)
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed the RAC approach. We then introduced a RACS, a fault tolerant
grid system that realizes the RAC approach. We discussed the RACS based on its conceptual
framework; we presented the roles of the framework’s components, their interactions and their
deployment in a grid infrastructure.
The second half of this chapter is focused on modelling the global behaviour of the RACS
using Discrete Time Markov chains. We first modelled a RACS without prediction and proac-
tive fault tolerance support. Then, we modelled the full behaviour of a RACS. We later refined
these models based on the principles of Valiant’s BSP model. For each model, we have shown
how to compute the reliability of a grid application and the overhead of the fault tolerance
management in a RACS.
Chapter 6
Architecture-Specific RAC
In Chapter 5, we proposed the RAC approach. We discussed all aspects of the RAC approach,
except the exploitation of our knowledge about the behaviour of a grid application execution
to provide better fault tolerance support, in detail. We refer to the RAC approach that does
not take into account the architecture of a grid application as the generic RAC approach.
The generic RAC approach makes minimal assumptions about the architecture (activities
and their interactions) of a grid application. The approach assumes the activities of a grid ap-
plication to be the same for the purpose of fault tolerance management, and be embarrassingly
parallel. The generic RAC based fault tolerance managers treat all activities equally irrespec-
tive of the degree of the impact of their failure on the overall computation. Furthermore,
these managers attempt to recover a failed activity, except on certain circumstances, only if
the activity is independent of all other activities. If the failed activity depends on previously
completed activities, then the activity is usually considered as failed beyond recovery and no
recovery attempt is made. The only exception when such activity can be recovered is if the
failure of the activity is predicted and the state of the activity is successfully checkpointed. On
such an occasion, the failed activity is rolled-back to the last saved state.
The generic RAC approach provides limited fault tolerance support to a grid application
with activities that communicate, and/or in which the failure of each of its activities has vari-
able impact on the overall computation. If there are dependencies between the activities of
the grid application, an additional feature is needed to recover the failure of activities whose
computation depends on other activities. Furthermore, since the failure of an activity on
which other activities depend affects the overall computation more severely than an indepen-
dent activity, activities that have severe impact on reliability should be given extra attention.
Therefore, in order to address the issues in the generic RAC approach, i.e., recovering the
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failure of dependent activities and providing additional care to guarantee the completion of
important activities, one has to understand the interactions between the activities of a grid
application and the significance of the role of each activity with respect to reliability.
Clearly, studying the architecture of all grid applications is impossible, due to, among other
things, time constraints and the impracticality of locating all grid applications. Therefore, as a
compromise, we consider the class of grid applications. For our study, we use the classification
of parallel applications by Asanovic et al. [2006] to provide customized fault tolerance support
to a class of grid applications rather than to a specific grid application. We refer to the RAC
approach that manipulates the class of the architecture of grid applications to provide better
fault tolerance support as the architecture-specific RAC approach.
Asanovic et al. [2006] classified parallel programs into thirteen computational kernels,
known as dwarfs (Section 4.1). Each dwarf has a different kind of parallel coordination, i.e.,
communication and computation pattern. For each coordination, one can assume a different
capability of utilising the parallel structure to increase reliability, and decrease cost of fault
tolerance support. However, the actual reliability gain, cost reduction, and the constraints
under which these can be achieved, if at all, are far from obvious and require some methodical
approach and evaluation.
In this thesis, we study the reliability-overhead tradeoff that is enabled by the architecture-
specific RAC approach for a grid application whose architecture can be classified under either
the MapReduce (Section 6.1) or the Combinational Logic dwarf (Section 6.2). An analysis
of all dwarfs was not feasible in the timeframe and so it was decided early on to focus on
these dwarfs, which are both widely used and supported each on different open-source parallel
platforms.
6.1 MapReduce Dwarf
The MapReduce (MR) dwarf represents parallel applications that are executed in two distinct
phases; all execution units in the first phase are embarrassingly parallel, while the executions
in the second phase involve some communication. Asanovic et al. [2006] defined the MR dwarf
as “. . . the essence is a single function that executes in parallel on independent data sets, with
outputs that are eventually combined to form a single or small number of results.”
The MR architecture is a well-known pattern in the functional programming paradigm
[Field and Harrison, 1988, pp. 48−52]. This architecture is composed of two parameterised
components: map and reduce. An idealized MR reference architecture is given in Figure 6.1.
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The map component accepts a unary function m, and a collection of data type A and size d;
where a0, a1, . . . ad−1 ∈ A, and produces an intermediate collection of data type B; where
b0, b1, . . . bd−1 ∈ B. The map component applies m to each element ai and outputs bi. This is
represented by level l in Figure 6.1. The signatures of m and map are shown below.
m : A→ B
map : m # collection(A)→ collection(B)
The reduce component accepts an associative (possibly commutative) binary function r©
and collection of type B that was returned by map. The reduce component successively
applies r© to combine the collection into a single object C. This is represented by levels [0, l-1]
in Figure 6.1. The signatures of r© and reduce are shown below, where the initial value of C
is null.
r© : B # C → C
reduce : r© # C # collection(B)→ C
. . .
r r
r
r
r
r
r
level l
level l-1
level 1
level 0
barrier. . .
. . .
Figure 6.1: Idealized MapReduce Reference Architecture
Example 6.1 (Counting the occurrences of “jovial”). We use a simple example to illustrate
how the map and reduce components work. In this example, we count the number of occur-
rences of the word “jovial” in a set of files.
• m scans a given file, and outputs the frequency of the word “jovial” in the file. Let F be
a file, and N be the total number of “jovial” in F . The signature of m is shown below.
m : F → N
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Suppose the word “jovial” occurs four times in a file named File1.txt. Thus,
m : File1.txt→ 4
• The map component applies m to a set of files.
map : m # collection(F )→ collection(N)
• After all files are scanned, the reduce component successively applies r© on collection(N)
to get the final sum, denoted by T . When reduce applies r© for the first time, the value
of T is 0. The signature of reduce is shown below.
reduce : r© # T # collection(N)→ T
• r© accepts N and T . Then, r© adds N and T and replaces T with the sum.
r© : N # T → T
Suppose “jovial” occurs 11 times in the first i files, and 8 times in the i+ 1st file. Thus,
r© : 8 # 11→ 19
6.1.1 MapReduce Grid Applications
MapReduce grid applications are grid programs that are composed of map and reduce com-
ponents. These applications are wide-spread and span a variety of domains such as machine
learning, data mining, search, and image and video rendering. Some MR applications are dis-
cussed in Dean et al. [2008], Chen et al. [2009], Pantel et al. [2009], Karimzadehgan et al. [2011],
GM et al. [2011], Suri and Vassilvitskii [2011], Chen et al. [2011], Rui Li et al. [2011] and Logo-
fatu and Dumitrescu [2011]. Google’s search is a notable example of an MR application [Dean
and Ghemawat, 2004].
Recall, that components encapsulate activities, and these activities are protected against
failure by fault tolerance mechanisms outside these components, but gracefully interoperating
with components by appropriate interfaces (Chapter 5). The common feature of MR grid
applications is that these applications are executed in two distinct phases, identified as map and
reduce. All executions in the map phase are embarrassingly parallel. This means, the physically
independent processors that execute separate parallel activities do not need to communicate
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or synchronise. In contrast, the executions in the reduce phase involve some communication.
Embarrassingly parallel grid applications are MR applications without the reduce phase. We
refer to an activity that is executed during the map phase as a map activity, and the reduce
phase as a reduce activity.
The difference among MR grid applications is that each application has its own, possibly
unique, set of map and reduce activities. The degree of complexity of each map and reduce
activity varies from one application to another. For example, in a Monte Carlo simulation, the
map activity can be a random simulation that, depending on the data set or parameters, has
highly variable long execution times. In other contexts, the map activity may simply be a linear
scan through a given document whose execution time depends on the length of the document,
e.g., a small file vs. a very large corpus of documents. Likewise, the reduce activity may be
a simple addition in one case and a complex join in some very large global data structure in
another.
The other important difference among MR grid applications is the way reduce activities
are executed. Reduce activities could be executed sequentially, hierarchically, asynchronously,
or randomly. The order of reduce activities execution has an impact on the performance of the
overall computation. We will now discuss this issue in detail.
6.1.1.1 Parallelism
An idealized execution order of map and reduce activities is shown in Figure 6.1, where all
map activities are executed first (level l), and then their outputs will successively be reduced
by taking logarithmic steps (levels [0, l-1]). In practice, the execution of MR grid applica-
tions on a dynamic grid environment does not necessarily honour the static structure shown in
Figure 6.1. Depending on the number of available resources, the type of messaging implemen-
tation (Hadoop [Had] vs. MPI [The Open MPI Development Team, 2011] vs. Xgrid [Xgr]),
and/or the use of barriers between successive reduction steps, the order of execution activities
could vary from one execution to another.
Map activities are embarrassingly parallel, therefore schedulers will find it easy to schedule
these activities independently. Maximal parallelism among map activities is possible if the
number of available cores, denoted by c, is at at least the same as the number of map activities,
denoted by m. However, if c < m, assuming equal load distribution, each core is allocated m/c
activities. Each core executes its allocated map activities sequentially, and then optionally
reduces their outputs. We refer to the sequential execution of reduce activities by a core to
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combine the outputs of its allocated map activities as a local reduction.
Reduce activities depend on map and previously completed reduce activities. Therefore, it
is not possible to concurrently execute all reduce activities. These activities could be executed
sequentially, hierarchically, or asynchronously. Local reduction is a sequential reduction. Once
all cores complete their respective local reductions, their outputs will be further reduced one
after another. We refer to such reduction as a global sequential reduction. The MPI Reduce
routine is an example of a global sequential reduction.
A hierarchical reduction is similar to what is depicted from level l−1 to level 0 in Figure 6.1.
Once all of the cores complete the execution of map activities and local reductions, the outputs
of the local reductions will be globally reduced in log2c reduction steps. In each reduction
step, maximal parallelism is possible. This is because executing the reduce activities in the
first reduction step requires half of the cores that are used during the execution of the map
activities; and the execution of reduce activities in each subsequent reduction step requires
only half of the cores that are being used in the current reduction step.
The other form of parallelism among the activities of an MR application is achieved by
interleaving the execution of map and reduce activities. If two cores, for instance, complete
the execution of their allocated map activities and local reductions ahead other cores, then
their output can be immediately reduced without having to wait for the other cores to finish
their computations.
6.1.2 The MapReduce-specific RAC Approach
The MapReduce-specific (MR-specific) RAC approach is a RAC approach that provides cus-
tomized fault tolerance support to grid applications whose communication and computation
pattern falls under the MapReduce dwarf. MR-specific fault tolerance managers understand
the role of map and reduce activities, and the dependency between the activities as defined by
the type of parallelism that is used during the computation.
The MR-specific fault tolerance managers know that map activities are embarrassingly
parallel, and the executions of these activities do not depend on the output of previously
completed computations. Therefore, these managers do not need any other information other
than the preferred fault tolerance strategy to handle the (impending) failure of map activities.
The MR-specific fault tolerance managers understand that the execution of a reduce activity
depends on the output of previously completed map or reduce activities. These managers
handle the (impending) failure of a reduce activity in two ways. First, if a reduce activity
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fails, all activities on which the failed activity depends will be re-executed to get the input of
the failed activity. If the re-execution is completed successfully, then the managers restart the
failed activity. Second, the managers save the output of previously completed activities and
meta-data that identifies the activity that produces a given output, on a persistent storage.
If a reduce activity fails or is predicted to fail, then the MR-specific managers access the
required data from the storage to execute either a reactive or a proactive strategy. Since
the checkpointing strategy saves the current state of computation, if the proactive strategy
is checkpointing, the managers do not need the output of previously completed activities.
However, if the proactive strategy is replication, for example, executing a replica of an activity
necessitates access to the input data that is needed for the computation.
Since the MR-specific fault tolerance managers identify the activities in an MR grid appli-
cation as either map or reduce, the managers are able to use various kinds of fault tolerance
strategies to handle the failure of each type of activity. For example, failure in map activities
could be managed using restart while failure in reduce activities is managed by replication;
the number of maximum retries to recover a failed map or reduce activity could be different;
or the number of maximum retries to recover failed reduce activities could be increased as the
overall computation gets closer and closer to completion in a hierarchical reduction.
6.1.3 MR-specific RACS
An MR-specific RACS is a fault tolerant grid system that realizes the MR-specific RAC ap-
proach. The reference architecture of an MR-specific RACS is similar to the one discussed
in Section 5.1. The only difference between a RACS that is introduced in Section 5.1 and
an MR-specific RACS is the head manager and compute managers of the MR-specific RACS
are specifically designed to provide fault tolerance support to MapReduce grid applications.
Since the behaviours of the head manager and compute managers are excluded from the formal
models, the global behaviour of MR-specific RACS is also as explained in Section 5.2.
6.1.3.1 The MR-specific RACS Model
We modify GSbsp, the BSP-based RACS model shown in Figure 5.8, to reflect how an MR
application execution would be carried out on a BSP computer. For such modification, we
make the following simplifying assumptions:
• In the abstraction (and different from the concrete implementation), the execution of all
map activities must be completed before any of the reduce activities begins. Therefore,
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MapReduce application execution is represented by a sequence of two supersteps: map
and reduce.
• Since all map activities are executed locally without requiring any communication, failure
of a map activity is most likely caused by core or memory failure, not communication
failure. Therefore, in the map superstep, the global communication is assumed to be
failure free.
• Reduce activities are considered to be dominated by communication. Therefore, failure
in reduce activities is caused by core, memory failure and communication failure.
• In both map and reduce supersteps, we assume the barrier synchronisation to be failure
free.
The global behaviour of an MR-specific RACS is modelled by a parameterised DTMC. The
model is a matrix of rank 17, and is denoted by GMR. Figure 6.2 shows the transition diagram
of GMR. Except for states e and s, the states in the transition diagram are labelled as xi, where
x is the corresponding state in GSbsp (Section 5.3.2), and i is an initial for the name of the
superstep, i.e. m for a state in the map superstep, and r for a state in the reduce superstep.
For example, clm is a compute state that represents local computations in the map superstep.
The parameters of GMR are ρl , ρg , l , g , pil , τ 1 , φ1 , φ0 , α, and θ.
In the map superstep, GMR transits from clm to cgm if all map activities are successfully
completed. A failure will occur during the execution of map activities with probability of ρl .
This makes GMR transit from clm to rlm. The failed map activities will, with probability of l ,
never recover. During the execution of map activities, a prediction is made with probability
of pil— GMR(clm, plm). The prediction will be positive with probability of τ 1 +φ1 . In such cases,
GMR transits from plm to either tlm or flm, depending on the correctness of the prediction. For
negative predictions, a true negative prediction causes the transition of GMR from plm to clm
while a false negative prediction causes the transition of GMR from plm to rlm (see Section 5.2.3
for a detailed discussion about the behaviour of a RACS after a prediction is made).
In line with assumptions stated in Section 6.1.3, after the successful execution of all map
activities—GMR(clm, cgm), GMR transits to clr with probability of 1. All the states and the
transitions in the map superstep are also present in the reduce superstep. However, the reduce
superstep has an additional state, rgr, along with the state’s outgoing and incoming transitions,
and one more outgoing transition from the barrier synchronisation state, GMR(cbr, clr).
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Figure 6.2: The parameterised DTMC of an MR-specific RACS (GMR)
• Since the execution of reduce activities involves a lot of communication, there is ρg
probability for a failure to occur during communication, and cause the transition of GMR
from cgr to rgr. The failed communication can never be re-established with probability
of g .
• Depending on the type of parallelism, the reduce superstep could be iterated multiple
times—GMR(cbr, clr). For example, in hierarchical reduction, GMR transits from cbr to clr
as many times as log2c−1, where c is the number of cores that executed the map activities,
provided that the overall computation completes successfully.
6.1.3.2 Reliability Prediction
We use GMR to predict the reliability of a MapReduce grid application to which an MR-specific
RACS provides fault tolerance support. The properties of GMR are given below:
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• clm, rlm, plm, flm, tlm, cgm, cbm , clr, rlr, plr, flr, tlr, cgr, rgr and cbr are transient
states.
• clm is the entry state and cbr is the exit state.
• s and e are absorbing states.
• The reliability of the MapReduce grid application is the transition probability of GMR
from clm to s in the underlying absorption probability matrix.
We used MATLAB [MathWorks Website] to symbolically derive the absorption probability
matrix of GMR. Due to the size of the reliability equation, we do not show the equation here.
6.1.3.3 Overhead
We use GMR to estimate the overhead of the fault tolerance management of an MR-specific
RACS. In the MR-specific RACS, the overhead comes from executing a reactive strategy, a
proactive strategy and making predictions. Therefore, the overhead of an MR-specific RACS
is the weighted sum of the expected number of visits from clm to rlm, rlr, rgr, plm, plr, flm,
flr, tlm and tlr. The total number of visits to each of these states is weighted by the overhead
of a single visit to each state. The expected number of visits are obtained from the potential
matrix of GMR.
Let PMR be the potential matrix of GMR, and O.i be the overhead of a single visit to state i.
Equation (6.1) shows the overhead of a RACS, denoted by OMR.
OMR = PMR(clm, rlm)×O.rlm + PMR(clm, rlr)×O.rlr + PMR(clm, rgr)×O.rgr
+ PMR(clm, plm)×O.plm + PMR(clm, plr)×O.plr + PMR(clm, flm)×O.flm
+ PMR(clm, flr)×O.flr + PMR(clm, tlm)×O.tlm + PMR(clm, tlr)×O.tlr
(6.1)
6.1.4 Evaluating the MR-specific RAC approach
We evaluate the reliability-overhead tradeoff that is enabled by the MR-specific RAC approach
to MapReduce grid applications in Chapter 9. The empirical evaluation of the approach is
presented in Section 9.1.1.
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6.2 Combinational Logic Dwarf
Asanovic et al. [2006] defined the Combinational Logic (CL) dwarf as dataflow networks of
functions, where functions are logical and have stored state, more specifically: “Combinational
Logic generally involves performing simple operations on very large amounts of data often
exploiting bit-level parallelism.”
In fact, CL is a well known pattern for digital circuits involving interconnected boolean
functions that process streams of binary data [Wakerly, 2000]. The outputs of these functions
depend only on the current inputs. The dataflow in such computation is represented by logic
gates, a mathematical expression, a truth table, and/or a schematic diagram.
Figure 6.3 shows bit level addition of two binary numbers, denoted by X and Y , using the
Full Adder circuit. For each bit-pair addition, the initial inputs of the circuit are xi, yi, and
a carry in, denoted by zi. The final outputs are the sum of xi, yi and zi, and a carry out. Full
Adder repeats this computation until the last bit-pair of X and Y is added.
XOR2
AND2
XOR1
AND1
X
Y
Carry In
OR3
Sum
Carry Out
(a) Logic Gates
Input Output
X Y Carry In Carry Out Sum
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
...
...
...
...
...
(b) Truth Table
Figure 6.3: Full Adder: CL example in hardware
The functions in Full Adder can be executed in parallel using the principle of Multiple-
Instruction-Single-Data of Flynn’s taxonomy [Flynn, 1972]. Whenever a new bit-pair of X and
Y arrives, XOR1 and AND1 are executed in parallel. Once the computations in XOR1 and AND1
are completed, the outcome of the computations is fed to the next functions; the output of
XOR1 is an input to XOR2 and AND2, and the output of AND1 is an input to OR3. Then, XOR2 and
AND2 will be executed in parallel to produce the sum of the bit-pair, and the input to the last
function, respectively. Finally, OR3 is executed to produce the carry out.
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6.2.1 Combinational Logic Grid Applications
The principles of CL at a hardware parallelism level can be exploited for higher-level software
coordination in grid applications through the CL dwarf. Combinational Logic grid applications
are, therefore, grid programs that are composed of dataflow networks of functions that operate
on streams of very large amounts of data. In CL hardware, binary bits are streamed, whereas
in CL grid applications, streams include bits, numerical figures, satellite images and other rich
datasets. The functions in CL hardware are simple binary operations, while functions in a CL
grid application could be simple like XOR or complex like rendering digital graphics.
CL applications are available in embedded computing, machine learning and databases
[Asanovic et al., 2006]. Examples for CL applications abound, [NIST, 2001, 1999, Peterson
and Brown, 1961, Garotte and Bras, 1995, Wang and Rundensteiner, 2009, Kuntschke et al.,
2006]. Computing Cyclic Redundancy Codes (CRC) and RSA encryption for data integrity and
security. High-performance computing of satellite/radio signal streams for weather forecasting,
environmental modelling or air/border control exhibits the CL pattern. Data streams from
large widely distributed sensor networks, such as RFID, in transport and logistics, or in content-
based routing systems are another example where increasingly vast amounts of real-time data
require parallel processing.
We view CL grid applications as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) of processing steps. A
processing step represents the concurrent execution of mutually exclusive functions. The partial
order of the DAG represents the control and dataflow dependencies, i.e. both synchronisation
and communication. Each vertex in the DAG represents a function, hereafter referred to as a
CL activity. CL activities are connected by streams. The minimal elements of the DAG are
fed by input streams and the maximal elements generate the output streams of the dataflow
network. The dataflow network represents the highest level of coordination abstraction in the
CL pattern.
Figure 6.4 shows the DAG of a CL grid application. The CL grid application, denoted by E,
is our running example. E has three processing steps, two input streams, {I0, I1}, two output
streams, {O5, O6}, and seven CL activities, {a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6}. For each element of the
input streams, computation begins in processing step 1, and ends in processing step 3. When
data arrives via I0 and I1, the CL activities in processing step 1, a0 and a1, begin execution.
The outputs of a0 and a1 are inputs to activities in processing step 2, i.e. a2, a3 and a4.
CL activity a2 depends on both a0 and a1, while a3 and a4 depend only on a1. Upon the
completion of a2, a3 and a4, the outputs of the activities is used to commence the execution
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a6
a4
a0
a3a2
a1
a5
processing step 1
processing step 2
processing step 3
I0 I1
O5 O6
input streams 
output streams 
Figure 6.4: The DAG of a CL grid application E: the minimal elements a0 and a1 form the first
processing step, followed by {a2, a3, a4}, and finally {a5, a6}. The input streams to the DAG are shown
at the top of the figure, the outputs at the bottom. The dependencies (direct partial ordering) between
processing steps are implicitly associated with input and output streams. For example the dependency
a1 → a3 is associated with O1 and I3.
of a5 and a6 in processing step 3. CL activity a5 depends on a2 and a3, while a6 depends on
a3 and a4. The computation ends when a5 and a6 produce O5 and O6, respectively.
6.2.1.1 Parallelism
The execution of a CL grid application involves one or more of the following parallelism types:
Course-Grain, Pipeline, Repeated and Stream. Though two or more parallelism types can be
used during CL application execution, our discussion is focused on the use of a single type of
parallelism at a time.
6.2.1.1.1 Coarse-Grain Parallelism
Course-Grain parallelism is a type of parallelism that facilitates the concurrent execution of
mutually exclusive activities. Such parallelism type is used to execute CL activities in a single
processing step. Table 6.1 shows the execution of E using coarse-grain parallelism. When the
nth data element of I0 and I1 arrives, activities in processing step 1 are concurrently executed
to process the data. This is followed by the concurrent execution of activities in processing
step 2, and then the concurrent execution of activities in processing step 3. Once the output
is produced, the computation is repeated for the n + 1st data element, and for n + 2nd data
element, and so on.
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Table 6.1: The execution of E using coarse-grain parallelism. Activities in each row are executed
in parallel.
Input stream
element
Processing
step
CL Activities CL Superstep
nth 1 a0n , a1n 1
nth 2 a2n , a3n , a4n 2
nth 3 a5n , a6n 3
n+ 1st 1 a0n+1 , a1n+1 4
n+ 1st 2 a2n+1 , a3n+1 , a4n+1 5
n+ 1st 3 a5n+1 , a6n+1 6
...
...
...
...
6.2.1.1.2 Pipeline Parallelism
Pipeline parallelism is a type of parallelism that executes all processing steps of a CL grid
application concurrently, provided that the activities in each processing step work on different
elements of the input stream. This type of parallelism is possible due to the streaming nature
of the CL dataflow network. While CL activities in processing step i are working on the nth
element of the input stream, CL activities in processing step i+1 can already start working on
the n− 1st element of the input stream, CL activities in processing step i+ 2 can already start
working on the n− 2nd element of the input stream, and so on. Table 6.2 shows the execution
of E using pipeline parallelism.
Table 6.2: The execution of E using pipeline parallelism. Activities in each row are executed
in parallel.
Input stream
element
Processing
step 1
Processing step 2
Processing
step 3
CL
Superstep
nth a0n a1n a2n−1 a3n−1 a4n−1 a5n−2 a6n−2 1
n+ 1st a0n+1 a1n+1 a2n a3n a4n a5n−1 a6n−1 2
n+ 2nd a0n+2 a1n+2 a2n+1 a3n+1 a4n+1 a5n a6n 3
n+ 3rd a0n+3 a1n+3 a2n+2 a3n+2 a4n+2 a5n+1 a6n+1 4
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
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6.2.1.1.3 Repeated Parallelism
Repeated parallelism is a type of parallelism that simultaneously processes k sets of input
streams using k identical CL applications. Many practical CL computations exhibit multiple
repeated occurrences of the same CL processing pattern. For example in transport, image
streams of toll gates come from more than one camera. Thus, the streaming of images from
different sections of a freeway will occur in parallel. The subsequent processing of these multiple
image streams can utilise the logical parallelism by repeated parallel processing steps. Therefore,
an independent CL computation can be scheduled to process each image stream. Table 6.3
shows the execution of E using repeated parallelism when there are two sets of input streams.
Since there are two sets of input streams, the activities in each processing step will have
duplicates. For example, in processing step 1, the activities whose input comes from r are a0r
and a1r, while the ones whose input is provided by p are a0p and a1p. Under the assumption
that data size and arrival rate in all k sets of input streams are roughly the same, the execution
of all k CL applications be in the same processing step at any given time. For example, when
the nth element arrives from r and p, then a0rn , a1rn , a0pn and a1pn are concurrently executed.
Table 6.3: The execution of E using repeated parallelism with 2 sets of input streams. Activities
in each row are executed in parallel.
Input
stream
element
Processing
step
Input stream set r Input stream set p
CL
Superstep
nth 1 a0rn , a1rn a0pn , a1pn 1
nth 2 a2rn , a3rn , a4rn a2pn , a3k2n , a4pn 2
nth 3 a5rn , a6rn a5pn , a6pn 3
n+ 1st 1 a0rn+1 , a1rn+1 a0pn+1 , a1pn+1 4
n+ 1st 2 a2rn+1 , a3rn+1 , a4rn+1 a2pn+1 , a3pn+1 , a4pn+1 5
n+ 1st 3 a5rn+1 , a6rn+1 a5pn+1 , a6pn+1 6
...
...
...
...
...
6.2.1.1.4 Stream Parallelism
Stream parallelism is a type of parallelism that divides a single set of input stream into m slices
and executes each slice using m identical CL applications. For stateful CL activities, there are
generally bounds on their history sensitivity. This means, one can divide an input stream into
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successive slices of the same size, such that any two slices can be reordered, while the order
of elements in a slice is significant. In practice, this is done by windows or markers. For
example, in some pattern recognition algorithms the size of a pattern match may be bounded
and an input splitter keeps feeding fixed-length substrings from the input stream to different
buffers used by parallel pattern matchers, starting from successive position j, j + 1, j + 2, etc.
In other algorithms, markers define boundaries where such reordering can occur due to the
independence of the data.
We note the similarity and the difference between stream and repeated parallelism types.
Both exploit the independence of data to provide logical parallelism. The difference between
the two arises in the way the data independence is achieved. In stream parallelism, the data
independence is achieved by dividing a single stream into chunks of data elements. Each chunk
of data is processed simultaneously. In repeated parallelism, data is streamed from multiple
sources. The data from each stream source is computed simultaneously. Since, other than the
way how the data is feed to the system, the style of the computation in both parallelism types
is similar, stream parallelism will not be discussed further.
6.2.1.2 CL supersteps
The type of parallelism, along with the dependency structure (DAG), determines the group
of CL activities that should be executed in parallel. For instance, activities of a single pro-
cessing step are concurrently executed using coarse-grain parallelism, whereas activities of all
processing steps run in parallel using pipeline parallelism. Inspired by the BSP model (see Sec-
tion 4.2), we refer to the concurrent execution of a group of mutually exclusive CL activities
as a CL superstep. See the CL supersteps of E in Tables 6.1-6.3.
Under the following simplifying assumptions, without loss of generality, we view a CL
computation as a sequence of CL supersteps:
• CL activities are relatively uniform in execution time.
• Alternatively, where there is large variation in execution times, the number of activities
in a CL superstep is considerably larger than the number of available cores. This allows
grid schedulers to randomly distribute CL activities to cores giving statistically uniform
global behaviour in execution time.
• Data types are uniform and data sizes are roughly equal. This allows to make reasonably
accurate characterization of the cost of collective communication that involves global
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data transfers, and local peer-to-peer communication.
• If more than one set of input streams are used, which is the case in repeated parallelism,
data arrival rate from all sets of input streams is roughly the same.
6.2.2 The Combinational Logic-specific RAC Approach
The Combinational Logic-specific (CL-specific) RAC approach is a RAC approach that provides
customized fault tolerance support to grid applications whose communication and computa-
tion pattern falls under the Combinational Logic dwarf. CL-specific fault tolerance managers
understand that a CL computation is a sequence of CL supersteps, and thus exploit superstep
barriers to provide improved reliability without a heavy penalty on the cost of the overall com-
putation. Unlike MapReduce grid applications, whose activities are identified either as map
or reduce components, CL grid applications do not have a fixed number of component types.
Therefore, CL-specific managers do not provide component type based fault tolerance support.
CL-specific managers use superstep barriers to save the outputs of CL activities in the
current superstep on a persistent storage. The saved data is used to recover a failed CL
activity. Suppose E is executed using coarse-grain parallelism. When the activities in CL
superstep 1 complete working on the nth data element, the outputs of a0n and a1n are written
in a disk. Then, during the execution of activities in CL superstep 2, suppose a2n fails, and
no proactive strategy is executed to avert the failure. In order to recover a2n , the CL-specific
manager needs to identify the activities on which a2n depends. This is achieved using the DAG
of E. Once the manager identifies the activities on which a2n depends, i.e., a0n and a1n , the
manager retrieves their outputs from the storage and restarts a2n . It is important to note that
if the outputs of completed CL activities on which a failed CL activity depends are not saved,
CL-specific managers will re-execute the failed activity as well as the activities on which the
failed activity depends.
CL managers also use superstep barriers to remove any information that is no longer needed.
The objective of discarding unwanted data is to prevent any potential storage problem. Since
a CL grid application execution involves large streams of data, it is a matter of time before the
available disk fills up if all the data that are saved are left untouched. Suppose E is executed
using coarse-grain parallelism. When the activities in CL superstep 2 complete working on
the nth data element, the CL managers save the outputs of a2n , a3n and a4n and discard any
information about a0n and a1n . An alternative approach to this is to delete all information
that is associated with the computation of an element of an input stream when the compu-
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tation of the element reaches its final stage. As shown in Table 6.1, the processing of the
nth element of the input stream reaches its final stage in CL superstep 3. Therefore, when
the activities in CL superstep 3 complete execution, all data that is saved in relation to CL
activities a0n , a1n , a2n , a3n and a4n will be removed.
If a CL application is executed with coarse-grain parallelism, then CL-specific managers
need to keep track of computational information about one data element. In pipeline paral-
lelism, for a CL application with d processing steps, the managers save information about d
data elements at a time. In the case of repeated parallelism, the amount of information to
be saved depends on the number of the set of input streams. The CL-specific managers keep
such information until the processing of the data elements is either successfully completed or
irrecoverably failed.
6.2.3 CL-specific RACS
A CL-specific RACS is a fault tolerant grid system that realises the CL-specific RAC approach.
The reference architecture of a CL-specific RACS is similar to the one discussed in Section 5.1.
The only difference between a RACS that is introduced in Section 5.1 and a CL-specific RACS
is the head manager and compute managers of the CL-specific RACS are specifically designed
to provide fault tolerance support to CL grid applications. Since the behaviours of the head
manager and compute managers are excluded from the formal models, the global behaviour of
CL-specific RACS is also as explained in Section 5.2.
6.2.3.1 The CL-specific RACS Model
We unfold GSbsp, the BSP-based RACS model shown in Figure 5.8, to represent the execution
of a CL grid application as a sequence of CL supersteps on a BSP computer. In the model,
each CL superstep has
• local computations, which represent the execution of CL activities of the CL superstep,
• global communications, which represent the transfer of outputs of from the CL activities
in the current superstep to the CL activities in the next CL superstep, and
• a barrier synchronisation, which ensures that no computation in the next superstep
commences before the completion of all local computations and global communications
in the current superstep.
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In order to unfold GSbsp, the total number of the CL supersteps during the execution of a
CL grid application should be known. Unfortunately, due to the involvement of data streams
in CL computations, there are infinite CL supersteps. For E, this is shown in Tables 6.1-6.3.
Nonetheless, we observe that, starting from arbitrary CL superstep n, the type of activities in
all CL supersteps that are identified by d× n, for some natural number d, are the same. The
difference between these supersteps is that the activities in each superstep will be working on
different elements of the input stream. In coarse-grain and repeated parallelism, d is the depth
of the DAG of the CL application, while in pipeline parallelism, d = 1. For example, if the
execution of E involves either coarse-grain or repeated parallelism, starting from an arbitrary
CL superstep, every third superstep will contain a similar type of CL activities. This is because
the depth of the DAG of E is three. As shown in Table 6.1, supersteps 1 and 4 contain a0 and
a1, where the activities in the respective supersteps work on the n
th and n + 1st elements of
the input stream. If E is executed using pipeline parallelism, all CL activities are executed in
every CL superstep. This is shown in Table 6.2.
Despite the execution of a CL application having infinite number of CL supersteps, since
similar computation pattern is repeated, it is possible to unfold GSbsp using finite number of
CL supersteps as long as the depth of the DAG of the application and/or the type of parallelism
is known. For example, since we have established that executing E with either coarse-grain
or repeated parallelism is equivalent to executing three unique CL supersteps repeatedly, with
different data element each time, the refined GSbsp that represents such computation will
consist of three CL supersteps. The transition diagram of the refined model is shown in
Figure 6.5. On the other hand, if E is executed with pipeline parallelism, since there is only
one unique CL superstep, no further refinement of GSbsp is needed, as GSbsp already represents
a grid computation with a single superstep.
The transition diagram of the refined GSbsp for any CL application execution, denoted by
GCL, is shown in Figure 6.6.
6.2.3.2 Reliability Prediction
We use GCL to predict the reliability of a RAC-based CL grid application to which a CL-specific
RACS provides fault tolerance support. The properties of GCL are given below:
• cl1, cl2, . . . , cld; rl1, rl2, . . . , rld; pl1, pl2, . . . , pld, fl1, fl2, . . . , fld; tl1, tl2, . . . , tld;
cg1, cg2 . . . , cgd; rg1, rg2, . . . , rgd; cb1, cb2, . . . , cbd; rb1, rb2, . . . , rbd are transient states,
where d is total number of unique CL supersteps.
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Figure 6.5: The transition diagram of the refined GSbsp for E with either coarse-grain or
repeated parallelism.
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Figure 6.6: The parameterised DTMC of a CL-specific RACS (GCL)
• cl1 is the entry state and cbd is the exit state.
• s and e are absorbing states.
• The reliability of the grid application is the transition probability of GCL from cl1 to s
in the underlying absorption probability matrix.
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We used MATLAB [MathWorks Website] to symbolically derive the absorption probability
matrix of GCL. Due to the size of the reliability equation, we do not show the equation here.
6.2.3.3 Overhead
We use GCL to estimate the overhead of the fault tolerance management of a CL-specific RACS.
In the RACS, the overhead comes from executing a reactive strategy, a proactive strategy and
making predictions. Therefore, the overhead of a CL-specific RACS is the weighted sum of the
expected number of visits from cl1 to rlj, rgj, rbj, flj, tlj and plj, for all superstep j. The
total number of visits to each of these states is weighted by the overhead of a single visit to
each state. The expected number of visits are obtained from the potential matrix of GCL.
Let PCL be the potential matrix of GCL, and O.i be the overhead of a single visit to state i.
Equation (6.2) shows the overhead of a CL-specific RACS, denoted by OCL.
OCL =
d∑
j=1
(PCL(cl1, rlj)×O.rlj + PCL(cl1, rgj)×O.rgj + PCL(cl1, rbj)×O.rbj)
+
d∑
j=1
(PCL(cl1, flj)×O.flj + PCL(cl1, tlj)×O.tlj + PCL(cl1, plj)×O.plj)
where d is total number of unique CL supersteps
(6.2)
6.2.4 Evaluating the CL-specific RAC approach
We evaluate the reliability-overhead tradeoff that is enabled by the CL-specific RAC approach
to Combinational Logic grid applications in Chapter 9. The empirical evaluation of the ap-
proach is presented in Section 9.1.2.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, the architecture-specific RAC approach was introduced. We also presented
the generic RAC approach and its limitations. We precisely characterised MR and CL grid
applications. Along with the characterisation of MR applications, we discussed local reductions,
global sequential reductions, hierarchical reduction and interleaving parallelism. Likewise, in
CL, we discussed coarse-grain, pipeline, repeated and stream parallelism. We also discussed
how to manipulate the architecture of MR and CL application to provide better fault tolerance
support via the MR-specific and CL-specific RAC approaches, respectively. Further, we showed
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that, along with reliability prediction and overhead equations, the adaptation of the BSP-based
RACS model to accurately represent the MR-specific RACS and the CL-specific RACS.
Part III
Evaluation
Friend to Groucho Marx: “Life is difficult!”
Marx to Friend: “Compared to what?”
In Part II, the generic and the architecture-specific RAC approaches were introduced. We stud-
ied how to provide customized fault tolerance support to MapReduce (MR) and Combinational
Logic (CL) grid applications in-depth. We now evaluate the RAC approach with respect to re-
liability and overhead. We first describe our experiment testbed in Chapter 7, and then present
our experiment design in Chapter 8. In Chapter 9, we report the reliability-overhead tradeoffs
that are enabled by the generic, the MR-specific and the CL-specific RAC architectures, and
show how these tradeoffs are affected by the choice of a fault tolerance strategy, the parameters
of the selected fault tolerance strategy, and the prediction interval and accuracy. Our evaluation
is based on simulations and real runs.
Chapter 7
Experiment Testbed
We designed an experiment testbed to answer our research questions (Section 1.1). The testbed
provides a platform to evaluate the reliability-overhead tradeoff of the generic, the MR-specific
and the CL-specific RAC architectures, and to analyse the sensitivity of such tradeoffs to
prediction accuracy, the choice of a fault tolerance strategy, and the parameters of the selected
fault tolerance strategy. In the testbed, each RAC architecture can be paired with restart,
checkpointing-rollback or replication fault tolerance strategy.
The testbed executes a grid application in either virtual-time or real-time. During such
execution, the testbed provides simulated fault tolerance support, which is based on the princi-
ples of the RAC approach, to the grid application. When the execution of the grid application
is completed, the testbed outputs simulated reliability, simulated execution time, which is the
real time that would have been elapsed from the start to end of the computation, and simulated
overall cost, which is the total CPU time that would have been consumed by the computation.
Suppose a computation has two embarrassingly parallel activities, which each runs for three
seconds. Assuming the two activities are executed concurrently, the total execution time of the
computation is three seconds, while the cost of the computation is six seconds.
The experiment testbed is parameterised in order to allow the user to explore a repre-
sentative set of scenarios reflecting the space of all possible grid fault tolerance scenarios.
Not all input parameters of the testbed are used in every experiment run. The use of a
parameter depends on the type of the grid application to which fault tolerance support is pro-
vided (MapReduce or Combinational Logic), and the required type of fault tolerance support
(prediction-based, reactive-only, proactive-only, and/or hybrid).
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Table 7.1: Parameter table
Type Name Values Experiments Variables
Basic
Type of execution virtual-time,
real-time
Shared
parameters in all
experiments
Controlled∗
Failure seed Z
Recovery seed Z
Experiment size Z+
Grid
Infrastructure
No. nodes Z+
No. cores per node Z+
Grid
Application
Global communication overhead Q+
Barrier synchronisation overhead Q+
Probability of activity failure [0, 1]
Type of global reduction sequential,
hierarchical Parameters used
only in MR
experiments
No. map activities Z+
Map activity execution time Q+
Reduce activity execution time Q+
CL activity execution time Q+
Parameters
used only in CL
experiments
Dependency structure text file
Type of parallelism pipeline,
course-grain,
repeated
No. sets of input streams Z+
No. stream elements Z+
No. maximum retry Z+
Shared
parameters in all
experiments
Fault
Tolerance
Management
Type of RAC architecture generic,
MR-specific,
CL-specific
Independent†
Type of fault tolerance strategy restart,
replication,
checkpointing-
rollback
Probability of unrecoverable failure [0, 1]
Probability of false negatives [0, 1]
Prediction
Based
Probability of false positives [0, 1]
Prediction interval Q+
Prediction overhead Q+
Replica overhead Q+ Replication
Checkpointing cost Q+
Checkpointing
Rollback cost Q+
Restart overhead Q+ Restart
∗ A variable whose value is held constant in all equivalent experiments.
† A variable whose value is varied in equivalent experiments.
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7.1 Parameters
The parameters of the experiment testbed are broadly divided into four types: basic, grid
infrastructure, grid application and fault tolerance management. Table 7.1 shows the list of
parameters, the type and possible values of each parameter, and in which experiment each
parameter is used.
7.1.1 Basic Parameters
The basic parameters of the testbed are type of execution, failure seed, recovery seed and
experiment size. These parameters are needed in all experiments. The type of execution
determines whether the grid application is executed in virtual-time or real-time. The failure
and the recovery seeds, on the other hand, are integer numbers that initialize two random
number generators, which we refer to as failure generator and recovery generator, respectively.
The failure generator produces a sequence of numbers that are used to check whether a given
activity fails or not. The recovery generator also produces a sequence of numbers that are used
to check whether the failed activity can be recovered or not. The last basic parameter of the
testbed, the experiment size, specifies the number of times an experiment is run, each run with
unique failure and recovery seeds.
7.1.2 Grid Infrastructure Parameters
The parameters of the testbed that are related to the grid infrastructure are number of nodes
and number of cores per node. These parameters are needed in all experiments.
7.1.3 Grid Application Parameters
The grid application parameters describe the structure and the behaviour of a grid application.
Some of these parameters are shared by all grid applications. The rest are applicable to either
MR or CL grid applications.
For all grid applications, the overhead of global communication and barrier synchronisation,
and the probability of activity failure should be given. The global communication overhead
is the time that is needed to transfer the output of one activity to another. The barrier
synchronisation overhead is the total time that is needed to ensure the completion of a given
superstep. The probability of activity failure is the likelihood of an activity of a grid application
to fail.
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The parameters of an MR grid application include number of map activities, type of re-
duction, map activity execution time, and reduce activity execution time. The number of map
activities and the type of reduction should be given if an MR grid application is executed in
virtual-time. The type of reduction notifies the testbed whether the map activities are reduced
sequentially or hierarchically. Map or reduce activity execution time is the time that is needed
to complete the execution of a map or a reduce activity without failing. We refer to such
execution time as the failure free execution time of an activity.
The parameters of a CL grid application are dependency structure, type of parallelism,
number of sets of input streams, number of stream elements, and CL activity execution time.
The testbed uses the dependency structure of a CL grid application to identify how data
flows between the activities of the application. The testbed expects the dependency structure
to be expressed using the syntax of the DAG generator that is known as Task Graph for
Free (TGFF) [Dick et al., 1998]. In order to identify the CL supersteps, the testbed also
expects the user to explicitly state the type of parallelism that is used during the computation.
The testbed recognises coarse-grain, pipeline and repeated parallelism. If repeated parallelism
is used, the number of the sets of input streams is required. Despite input streams ideally never
stopping, our evaluation assumes bounded length of streams. Therefore, the total number of
stream elements should be given. The last parameter, CL activity execution time, is the failure
free execution time of a CL activity.
7.1.4 Fault Tolerance Management Parameters
The fault tolerance management parameters describe the behaviour of the fault tolerance
support in a RACS. Some parameters are needed in all experiments, while others only in
specific scenarios.
The type of the RAC architecture, the type of fault tolerance strategy, the number of
maximum retry, and the probability of unrecoverable failure are required in all experiments.
The selection of a RAC architecture is made via the type of RAC architecture parameter. The
testbed recognises generic, MR-specific and CL-specific RAC architectures. The selected RAC
architecture can be combined with restart, checkpointing-rollback or replication fault tolerance
strategy. The user specifies her preferred fault tolerance strategy via the type of fault tolerance
strategy parameter. The number of maximum retry is the utmost number of attempts to either
recover a failed activity or avert the impending failure of an activity by replication. The
maximum number of retry in restart, replication and checkpointing fault tolerance strategies
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is referred to as the maximum number of restarts, replicas and rollbacks, respectively. The
probability of unrecoverable failure is the likelihood of a failed activity to never recover.
In a typical RAC architecture, the execution of a proactive strategy is based on a runtime
prediction. Thus, unless the user selects either no or reactive only fault tolerance support; the
prediction interval, the prediction overhead, the probability of false positives, and the proba-
bility of false negatives should be given. The prediction interval is the duration between two
successive predictions, while the prediction overhead is the time that is needed to make a single
prediction. The user also has an option to opt-out of using a runtime prediction.
The remaining fault tolerance management parameters are concerned with the overhead of a
fault tolerance strategy. Replica overhead, checkpointing cost, rollback cost and restart overhead
represent the time that is needed to initiate the execution of the replica of an activity, to save
the current state of an activity, to restore a failed activity to a stable state, and to restart a
failed activity, respectively.
7.2 Testbed In Action
An experiment run commences after the values of the input parameters, which are needed for
the experiment run, are given. During the run, the testbed engages in the following tasks: grid
application execution, fault injection, failure prediction, fault tolerance management, and data
collection. Upon the completion of these tasks, the testbed outputs the simulated reliability,
execution time and cost of the grid application execution.
7.2.1 Grid Application Execution
The testbed executes a grid application in either real or virtual-time. In a real-time execution,
the testbed submits the application to Xgrid or Condor. In a virtual-time execution, the
testbed advances the execution without actually running the activities of the grid application.
Suppose the failure free execution time of an activity is x. Given the activity completes
execution without failure, virtually executing this activity is equivalent to adding the activity’s
execution time to the total execution time of the application, i.e. T = T + x, where T is the
execution time so far. The testbed also simulates the transfer of data between activities. This
is done by adding the global communication overhead, denoted by y, to the execution time so
far, i.e., T = T+y. The testbed assumes equal load distribution during virtual-time executions.
For a virtual-time execution, the testbed requires information about the grid infrastructure
and the grid application. The number of nodes and the number of cores per node should
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be given to the testbed regardless of the class of the grid application. If the class of the
grid application is MapReduce, the testbed expects the number of map activities, the type of
reduction, and the failure free execution times of map and reduce activities. Since the testbed
assumes equal load distribution, the map activities will be equally distributed among the
available cores before execution begins. Then, the cores concurrently execute their allocated
map activities. If each core is allocated two or more map activities, the outputs of the map
activities on each core will be locally reduced. Upon the completion of all of map activities
and local reductions, the testbed commences global reductions, which are either sequential or
hierarchical. When the global reduction is completed, so is the execution of the MR application.
If the class of the grid application is Combinational Logic, then the testbed expects the
dependency structure, the type of parallelism, the number of stream elements, the number of
the sets of input streams, and the failure free execution time of CL activities. The testbed
uses the dependency structure and the type of parallelism to identify all CL supersteps of the
computation. Since the testbed assumes bounded streams, the number of CL supersteps is
finite. The testbed commences the CL computation by executing the activities in the first CL
superstep. When these activities complete execution, the testbed then executes the activities in
the next superstep. This continues until the execution of the activities in the last CL superstep
is completed. Similar to MR activities, before the execution of activities in a CL superstep
commences, the activities are equally distributed among available cores.
7.2.2 Fault Injection
The testbed injects real and simulated faults during the execution of a grid application. If the
application is executed in real-time, then activities are randomly killed. If the application is
executed in virtual-time, then simulated faults are injected to terminate virtually running ac-
tivities. The testbed estimates the time of fault injection based on an exponential distribution.
The execution time of an activity, which is killed by a simulated fault, is the total time the
activity would be running until the time of the fault injection. The testbed injects faults at
the node level. Thus, all activities that are running on the node, where the fault is injected,
are assumed to fail.
7.2.3 Failure Prediction
The testbed regularly checks the presence of an impending failure. The testbed uses a random
uniform distribution, along with the probability of false negatives and false positives, to de-
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termine the presence of an impending failure before the next prediction. Further, the testbed
uses the prediction interval parameter to determine the time to make the next prediction.
At the time of any prediction, there are two mutually exclusive events: failure is impending
or failure is not impending. Given failure is impending, the testbed will either correctly predict
the presence of a threat in the near future, i.e. true positive, or not, i.e., false negative. The
prediction outcome under this scenario depends on the probability of false negatives. Given
failure is not impending, the testbed will either recognize the absence of a threat in the near
future, i.e., true negative, or send an unnecessary warning, i.e., false positive. The prediction
outcome under this scenario depends on the probability of false positives.
In the testbed, a prediction is made at the node level. Therefore, whenever an impending
failure is predicted, the testbed executes a proactive strategy to avert the impact of the im-
pending failure on all activities that are running on the node. For example, if the proactive
strategy is replication, then a replica of all activities will be instantiated.
7.2.4 Fault Tolerance Management
The testbed provides fault tolerance support to grid applications that are executed in virtual-
time. The fault tolerance support is simulated, and thus the selected fault tolerance strategy
is executed in virtual-time.
The testbed can be configured to follow the principles of the RAC approach as well as
existing alternative fault tolerance approaches. For instance, instead of replicating an activity
based on positive failure prediction, which is the case in the RAC approach, the testbed repli-
cates all activities n times before the execution of the application commences. The testbed
also offers an option to execute a grid application without any fault tolerance support. Fur-
ther discussions focus on describing the behaviour of the testbed when the RAC-based fault
tolerance support is provided.
The type of the fault tolerance support depends on the selected RAC architecture and fault
tolerance strategy. Therefore, we identify each support using the type of the RAC architecture
and the fault tolerance strategy with which the architecture is paired. For example, if the
managers in MR-specific architecture handle failure using replication, then the fault tolerance
support is referred to as the MR-specific replication-based RAC.
• Restart-based RAC: The restart-based RAC manages failure only reactively. The
generic restart-based RAC restarts a failed activity whose computation does not depend
on previously completed activities, whereas both the MR-specific restart-based RAC and
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the CL-specific restart-based RAC can restart any failed MR and CL activity, respec-
tively.
• Replication-based RAC: The replication-based RAC manages failure only proactively.
If an activity is predicted to fail, then the replica of the activity will be executed. If the
impending failure of the activity is not predicted prior to the activity’s failure, no attempt
is made to recover the activity. In the replication-based RAC, at most two replicas of
an activity are simultaneously executed. If a positive prediction is made while the two
replicas are being executed, no more replica is instantiated even if the maximum replica
limit is not reached. The generic replication-based RAC can replicate an activity only
if the activity does not depend on other activities, whereas the MR-specific replication-
based RAC and the CL-specific replication-based RAC can replicate any MR and CL
activity, respectively.
• Checkpointing-based RAC: The checkpointing-based RAC manages failure proac-
tively and reactively. The checkpointing-based RAC saves the current state of an activ-
ity whenever the activity is predicted to fail. If/when the activity fails, the activity is
rolled-back to the last checkpoint. Unlike the restart and the replication counterparts,
the generic checkpointing-based RAC can recover the failure of any type of activity pro-
vided that specific conditions are met. If an activity that depends on a previously com-
pleted activity fails and the activity is checkpointed before its failure, then the generic
checkpointing-based RAC recovers the failed activity. The MR-specific checkpointing-
based RAC and the CL-specific checkpointing-based RAC can, with no restriction, man-
age the failure of any MR and CL activity, respectively.
The testbed restarts, replicates and rolls-back an activity a fixed number of times. If
the activity is unable to successfully complete its execution after the maximum retry limit is
reached, the activity is considered to fail beyond recovery. All other activities that depend on
the failed activity will be marked as failed beyond recovery. The testbed can also be configured
to execute a fault tolerance strategy an unlimited number of times. However, such configuration
should be used cautiously as there is a possibility for an activity to continuously fail and never
be able to successfully complete its execution.
The testbed uses the probability of unrecoverable failure along with a random uniform
distribution to determine whether a failed activity can be recovered or not. The testbed
performs this type of check only in the restart-based RAC and the checkpointing-based RAC.
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Since the restart-based RAC and the checkpointing-based RAC attempt to recover a failed
activity, it is essential to determine whether the failed activity is recoverable or not. If the
failure is unrecoverable, then no attempt is made to recover the activity.
7.2.5 Data Collection
While the execution of a grid application is in progress, the testbed records the execution time
and the cost of the application so far. At the end of each execution, the testbed outputs the
status of the execution (completed or failed), the execution time and the cost of the application.
The status of a grid application execution is used to determine the reliability of the application
under the given conditions. In Sections 7.2.5.1, 7.2.5.2 and 7.2.5.3, we discuss how the testbed
estimates the reliability, the total execution time and the cost of a grid application execution,
respectively.
7.2.5.1 Reliability
Every experiment is run multiple times with unique failure and recovery seeds. At the end
of each run, the testbed records the status of the execution. In line with the discussion in
Section 5.2.1, all of the activities of a grid application must successfully complete in order for
the execution of the application to be regarded as a success. Otherwise, if any of the activities
fails beyond recovery, then the execution is considered as a failure. Once the multiple executions
of a given experiment are completed, the testbed reports the reliability of the grid application
execution under the given constraints according to Equation (7.1).
Reliability =
Number of successfully completed runs
Number of all runs
(7.1)
The reliability estimation of a CL grid application is slightly different from what is discussed
above. During a CL computation, each experiment run involves multiple executions of a CL
application. In each CL experiment, a CL application is executed as many times as the total
number of the stream elements. Therefore, when an experiment run is completed, the testbed
records the number of the stream elements that are successfully processed. Then, when all
of the experiment runs are completed, the testbed reports the reliability of CL application
according to Equation (7.2), provided that n be the total number of experiment runs, m be
the total number of stream elements, and xi be the number of successfully processed stream
elements in experiment run i.
Reliability =
∑n
i xi
n×m (7.2)
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7.2.5.2 Execution Time
The testbed either records or estimates the execution time of a grid application. If the appli-
cation is executed in real-time, then the execution time is recorded. Otherwise, the execution
time is estimated. Hereafter, our discussion focusses on estimating the execution time of a grid
application.
The execution time of a grid application depends on the architecture of the grid application,
the execution time of the application’s activities, the number of available cores, the type of
the scheduler, and the data transfer overhead. The testbed assumes that the distribution of
the initial input data and executable files to the cores is already taken care of. Therefore, the
testbed does not include the time that is needed to distribute these files in the total execution
time. The testbed also assumes the scheduling policy to be equal load distribution. Before
presenting how the execution time of a MapReduce and a Combinational Logic grid applications
are estimated in Sections 7.2.5.2.2 and 7.2.5.2.3, Section 7.2.5.2.1 discusses the estimation of
the execution time of an activity under various scenarios.
7.2.5.2.1 Execution Time of an Activity
The execution time of an activity depends on what happens to the activity and/or its execution
environment during execution. In this section, we present four selected scenarios that show
how the testbed estimates activity execution time. The execution time of an activity in all
other scenarios can be constructed from the discussions below. When the execution time of an
activity is estimated, the testbed does not include the duration between activity failure and
failure detection in the total execution time of the activity.
Scenario 1 (Failure Free Execution). Suppose an activity completes execution without failing.
The execution time of the activity is the same as its failure free execution time, Figure 7.1.
E
FF
Legend E: total execution, FF: failure free execution
Figure 7.1: Execution of an activity without failing
Scenario 2 (Execution with Restart). Suppose an activity fails, and then successfully com-
pletes execution after restart. The total execution time of such activity is equal to the time
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the activity spent on an uncompleted execution, the restarting overhead, and the failure free
execution time of the activity, Figure 7.2.
x
failed
E
UNC FF
|
restarting
Legend E: total execution, FF: failure free execution, UNC: uncompleted execution
Figure 7.2: Execution of an activity with restart
Scenario 3 (Execution with Replication). Suppose the impending failure of an activity is pre-
dicted, the activity is replicated before its failure, and the replica of the activity is successfully
executed. The execution time of such activity is the sum of the activity’s failure free execution
time, the replication overhead, and the time the activity spent on the original execution before
the failure prediction, Figure 7.3. Though the original execution continues until it fails, the
duration between failure prediction and failure occurrence in the original execution does not
contribute towards the total execution time of the activity. This is because the computation
in this duration overlaps with the execution of the activity’s replica.
x
failed
E
UNC
|
failure
predicted
FF
Replica|replicating
Legend E: total execution, FF: failure free execution, UNC: uncompleted execution
Figure 7.3: Execution of an activity with replication
Scenario 4 (Execution with Checkpointing-Rollback). Suppose an activity is checkpointed be-
fore its failure, and then the activity successfully completes execution after rollback. The total
execution time of such activity is the sum of the failure free execution time of the activity, the
time the activity spent on computing after the checkpoint but before its failure (uncompleted
execution), and the time that is needed to checkpoint and rollback the activity Figure 7.4.
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FF
checkpointing
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| |
rollingback
Legend E: total execution, FF: failure free execution, UNC: uncompleted execution
Figure 7.4: Execution of an activity with checkpointing-rollback
7.2.5.2.2 Execution Time of a MapReduce Application
The execution time of a MapReduce application is the time that is needed to complete the
map phase with optional local reductions, the transfer of data between activities, and a global
reduction. The execution time of the map phase is determined by the core whose allocated
map activities take the longest time to complete and be locally reduced.
The total data transfer time from either map or local reduce activities to global reduce
activities, or from one global reduce activity to another in hierarchical reduction depends on
the type of the communication channel. If the output data can be sent in parallel, the data
transfer time is g × log2 c; where g is the global communication overhead and c is the number
of cores that are used during the map phase. If the communication channel is shared, however,
the total data transfer time will be g × (c − 1). The testbed assumes shared communication
channel.
The execution time of a global reduction depends on its type, i.e., sequential or hierarchical.
The execution time of a sequential global reduction is the sum of the execution times of all
global reduce activities. For a hierarchical global reduction, the execution time is the sum of
the execution time of the longest reduce activity in each level (see Figure 6.1). Suppose c cores
are used during the map phase, the map activities are reduced in log2 c levels.
7.2.5.2.3 Execution Time of a Combinational Logic Computation
As discussed in Section 7.2.1, the testbed identifies all CL supersteps of a CL computation.
Since a CL computation is a sequence of CL supersteps, the testbed adapts Valiant’s cost
model, as shown in Equation (4.1), to estimate the execution time of a CL computation. The
execution of CL activities in a CL superstep is equivalent to local computation in Valiant’s
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superstep. Transferring the outputs of these activities to the activities in the next superstep
represents Valiant’s global communication. Finally, the time the testbed adds at the end of
global communications, before executing activities in the next CL superstep, is equivalent to
Valiant’s barrier synchronisation.
The adaptation of Valiant’s model is needed to incorporate the assumption of the testbed
about communication channel being shared, and to include scenarios where the number of CL
activities in a superstep is greater than the number of allocated cores for the computation.
The adapted Valiant’s model is shown in Equation (7.3).
Let
• S: the total execution time of a CL computation
• si: the execution time of CL superstep i
• wi,j,k: the execution time of CL activity j in superstep i on core k
• hj : the h-relation of activity j
• g: the transmission capacity of the network to deliver data (bandwidth)
• b: fixed (amortised) cost of synchronisation (conceptual barrier)
S =
m∑
i=1
si
for m total CL supersteps in S
(7.3)
si =
c
max
k=1
( n/c∑
j=1
wi,j,k
)
+
n∑
j=1
(hj × g) + b
where c : total cores allocated for CL superstep i
n : total CL activities in superstep i
(7.4)
7.2.5.3 Cost
The cost of a grid application execution is the total CPU time that is spent on executing the
activities of the application, fault tolerance management and prediction.
We use the cost of a grid application, instead of the total execution time, for our reliability-
overhead analysis. The user of a grid service is either allocated a specific resource usage quota
if the service is free, or is billed based on the amount of resources she uses to execute her
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application, which is standard especially in service providers like GoGrid [GoGrid Website]
and Amazon [Amazon Website]. Therefore, since the total execution time only reflects the
length of the computation, we chose the cost of a grid application, which shows the area of
the computation. The area of the computation, as represented by time, is the total computing
power that is consumed by the application and the fault tolerance support.
Suppose p be the cost of the execution of a grid application without fault tolerance support,
and q be the cost of the execution of a grid application with fault tolerance support. The
unscaled overhead of the fault tolerance support is q− p. For the reliability-overhead analysis,
we normalize the unscaled overhead according to Equation (7.5).
Normalised Overhead =
q
p
− 1 (7.5)
7.3 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced our parameterised experiment testbed that is designed to empir-
ically evaluate a given RAC architecture with respect to reliability and overhead. The testbed
can be configured in many ways through its grid application, grid infrastructure and fault
tolerance management parameters. During an experiment run, the testbed engages in grid
application execution, fault injection, failure prediction, fault tolerance management, and data
collection. Upon the completion of these tasks, the testbed outputs the simulated reliability,
execution time and cost of the grid application execution.
Chapter 8
Experiment Design
The objective of our experiment runs is to answer our research questions (Section 1.1). There-
fore, we design various sets of experiments to analyse
i. the reliability-overhead tradeoff that is enabled by the generic, the MR-specific and the
CL-specific RAC architectures (Sections 9.1.1 and 9.1.2),
ii. the impact of the parameters of a fault tolerance strategy, which is paired with a given
RAC architecture, on the tradeoff (Sections 9.2 and 9.3), and
iii. the sensitivity of the tradeoff to prediction interval (Section 9.4), and false negative and
false positive predictions (Section 9.5).
For each set of experiments, we assign a single value or a range of values to the parameters
of the testbed. As shown in Table 7.1, we recognise the testbed parameters as controlled and
independent variables. The value of a controlled variable is held constant in all experiments,
while the value of an independent variable is changed from one experiment to another. In all
experiments, the dependent variables∗ are reliability and cost. The experimental setup of the
controlled and independent variables is discussed in Sections 8.1 and 8.2, respectively.
Our experiments are based on simulation. We aim to evaluate the RAC approach for a range
of independent variables settings, where the value of each independent variable is uncertain and
the impact of an independent variable is defined not necessarily in isolation but in its complex
interactions with others. Real data for such combinations of conditions are hard to get by, and if
∗Generally in a scientific experiment, the experiment aims to establish the dependency of certain observa-
tions, which are the dependent variables; and the factors that these observations depend upon, which are the
controlled and the independent variables [Welkowitz et al., 2012].
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we measure them in a real cluster or grid within a real application run or even thousands of runs,
these ‘real’ contexts are still only few samples in the sea of so many applications, frameworks
and architectures combinations that we are interested in. Consequently, how well the ‘real’
data represents the part of the ‘sea’ we are interested in, is entirely uncertain. Likewise, when
we look at dependent variables in these ‘real’ runs, it remains very uncertain, what kind of
generalisations we can make about the dependency measured. Therefore, simulation is the
only option we have in general for this type of wide-ranging problem [Zurell et al., 2010].
8.1 Controlled Variables
The results of all experiments depend on type of execution, failure seed, recovery seed, experi-
ment size, number of nodes, number of cores per node, global communication overhead, barrier
synchronisation overhead, and probability of activity failure. These are the shared controlled
variables. The remaining controlled variables in Table 7.1 are specific to either MR or CL
related experiments; therefore we discuss these variables separately in Sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2,
respectively.
For all experiment runs, a grid application execution and fault tolerance management are
carried out in virtual-time. In order to minimise noise from the data, an experiment run is
repeated 103 times, each time with unique failure and recovery seeds. We allocate 32 dual-core
compute nodes to each experiment run, and thus, upto 64 activities can be executed in parallel.
The overheads of global communication and barrier synchronisation are obtained from
the Pallas MPI Benchmarks (PMB) suite [PMB, 2000]. The Ping Pong and the Barrier
benchmarks of the PMB suite are used to measure the overhead of global communication and
barrier synchronisation, respectively. We run the benchmarks on our HPC cluster of 32 nodes
with 8 cores each. The global communication overhead depends on the size of the data to be
transferred, while the barrier synchronisation overhead depends on the number of activities
to be synchronised. For example, the global communication overhead of transferring 2MB of
data is 8.45µsec, and the barrier synchronisation overhead for synchronising 64 activities is
638.52µsec.
We assume individual activities of a grid application to be highly reliable, and thus we
limit the probability of activity failure within the range of {0, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015,. . . , 0.2}. The
fact that failure in a grid application execution being highly likely, when compared to non-grid
applications, does not necessarily imply that the failure probability of the individual activities
of the application is very high. The high likelihood of failure in a grid is due to factors like the
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massive number of grid components, which have non-zero probability of failure, the longevity
of grid computations, and the like (see Section 4.3.1 for details).
8.1.1 MapReduce Experiments
The controlled variables that are needed in MR experiments are number of map activities, map
execution time, reduce execution time, and type of global reduction.
Our simulated MR grid application is inspired by 4CareK [Peake et al., 2009], a parame-
terised large scale distributed lattice generator. 4CareK allows the user to specify, among other
things, the number of map activities and the execution time of each activity via its parameters.
For our experiment, we assume a simulated 4CareK grid application with 256 map activities;
therefore, each of the 64 cores will be allocated four activities. Since the execution time of each
map activity of 4CareK can be configured, we assume each map activity to take 15 minutes
in one set of experiments and 1 hour in another. Inspired by the MPI REDUCE routine and
4CareK, we assume global sequential reduction. We measured the execution time for reducing
the map activities of 4CareK on our Xgrid. The execution time is roughly 1500 msec, which is
very small. Therefore, in order to study MR grid applications with expensive reduce activities,
we also set the execution time of each reduce activity to be the same as and significantly more
than the execution time of a map activity.
8.1.2 Combinational Logic Experiments
The controlled variables that are needed in CL experiments are dependency structure, type
of parallelism, number of sets of input streams, number of stream elements, and CL activity
execution time.
We execute a randomly generated and two real CL applications during CL experiment runs.
We refer to the randomly generated application as Tgff since the application is generated by
the TGFF tool (Section 7.1.3). Tgff has 26 CL activities and 7 processing steps. The other CL
applications are Spatial Matching [Kuntschke et al., 2006], an astrophysics application that is
required to determine Spectral Energy Distributions (SEDs), and FilterBank [Gordon, 2010],
a multi-rate signal decomposer in, for example, image processing. Spatial Matching has 11
CL activities and 4 processing steps, while FilterBank has 67 CL activities and 10 processing
steps. The DAGs of Tgff, Spatial Matching and FilterBank are shown in Figure 8.1. We assume
pipeline and repeated parallelism during the execution of these CL applications. The number of
input stream sets is 2, while the number of stream elements is 50. In-line with our assumption
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Figure 8.1: Benchmark DAGs for CL Experiments
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in Section 6.2.1.2, each CL activity of a CL computation is assigned equal execution times.
For each CL computation, the execution time of its CL activities are randomly generated.
The randomly generated execution times represent small and long execution times, in their
respective experiment runs.
8.2 Independent Variables
The independent variables that are needed in all experiments are type of RAC architecture, type
of fault tolerance strategy, number of maximum retry, and probability of unrecoverable failure.
The rest of the independent variables are related to prediction, and the overhead of the selected
fault tolerance strategy. We discuss the values of these variables in Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2.
In MR experiments, the fault tolerance support is based on the generic and the MR-specific
RAC architectures. Likewise, in CL experiments, we use the generic and the CL-specific RAC
architectures. Each RAC architecture is paired with restart, replication or checkpointing-
rollback fault tolerance strategy. These strategies represent reactive only, proactive only and
hybrid failure handling. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, there are other fault tolerance strategies
that a RAC architecture could be paired with; however, such strategies are represented by the
selected strategies at an abstract level. Redundancy, standby spare and N -version are similar
to replication; despite the difference in the actual implementation, all of them advocate the
use of more than one instance of an activity to manage failure. The reason checkpointing is
combined with rollback rather than with migration is that checkpointing-rollback is a hybrid
strategy while checkpointing-migration is a proactive strategy; a proactive strategy is already
represented by replication. Rejuvenation is also not considered due to its purely proactive
nature.
We leave the number of maximum retries unbounded and determine the bound (if any) by
experiment. We assume a non-zero probability for an activity to never recover after its failure.
Possible causes of an unrecoverable failure include internal software bug, data corruption during
execution, memory leak, CPU crash, and others. Though there are multiple events that could
trigger such failure, they are not necessarily frequent. Therefore, we set the probability of
unrecoverable failure to be low, i.e. 0.01. Later, in Section 9.2, we study the general impact of
the probability of unrecoverable failure on the performance of a RAC architecture. For such
study, the values of the probability of unrecoverable failure are 0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.3, and 0.75.
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8.2.1 Prediction Variables
The independent variables that are specific to prediction are prediction interval, probability of
false negatives, probability of false positives, and prediction overhead. We discuss the prediction
overhead, along with other fault tolerance overheads, in Section 8.2.2.
8.2.1.1 Prediction Interval
We set the prediction interval to be 5% of the failure free execution time of an activity. In MR
experiments, since map and reduce activities could have different execution times, the MR-
specific RAC architecture adjusts the prediction interval for each type of activity. Suppose the
execution time of a map and reduce activity is 2000 and 50, respectively. During the map phase,
a prediction is made every 100 units of time, while in the reduce phase, a prediction is made
every 2.5 units of time. The generic RAC architecture does not change the prediction interval
as the architecture assumes all activities to be the same for the purpose of fault tolerance
support. Later, in Section 9.4, we study the general impact of the prediction interval on the
performance of a RAC architecture. For such study, the values of the prediction interval are
5%, 15%, 25%, . . . , 95% of the failure free execution time of an activity.
Note that, in the checkpointing-based RAC, the prediction interval should be greater than
the overhead of a single checkpoint. Suppose positive predictions are made during the nth
and n+ 1st predictions, for some natural number n. If the prediction interval is less than
the overhead of a single checkpoint, then the second checkpointing begins while the first is in
progress. Since the activity to be checkpointed is still suspended when the second checkpointing
begins, the second checkpointing does not save an advanced state of the activity. Such scenario
can be avoided by using a prediction interval that is larger than the overhead of a single
checkpoint.
8.2.1.2 Prediction Accuracy
The probabilities of false positives and false negatives determine the accuracy of a predictor.
In an ideal predictor, which knows the state of the system and makes perfect prediction all
the time, these probabilities are zero. In the other extreme, a predictor will have no access
to the state of the system, and therefore, ‘guesses’ the current status of the system by, for
example, tossing a coin. We refer to such a predictor as state oblivious. All other predictors lie
between these two. These predictors have limited or full access to the system. However, since
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“prediction is very difficult, especially about the future”†, their predictions are not necessarily
correct all the time. We refer to these predictors as state aware. An ideal predictor is a state
aware predictor that makes perfect predictions.
We use state oblivious predictors to set the baseline for the quality of state aware pre-
dictors. Since state aware predictors take into account the current condition of the execution
environment, these predictors must be more accurate than the state oblivious ones. Otherwise,
it is not worth putting any effort to develop these predictors. In all experiments, except where
stated otherwise, we assume a state oblivious predictor. This is because we would like to study
how a RAC architecture performs despite the available predictor being the least accurate one.
Our state oblivious predictor is randomised, i.e., the predictor makes a prediction based on a
random constant k, where k ∈ [0, 1]. k is the probability of making positive prediction regard-
less of the current status of the execution environment with respect to an impending failure.
At the time of prediction, this predictor generates a random number i, where i ∈ [0, 1), and
then compares i to k. If k ≥ i, then a positive prediction is made. Otherwise, a negative
prediction is made.
In our experiment testbed, k cannot be directly used. The testbed expects the probability
distribution of a predictor’s outcomes to be expressed by the probabilities of false positives
and false negatives (Section 7.1.4). However, the probability distribution of a state oblivious
predictor is given in terms of positive and negative predictions. Even though there are two
mutually exclusive events at the time of prediction (Section 7.2.3), failure is impending and
failure is not impending, a state oblivious predictor does not intrinsically recognise these events.
Therefore, the probability of positive predictions remains the same irrespective of the current
event. Following is summarised the probability distribution of a state oblivious predictor.
• Given an impending failure at the time of prediction, the probability of true positives
is k and the probability of false negatives is 1− k.
• Given no impending failure at the time of prediction, the probability of true negatives
is 1− k and the probability of false positives is k.
Let the probability of false positives given no impending failure be x, and the probability
false negatives given an impending failure be y. From the probability distribution of a state
oblivious predictor, we observe that x + y = 1. In our experiment, k = 0.5, and thus, the
probabilities of both false positives and false negatives are 0.5. Later, in Section 9.5, we will
†The source of the quote is disputed. However, we attribute the quote to Niels Bohr.
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discuss how the performance of a RAC architecture is affected by the accuracy of a state
oblivious predictor, where k ∈ [0, 1], and a state aware predicator.
8.2.2 Overhead Variables
The independent variables that are related to overhead are checkpointing cost, rollback cost,
replica overhead, restart overhead, and prediction overhead.
For our evaluation, we assume system level checkpointing, and therefore measure the time
that is needed to take a memory dump. The checkpointing cost of a 4CareK activity on NFS
is 131 msec, and the size of the checkpoint is 2MB. Since the overhead of checkpointing an
activity depends on the complexity of the activity, the size of the information to be saved, the
location of the checkpointing storage (local disk vs. NFS), and the network bandwidth [Plank
et al., 1999], we therefore study the impact of the cost of checkpointing on checkpointing-based
RAC in Section 9.3 in detail. According to Nurmi et al. [2005], the overheads of checkpointing
and rollback are roughly the same in long running jobs on Condor. Therefore, we assign equal
values for the rollback cost and the checkpointing cost.
We measure restart and replication overheads. Since restart and replication create a new
instance of an activity, they both need the same input values. In 4CareK, for example, the
overhead of reading the input values of an activity from NFS is 0.66 msec. We also measure
the overhead of making prediction by a state oblivious predictor, and it is 0.014 msec. All our
measurements are done using YourKit Java Profiler [YourKit Website].
8.3 Experiment Runs Presentation
For each evaluation, we only show the most significant portions of the data, and elide other
redundant portions that show essentially the same thing. The outputs of all experiment runs
will be provided on request.
Figure 8.2 shows the reference graph notation, which subsequent graphs in this thesis will
follow. Each graph is divided into two, each half representing reliability and overhead. For
the value of a given variable in the x-axis, the reliability of a grid application whose failure is
managed by a specific fault tolerance support type is plotted on the Reliability half, and the
overhead of the fault tolerance support is shown on the Overhead half.
The graph has an additional dimension based on color to represent a fault tolerance support
type. RPL-g, CHK-g and RST-g denote generic replication-based RAC, checkpointing-based
RAC and restart-based RAC, respectively; and their respective architecture-specific equivalents
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are RPL-s, CHK-s and RST-s. Finally, NoFT shows a grid application execution without any
fault tolerance support.
Figure 8.2: Reliability-overhead tradeoffs from one of the benchmark runs.
8.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the design of our experiment. We described the values of the
controlled and the independent variables in Table 7.1. Finally, we provided a reference graph
notation that will be used throughout the thesis.
Chapter 9
Results
In this chapter, we answer our research questions (Section 1.1): What is the reliability-overhead
tradeoff that is enabled by the RAC approach for MapReduce and Combinational Logic grid
applications? How sensitive is such reliability-overhead tradeoff to a fault tolerance strategy
and its parameters, and prediction accuracy? We answer the first question by presenting
the reliability-overhead tradeoff that is enabled by the generic, the MR-specific and the CL-
specific RAC architectures. We then answer the second question by discussing the impact of an
unrecoverable failure on the reliability-overhead tradeoff, how the cost of checkpointing affects
the performance of the checkpointing-based RAC, and the sensitivity of the checkpointing-
based and the replication-based RAC to prediction interval and accuracy. These discussions
are based on the scenario presented in Figure 9.1c. Nonetheless, the knowledge is transferable
to other scenarios as well.
9.1 Reliability and Overhead under RAC Architecture
The generic and the architecture-specific RAC approaches improve the reliability of MR and CL
grid applications. Such reliability improvement, nevertheless, comes at the expense of increased
cost of execution. The extent of the reliability improvement and the overhead of providing such
improvement depend on the type of the RAC architecture (generic, MR-specific, CL-specific),
and the fault tolerance strategy with which the RAC architecture is paired. We present the
reliability improvement that MR and CL grid applications would gain by adapting the RAC
approach and the associated cost of the reliability improvement in Sections 9.1.1 and 9.1.2.
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9.1.1 The Case of MapReduce
Under the default parameter settings, the execution of an MR grid application without fault
tolerance support almost always leads to failure at application level. In such situations, the
reliability of the execution is almost zero if the probability of activity failure is greater than
0.04. This is shown in Figure 9.1. According to our reliability definition (Section 7.2.5.1),
the failure of one activity suffices to consider the entire execution as failed. Combining either
generic or MR-specific fault tolerance support with an MR execution improves the reliability
of the execution up to a limit.
We evaluated the reliability-overhead tradeoff of the generic and the MR-specific RAC
architectures for MR grid applications. In summary,
• Result 1: MR-specific fault tolerance support provides a more reliable MR application
execution than generic fault tolerance support. Figure 9.1.
• Result 2: Given the execution time of a map activity is significantly higher than the
execution time of a reduce activity, the overhead of MR-specific fault tolerance support
is almost the same as the overhead of its generic counterpart. Figures 9.1a and 9.1b.
• Result 3: Given the execution time of a reduce activity is at least equal to the execu-
tion time of a map activity, the overhead of MR-specific fault tolerance support, with
the exception of the checkpointing-based RAC, is significantly higher than the over-
head of generic fault tolerance support. The generic and the MR-specific variants of the
checkpointing-based RAC incur roughly the same overhead. Figures 9.1c and 9.1d.
• Result 4: The MR-specific restart-based and the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC
provide almost equally reliable execution of an MR grid application. Figure 9.1.
• Result 5: Given the failure of some activities requires reactive fault tolerance manage-
ment, the MR-specific restart-based and the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC pro-
vide a more reliable execution of an MR grid application than any of the other fault
tolerance support types. Figures 9.1a, 9.1c and 9.1d.
• Result 6: Given a proactive strategy can be executed prior to the failure of any activity
and the cause of the failure is a transient fault, the MR-specific replication-based RAC
provides the most reliable MR computation. Figure 9.1b.
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(a) Long running map and short running reduce.
Failure at any time.
(b) Long running map and short running reduce.
Failure towards the end.
(c) Equal execution time for map and reduce.
Failure at any time.
(d) Short running map and long running reduce.
Failure at any time.
Figure 9.1: The reliability-overhead tradeoff of the generic and the MR-specific RAC.
• Result 7: Given the probability of activity failure is non-zero, of the MR-specific fault
tolerance support types, the replication-based RAC introduces the highest overhead,
followed by the restart-based RAC and then the checkpointing-based RAC. Figure 9.1.
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9.1.1.1 Restart-Based RAC
The MR-specific restart-based RAC provides a more reliable execution of an MR gird appli-
cation than the generic restart-based RAC, Figure 9.1. This is due is to the fact that the
MR-specific restart-based RAC can manage the failure of both map and reduce activities,
whereas the fault tolerance support by the generic restart-based RAC is limited to map activ-
ities. The inability of the generic restart-based RAC to recover a failed reduce activity makes
it provide a less reliable execution of an MR grid application than its MR-specific counterpart.
The superiority of the MR-specific restart-based RAC over the generic restart-based RAC
becomes more pronounced than before as the probability of activity failure increases. As
shown in Figure 9.1a, for example, if the probability of activity failure is 0.01, the generic
restart-based RAC and the MR-specific restart-based RAC guarantee a reliability of 0.72 and
0.98, respectively. In this case, the MR-specific RAC provides 0.26 more reliability than the
generic RAC. However, if the probability of activity failure becomes 0.03, the difference in the
reliability of the computation reaches 0.6; while the MR-specific RAC achieves 0.94 reliability,
the generic RAC guarantees only 0.34 reliability. The key reason behind the widening of the
gap with an increase in the probability of activity failure is that as the probability of activity
failure increases, the likelihood of the reduce activity to fail increases as well. Since the generic
restart-based RAC does not have a mechanism to deal with reduce failures, such increase highly
impacts its performance.
The MR-specific restart-based RAC introduces more overhead than its generic counterpart.
Nonetheless, the degree of the overhead difference depends on the relative execution time of
reduce and map activities. When the execution time of a map activity is considerably higher
than the execution time of the reduce activity, as shown in Figures 9.1a and 9.1b, the overhead
of the MR-specific restart-based RAC is only marginally larger than the overhead of the generic
restart-based RAC. In this scenario, the majority of the overhead is incurred during the map
phase. Since both types of fault tolerance support put equivalent effort to handle the failure
of map activities, they introduce more or less comparable overhead. The additional attempt
to restart failed reduce activities by the MR-specific restart-based RAC will not introduce
significant overhead as the execution time of the reduce activities is very small, especially
when compared to the execution time of the map activities.
In the scenario when the execution time of a reduce activity is at least the same as the
execution time of a map activity, as shown in Figures 9.1c and 9.1d, the overhead of the
MR-specific restart-based RAC is significantly higher than the overhead of the generic restart-
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based RAC. Since only the MR-specific restart-based RAC attempts to recover a failed reduce
activity, which in this case is very expensive, we observe a significant gap between the overhead
of the two types of fault tolerance support.
9.1.1.2 Replication-Based RAC
Both the generic and the MR-specific variants of the replication-based RAC improve the re-
liability of an MR grid application up to a limit. The performance of these types of fault
tolerance support is limited by the lack of any mechanism to recover a failed activity. This, as
shown in Figures 9.1a, 9.1c and 9.1d, becomes apparent as the probability of activity failure
increases. With an increase in the probability of activity failure, more and more activities
will fail before their impending failure can be predicted, all other things kept constant. If the
failure of activities is not predicted, then no replica will be instantiated.
Despite an increase in the probability of activity failure, if a proactive strategy can be
executed prior to the failure of any activity and the cause of the failure is a transient fault, then
the MR-specific replication-based RAC guarantees a 100% reliable computation. Under the
default parameter settings, if an activity fails only towards the end of its execution, a positive
prediction will be made at some point during its computation, and consequently the activity
will be replicated. Such execution is shown in Figure 9.1b. As long as the cause of the failure
is a transient fault and a replica is instantiated before the failure of the activity, the activity
eventually completes successfully. If the cause of the failure is a permanent fault, regardless
of how many times the activity is replicated, it will not complete successfully. The generic
replication-based RAC does not guarantee a 100% reliable computation as its performance is
limited by its inability to not only recover a failed activity but also initiate a replica of a reduce
activity.
The relationship between the generic and the MR-specific variants of the replication-based
RAC with respect to overhead is similar to that of the restart-based RAC. Given the execution
time of a map activity is considerably higher than the execution time of a reduce activity,
as shown in Figures 9.1a and 9.1b, the MR-specific replication-based RAC introduces almost
equivalent overhead as the generic replication-based RAC. However, if the execution time of
the reduce activity is at least the same as the execution time of the map activity, as shown on
Figures 9.1c and 9.1d, then the overhead of the MR-specific replication-based RAC becomes
significantly higher than that of its generic counterpart.
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9.1.1.3 Checkpointing-Based RAC
The MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC provides a more reliable execution of an MR grid
application than the generic checkpointing-based RAC, Figure 9.1. The generic and the MR-
specific variants of the checkpointing-based RAC save the current state of both map and
reduce activities after a positive prediction. The difference between the two comes at the time
of rolling-back a reduce activity. If the reduce activity is not checkpointed before its failure,
unlike the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC, the generic checkpointing-based RAC cannot
recover it. This is why the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC provides a more reliable
computation than its generic counterpart.
The extent of the reliability of an MR computation, whose failure is managed by the generic
checkpointing-based RAC, depends on the relative execution time of map and reduce activities.
In the scenario when the execution time of a map activity is considerably higher than that of
a reduce activity, the reliability of the computation is low. Otherwise, the reliability of the
computation is relatively high. This is due to the way the prediction interval is configured
during the execution of an MR grid application.
The prediction interval in the generic checkpointing-based RAC is set up with respect to
the activity that has the longest execution time. Suppose the respective execution time of a
map and a reduce activity are 104 and 5 units of time, and the prediction interval be 5% of the
failure free execution time of an activity. Thus, the prediction interval will be 500. Since, such
prediction interval is larger than the execution time of the reduce activity, no prediction will be
made during the execution of a reduce activity; and consequently none of the reduce activities
will be checkpointed. In this scenario, the reliability of the MR grid application, whose fault
tolerance support is provided by the generic checkpointing-based RAC, will be low due to the
inability of the generic RAC to recover a failed reduce activity that is not checkpointed. This
scenario is shown in Figures 9.1a and 9.1b.
In the scenario when the execution time of a reduce activity is higher than that of a map
activity, the performance of the generic checkpointing-based RAC will not be affected by the
prediction interval. By reversing our previous example, let the execution time of a map and
a reduce activity be 5 and 104, respectively. Since the longest activity execution time is used
to set the prediction interval, the prediction will still be 500. Due to the large difference
between the execution time of a map activity and the prediction interval, no prediction will
be made during the map phase. Nonetheless, since the generic checkpointing-based RAC can
recover a failed map activity even if the activity is not checkpointed, the performance of the
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generic checkpointing-based RAC will not be affected due to the prediction interval setting.
In such scenario, as shown in Figure 9.1d, the generic and the MR-specific variants of the
checkpointing-based RAC provide a comparably reliable MR computation.
The extent of the reliability of an MR computation, whose failure is managed by the MR-
specific checkpointing-based RAC, does not depend on the relative execution time of map
and reduce activities. This is because the prediction interval in the MR-specific checkpointing-
based RAC is set up based on the execution time of each activity type. In the previous example,
where the execution time of a map activity is 104 and the execution time of the reduce activity
is 5, the prediction interval is 500 during the map phase and 0.25 during the reduce phase.
Therefore, there will be prediction during the execution of all activities.
The overhead of the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC is marginally higher than that
of the generic checkpointing-based RAC irrespective of the relative execution time of a map and
a reduce activities. As discussed in Section 9.1.1.2, if the execution time of the map activity is
significantly higher than that of the reduce activity, the bulk of the overhead comes from the
map phase. As the result, both fault tolerance support types introduce marginally the same
overhead. If the execution time of the map activity is not significantly higher than that of the
reduce activity or if the execution time of the reduce activity is at least the same as that of the
map activity, the overhead comes from both the map and the reduce phases. Since such scenario
leads to favourable prediction interval settings to the generic checkpointing-based RAC, the
generic checkpointing-based RAC puts almost as equal effort as its MR-specific counterpart
to handle the failure of both map and reduce activities. As the result, both fault tolerance
support types introduce comparable overhead.
9.1.1.4 Comparing the RAC-based Fault Tolerance Support Types
In Sections 9.1.1.1-9.1.1.3, we established that MR-specific fault tolerance support provides a
more reliable execution of MR grid applications than generic fault tolerance support. Therefore,
in this section, we will focus on only the MR-specific fault tolerance support types. The overall
relationship among the MR-specific fault tolerance support types is as follows:
• The MR-specific variants of the restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC provide
almost equally reliable execution of an MR grid application. This is because, unless an
activity fails due to an unrecoverable failure, both fault tolerance support types repeat-
edly restart/rollback the activity until it completes successfully. Despite the similarity
in behaviour with respect to repeated retries, the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC
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sometimes provides a more reliable computation than the MR-specific restart-based RAC.
Since a rolled-back activity generally has shorter execution time than a restarted activity,
the rolled-back activity stands a better chance of avoiding an unrecoverable failure, and
subsequently completing successfully than the restarted one. The longer the execution
time, the more likely to fail.
• The MR-specific restart-based and the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC provide a
more reliable computation than the MR-specific replication-based RAC, provided that
the failure of some activities requires reactive fault tolerance management. This is due to
the fact that the MR-specific replication-based RAC being a purely proactive fault tol-
erance support. However, there are scenarios in which the MR-specific replication-based
RAC provides equally or more reliable computations than its checkpointing and restart
counterparts. Examples of such scenarios include when the probability of unrecoverable
failure is more than 0.05 (Section 9.2), when the probability of false positives is more
than 0.8 (Section 9.5), and when the predictor is perfect.
• The MR-specific replication-based RAC introduces the highest overhead of all. Since a
replica is instantiated due to both true and false positive predictions, the MR-specific
replication-based RAC almost always doubles the cost of the execution. The next costly
fault tolerance support is the MR-specific restart-based RAC. Whenever an activity fails,
the computation is started from the beginning. In fact, the MR-specific restart-based
RAC is equivalent to the MR-specific replication-based RAC, provided that the MR-
specific replication-based RAC replicates an activity based on only true positive predic-
tions. Since the MR-specific replication-based RAC unnecessarily replicates an activity
because of false positive predictions, it is more costly than its restart counterpart. Under
the default parameter settings, given the probability of activity failure is non-zero, the
MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC introduces the least overhead. Since the computa-
tion that will be lost is the one from the last checkpoint, it is expected for the MR-specific
checkpointing-based RAC to be relatively less costly than the others. This is especially
evident from Figure 9.1b, on which the overhead of the checkpointing-based RAC is
shown to be almost one order of magnitude less than the restart-based RAC. When the
probability of activity failure is zero, unnecessary checkpointings due to false positive pre-
dictions make the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC introduce more overhead than
the MR-specific restart-based RAC.
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9.1.2 The Case of Combinational Logic
We evaluated the reliability-overhead tradeoff of the generic and the CL-specific RAC archi-
tectures for CL applications. In summary:
• Result 8: CL-specific fault tolerance support provides a more reliable execution of a CL
application than generic fault tolerance support. Figure 9.2.
• Result 9: The overhead of CL-specific fault tolerance support, with the exception of the
checkpointing-based RAC, is notably higher than the overhead of generic fault tolerance
support. Figure 9.2.
• Result 10: Given a proactive strategy can be executed prior to the failure of any activity,
the generic and the CL-specific variants of the checkpointing-based RAC provides almost
equally reliable computation of a CL application. Figure 9.2b.
• Result 11: The CL-specific restart-based and the CL-specific checkpointing-based RAC
provide almost equally reliable execution of a CL grid application. Figure 9.2.
• Result 12: Given the failure of some activities requires reactive fault tolerance manage-
ment, the CL-specific restart-based and the CL-specific checkpointing-based RAC provide
a more reliable execution of a CL grid application than any of the other fault tolerance
support types. Figure 9.2a.
• Result 13: Given a proactive strategy can be executed prior to the failure of any activity
and the cause of the failure is a transient fault, the CL-specific replication-based RAC
guarantees 100% reliable execution. Figure 9.2b.
• Result 14: Given the probability of activity failure is non-zero, of the CL-specific fault
tolerance support types, the replication-based RAC introduces the highest overhead,
followed by the restart-based RAC and then the checkpointing-based RAC. Figure 9.2.
9.1.2.1 Restart-Based RAC
The CL-specific restart-based and the generic restart-based RAC improve the reliability of a
CL application execution. The CL-specific restart-based RAC provides, as shown in Figure 9.2,
a more reliable execution of a CL grid application than the generic restart-based RAC. This
is the result of the CL-specific RAC being able to handle the failure of any activity, and the
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(a) FilterBank. (b) FilterBank. Failure towards the end.
(c) Tgff. (d) Spatial Matching.
Figure 9.2: The reliability-overhead tradeoff of the generic and the CL-specific RAC: The inset
figures magnify selected data to show the relationship between the plotted fault tolerance support types
whose plots are overlapped on the scale of the outer figure.
inability of the generic RAC to manage the failure of an activity whose execution depends
on previously completed computations. Hereafter we refer to an activity whose computation
depends on previously completed activities as a successor activity.
The superiority of the CL-specific restart-based RAC over its generic counterpart becomes
more pronounced than before with an increase in the probability of activity failure, and/or the
complexity of a given CL application, i.e., the size and the degree of communication among the
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activities of the application. As the probability of activity failure increases, the likelihood of a
successor activity to fail increases as well. This disadvantages the generic restart-based RAC
as the generic RAC does not have a mechanism to deal with the failure of a successor activity.
As the complexity of a CL application increases, so does the number of successor activities,
e.g., Spatial Matching vs. Tgff. The more the successor activities, the less the degree of the
fault tolerance support by the generic restart-based RAC.
The CL-specific restart-based RAC introduces more overhead than its generic counterpart.
The extent of the difference in overhead depends on the complexity of a given CL application.
As the complexity of a CL application increases, so does the overhead difference between the
two variants of the restart-based RAC. Since the generic restart-based RAC does not handle
the failure of successor activities, its overhead is limited to the management of CL activities
in the first processing step only; whereas the overhead of the CL-specific restart-based RAC
is incurred in all processing steps as the CL-specific RAC can manage the failure of any CL
activity. The overhead difference between the generic RAC and the CL-specific RAC, for
instance, is significantly higher in Tgff than in Spatial Matching. This is expected since Tgff
has more activities, more communication among its activities and more processing steps than
Spatial Matching. In Tgff, as shown in Figure 9.2c, the increase in the cost of execution is up to
175% by the CL-specific RAC and only 50% by the generic RAC. However, in Spatial Matching,
as shown in Figure 9.2d, we observe a relatively small gap between the two. The increase in
the cost of execution is up to 50% by the CL-specific RAC and 30% by the generic RAC.
9.1.2.2 Replication-Based RAC
The CL-specific replication-based and the generic replication-based RAC improve the reliability
of a CL application execution. However, their performance is limited by their inability to
recover a failed activity. With an increase in the probability of activity failure, as shown in
Figures 9.2a, 9.2c, and 9.2d, more and more activities fail before their impending failure can
be predicted. Unless a prediction is made, the replica of an activity will not be instantiated.
Despite an increase in the probability of activity failure, as shown in Figure 9.2b, if a proactive
strategy can be executed prior to the failure of any CL activity and the cause of the failure is a
transient fault, the CL-specific replication-based RAC guarantees a 100% reliable computation.
Such behaviour is also shared by the MR-specific replication-based RAC, and therefore see
Section 9.1.1.2 for further discussion, all reference to reduce activity and MR shall be understood
to mean successor activity and CL, respectively.
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The CL-specific replication-based provides a more reliable CL computation, and introduces
a higher overhead than the generic replication-based RAC. The relationship between these fault
tolerance support types is similar to the one between the generic and the CL-specific variants
of the restart-based RAC. Therefore, see Section 9.1.2.1 for further discussion.
9.1.2.3 Checkpointing-Based RAC
Both variants of the checkpointing-based RAC improve the reliability of a CL application
execution. The CL-specific checkpointing-based RAC generally provides a more reliable CL
computation than the generic checkpointing-based RAC. This is due to the inability of the
generic checkpointing-based RAC to recover a successor activity that was not checkpointed
before its failure. However, if the activities of a CL application fail only towards the end of
their computation or if the application is not complex, then both fault tolerance support types
provide almost equally reliable CL computations.
In the case when a successor activity fails only towards the end of the computation, the
likelihood of the activity to have been checkpointed is high. Given an activity fails after
completing 95% of its computation, under the default parameter settings, where the prediction
interval is 5% of a CL activity execution time and the probability of positive predictions is
0.5, there will be 19 predictions before the activity fails. Roughly half of these predictions will
be positive, and therefore cause the activity to be checkpointed. Once a successor activity is
checkpointed, the generic checkpointing-based RAC can manage its failure.
The complexity of a CL application is a good indicator of the extent of the presence of
successor activities in the application. As the complexity of a CL application increases, from
Spatial Matching to FilterBank, the number of successor activities in the application increases
as well. The more complex the application is, the less manageable its failure will be by the
generic checkpointing-based RAC, and vice versa.
The overhead of the CL-specific checkpointing-based RAC is marginally higher than the
overhead of the generic checkpointing-based RAC, even when the reliability gap between the
two is significant. Figure 9.2a, for example, shows that as the probability of activity failure
increases, the difference between the two fault tolerance support types with respect to reli-
ability increases at a faster speed than with respect to overhead. As long as an activity is
checkpointed, the generic and the CL-specific RAC put equivalent effort to handle its failure.
Under the default parameter settings, many of the activities of the benchmark CL applications
are checkpointed more often than not, and thus we observe marginally equal overhead. How-
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ever, due to the non-zero probability of false negative predictions, there are successor activities
that will fail before they can be checkpointed. As discussed previously, the presence of such
activities deteriorates the overall reliability of the application whose failure is managed by the
generic checkpointing-based RAC.
9.1.2.4 Comparing the RAC-based Fault Tolerance Support Types
See Section 9.1.1.4, all reference to MR shall be understood to mean CL.
9.2 Probability of Unrecoverable Failure
The probability of unrecoverable failure is one of the independent variables that affects the
performance of the restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC. In summary:
• Result 15: As the probability of unrecoverable failure increases, the restart-based and
the checkpointing-based RAC provide less and less reliable execution of an MR grid
application, all other things being equal. The reliability of the computation eventually
becomes smaller than the execution of the application with the replication-based RAC.
Figure 9.3.
• Result 16: With an increase in the probability of unrecoverable failure, the overhead
of the restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC becomes less and less, all other
things being equal. Figure 9.3.
• Result 17: Given the cause of the unrecoverable failure is not an internal software fault,
an increase in the probability of unrecoverable failure does not have a notable impact on
the replication-based RAC, all other things being equal.
The restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC perform at a peak level when the
probability of unrecoverable failure is 0. As the probability of unrecoverable failure increases,
the performance of these fault tolerance support types deteriorates, all other things being equal.
For instance, as shown in Figure 9.3, if the probability of unrecoverable failure is more than
0.05, the restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC provide less reliable computation
than the MR-specific replication-based RAC. By the time the probability of unrecoverable
failure reaches 0.3, the restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC will at best be as good
as the generic replication-based RAC. The minimum value of the probability of unrecoverable
failure that makes the restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC perform less than the
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(a) Probability of activity failure 0.035 (b) Probability of activity failure 0.175
Figure 9.3: The impact of the probability of unrecoverable failure on the reliability-overhead
tradeoff: The overhead of the replication-based RAC is not plotted. The overhead is already shown
in Figure 9.1c to be significantly higher than the other fault tolerance support types. Including such
overhead in the plot obscures the impact of the probability of unrecoverable failure on the overhead of
the restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC, which is negligible for the replication-based RAC.
The inset figures magnify selected data to show the relationship between the plotted fault tolerance
support types whose plots are overlapped on the scale of the outer figure.
replication-based RAC is application and execution environment dependant. For example,
as shown in Figure 9.3, for the probability of activity failure 0.035 and 0.175, the respective
minimum value is 0.3 and 0.1.
With an increase in the probability of unrecoverable failure, as shown in Figure 9.3, the
overhead of the restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC decreases. Since no attempt is
made to recover an activity that has failed beyond recovery, (Section 7.2.4), the more activities
fail beyond recovery, the less time is spent on executing a fault tolerance strategy.
The probability of unrecoverable failure does not have a notable impact on the performance
of the replication-based RAC, provided that the cause of the failure is not an internal software
fault. When a replica of an activity is initiated due to a true positive prediction, the new replica
is assumed to execute in a new environment. Despite the failure of the original activity beyond
recovery, the event that triggered the unrecoverable failure on the original activity might not
exist in the new environment. Thus, the new replica stands a good chance of terminating
successfully. The restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC, on the other hand, attempt
to recover (restart/rollback) the failed activity on the same environment. Thus, no matter how
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many times the attempt is made, the activity will keep failing.
9.3 Cost of Checkpointing
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the cost of checkpointing on the reliability-overhead
tradeoff that is enabled by the checkpointing-based RAC. For such evaluation, we set the cost of
checkpointing to be 0.01%, 0.1%, 1%, 10%, 20%, and 40% of the failure free activity execution
time. Due to the requirement that the prediction interval must be greater than the cost of
a single checkpoint (Section 8.2.1.1), we need to adjust the value of the current prediction
interval, which is 5% of activity execution time, for some of the experiment runs. The current
prediction interval is valid only for experiment runs whose cost of checkpointing is less than
5% of activity execution time. Since a prediction interval that is valid for a given experiment
could be invalid for another, instead of fixing the prediction interval in each experiment run,
we use a range of values. In each experiment run, we vary the prediction interval between
5% and 95% of activity execution time. Then, for the given cost of checkpointing, we choose
the prediction interval that enables the checkpointing-based RAC to provide the most reliable
computation with the least overhead possible. In summary:
• Result 18: As the cost of a single checkpoint increases, the reliability of the computa-
tion whose failure is managed by the checkpointing-based RAC either stays the same or
decreases. Figure 9.4.
• Result 19: Provided that the reliability of a grid application computation remains almost
constant, an increase in the cost of a single checkpoint generally increases the overhead
of the checkpointing-based RAC. Table 9.1.
As the cost of a single checkpoint increases, the reliability of a grid computation either
stays the same or decreases, all other things being equal. If an increase in the cost of a
single checkpoint does not require to increase the prediction interval, then the reliability of the
computation will be almost constant. This is because if there is no change in the prediction
interval, the level of the proactive fault tolerance support provision would remain the same.
For instance, Table 9.1 shows the absence of a change in the prediction interval despite an
increase in the cost of a single checkpoint from 0.01% to 1% of activity execution time. This
is why the reliability of the computation remains at approximately 0.83.
In the scenario when the increase in the cost of checkpointing necessitates a change in
the prediction interval, we observe a significant drop in the reliability of the computation.
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(a) Probability of activity failure 0.075. (b) Probability of activity failure 0.075.
(c) Probability of activity failure 0.195. (d) Probability of failure 0.195.
Figure 9.4: The impact of the cost of a single checkpoint on the reliability-overhead tradeoff
of the checkpointing-based RAC.
Increasing the prediction interval implies more spread out predictions than before. Therefore,
unless the predictor is highly accurate and can predict the status of the computation over
an extended period of time, there is a good chance to overlook the presence of an impending
failure before the next prediction point. This increases the number of activities that fail before
being checkpointed. As the result, the performance of the checkpointing-based RAC will be
affected. The performance degradation is more severe on the generic than on the MR-specific
RAC due to the inability of the generic checkpointing-based RAC to recover an uncheckpointed
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successor activity. For example, as shown in Table 9.1, if the cost of a single checkpoint is 10%
of activity execution time, the prediction interval will be increased to 15% of activity execution
time, and consequently the reliability of the computation will drop from 0.83 to 0.6.
Table 9.1: The impact of the cost of a single checkpoint on the generic checkpointing-based
RAC. Probability of activity failure is 0.075. Equivalent data is shown in Figure 9.4a
Cost of a single
checkpoint
Prediction
Interval
Reliability Overhead
0.01% 5% 0.833 0.31
0.1% 5% 0.83 0.33
1% 5% 0.824 0.46
10% 15% 0.66 0.96
20% 35% 0.41 0.8
40% 75% 0.21 0.76
An expensive checkpointing strategy may make the checkpointing-based RAC provide less
reliable computation than the restart-based RAC. Figure 9.4b, for example, shows that when
the cost of a single checkpoint is 20% and 40% of activity execution time, the reliability of
the computation is higher with the MR-specific restart-based RAC than with the MR-specific
checkpointing-based RAC. Whenever a positive prediction is made, the execution time of the
activity is extended by the time that is needed to complete the checkpoint (Section 7.2.5.2).
Expensive checkpointing mechanisms make the execution time of the activity be significantly
longer than before. The longer the execution time, the more likely the activity to fail due to
an unrecoverable failure.
Overall, if the reliability of the computation is not changed due to the increase in the cost of
a single checkpoint, the overhead of the checkpointing-based RAC generally increases. This is
because the user is paying extra when she uses the expensive checkpointing without the benefit
of increased reliability. Table 9.1 shows that when the cost of a single checkpoint increases
from 0.01% to 1%, the reliability stays almost constant, but the overhead increases.
9.4 Prediction Interval
The prediction interval affects the reliability improvement of the replication-based and the
checkpointing-based RAC offer to grid applications. In summary:
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(a) Cost of a single checkpoint 0.01%. (b) Cost of a single checkpoint 10%.
(c) Cost of a single checkpoint 20%. (d) Cost of a single checkpoint 40%.
Figure 9.5: The impact of prediction interval on the reliability-overhead tradeoff of the
checkpointing-based and the replication-based RAC. Probability of activity failure 0.02
• Result 20: With an increase in the prediction interval, the replication-based RAC provides
less reliable computation and requires less overhead than before. Figure 9.5.
• Result 21: With an increase in the prediction interval, the checkpointing-based RAC
increasingly provides more reliable computation than before, up to a limit. Once the
limit is reached, the reliability remains roughly constant in the MR-specific checkpointing-
based RAC, but decreases in the generic checkpointing-based RAC.
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As discussed in Section 9.3, an increase in the prediction interval decreases the degree of
proactive fault tolerance support provision, and increases the reliance on reactive strategies for
failure management. As the result, an increase in the prediction interval affects the performance
of fault tolerance support types that rely on proactive fault tolerance strategies to manage
failure. The replication-based RAC and the generic checkpointing-based RAC are among
these fault tolerance support types. As the prediction interval increases, since the replication-
based RAC manages failure only proactively, its engagement in fault tolerance management
becomes increasingly limited. As the result, it provides less reliable computation, and incurs
less overhead than before.
In the checkpointing-based RAC, an increase in the prediction interval optionally increases
reliability at first, and then the reliability stays roughly constant or decreases. This is shown
in Figures 9.5c and 9.5d. An increase in the reliability of the computation is observed if the
difference between the prediction interval and the cost of a single checkpoint is relatively small.
In such configuration, whenever a positive prediction is made, a given activity completes only a
fraction of its computation before the next prediction point. Consequently, a string of positive
predictions significantly increase the execution time of the activity. The longer the execution
time, the more chance to fail. Increasing the gap between the prediction interval and the cost
of checkpointing enables activities to complete more computation between predictions than
before, and subsequently shortens their execution time. Figure 9.5c, for example, shows that
when the prediction interval is 25% of activity execution time, the generic checkpointing-based
RAC guarantees 0.5 reliability. However, by increasing the prediction interval to 35% of activity
execution time, up to 0.8 reliability can be achieved.
Once the prediction interval that guarantees the most reliable computation is achieved,
which we refer to as the optimal prediction interval, increasing the prediction interval is nei-
ther necessary nor advisable practice. As a given prediction interval deviates from the op-
timal prediction interval, more and more activities will fail before being checkpointed. As
discussed in Section 9.3, long prediction interval deteriorates the performance of the generic
checkpointing-based RAC. Using longer prediction interval than the optimal one does not have
a notable impact on the performance of the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC. This is
because the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC can recover any activity, checkpointed or
uncheckpointed, as long as the failure is recoverable.
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9.5 Prediction Accuracy
The accuracy of a predictor, which is expressed by the probabilities of false positives and false
negatives, influences the performance of the replication-based and the checkpointing-based
RAC. Since the restart-based RAC does not use prediction for fault tolerance management, it
is insensitive to the accuracy of a predictor. In this section, we discuss how the accuracy of
a state oblivious predictor and a state aware predictor affect the reliability-overhead tradeoffs
that are enabled by the replication-based and the checkpointing-based RAC.
9.5.1 State Oblivious Predictors
We discuss the impact of the accuracy of a state oblivious predictor based on a change in the
probability of false positives only. The probability of false negative is 1 − x, where x is the
probability of false positives (Section 8.2.1.2). Therefore, studying the impact of an increase
in false positive predictions is equivalent to studying the impact of a decrease in false negative
predictions, and vice versa.
We evaluated the sensitivity of the reliability-overhead tradeoff to the probability of false
positives of a state oblivious predictor. In summary,
• Result 22: As the probability of false positives increases, the replication-based and the
checkpointing-based RAC increase the reliability of an MR grid application execution up
to a limit, all other things being equal. Figure 9.6.
• Result 23: With an increase in the probability of false positives, the overhead of the
replication-based RAC and the generic checkpointing-based RAC increases, but the over-
head of the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC decreases up to a limit, all other things
being equal. Figure 9.6.
Given failure is not impending, an increase in the probability of false positives increases
the reliability that is provided by both replication-based and checkpointing-based RAC. The
advantage of increasing the probability of false positives comes in two fold:
i. The execution of a proactive strategy increases with an increase in the probability of false
positives. Though the rise in an unnecessary proactive strategy execution is generally
considered as a waste of resources, there are circumstances when such event pays off.
Suppose a proactive strategy is executed to manage the failure of an activity due to a
false positive prediction. If this activity fails later in the execution and the impending
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(a) Probability of activity failure 0.01. (b) Probability of activity failure 0.01. Magnified
CHK-s, CHK-g, RST-s, RST-g.
(c) Probability of activity failure 0.195. (d) Probability of activity failure 0.195. Magnified
CHK-s, CHK-g, RST-s, RST-g.
Figure 9.6: The impact of the accuracy of a state oblivious predictor on the reliability-overhead
tradeoff: the impact of an increase in the probability of false positives is read from left to right, and
the impact of an increase in the probability of false negatives is read from right to left.
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failure of the activity is not identified at the most recent prediction, then the previously
executed proactive strategy presents an opportunity to successfully complete the failed
activity.
ii. In a state oblivious predictor, if the probability of false positives increases, so does the
probability of true positives (Section 8.2.1.2). Increasing the probability of true positives
is a desirable property since it presents an opportunity to take an action that potentially
minimises the impact of the impending failure on the overall computation.
Overall, increasing the probability of false positives progressively increases the use of a
proactive strategy and decreases the use a reactive strategy. This property is advantageous for
both replication-based and checkpointing-based RAC:
• The replication-based RAC manages failure solely proactively. Since increasing the prob-
ability of false positives decreases the reliance on a reactive strategy to manage failure,
the replication-based RAC gains a performance boost as the probability of false positives
gets higher and higher.
• In the checkpointing-based RAC, increasing the probability of false positives results in
more activities being checkpointed than before. If/when activities fail, provided that the
failure is recoverable, they will be rolled-back to the last checkpoint. Since rolled-back
activities generally have shorter execution time than restarted ones, they have a better
chance of completing successfully.
The extent of the performance gain due to increased positive predictions depends on the
type of the fault tolerance support and the behaviour of the computation. Given failure is not
impending, if the probability of false positives is 1, the cause of an activity failure is a transient
fault and an activity does not fail before the first prediction is made, then the MR-specific
replication-based RAC guarantees 100% reliable computation. In this scenario, the predictor
always sends warning, and subsequently all activities are protected at all times irrespective of
their status of computation. However, this is not the case for the generic replication-based
RAC. Even though the predictor sends warning all the time, the generic replication-based
RAC does not know how to replicate an activity (e.g., reduce) that depends on a previously
completed activity (e.g., map). Once the point, where the failure of all independent activities
can be handled, is reached, increasing the probability of false positives will not yield any
significant reliability gain. Figure 9.6a shows that, for example, the generic replication-based
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RAC increases the reliability of an MR application execution considerably until the probability
of false positives reaches 0.7. Once such point is reached, reliability remains almost constant.
Similar to the replication-based RAC, for the checkpointing-based RAC, with increasing
probability of false positives, reliability increases. However, as Figure 9.6 shows, reliability
approaches a limit asymptotically. This limit seems to represent a residual amount of unre-
coverable failure, which cannot be managed by checkpointing. For example, Figure 9.6c shows
that the generic checkpointing-based RAC asymptotically approaches 0.68.
Despite an increase in the probability of false positives having a desirable impact on re-
liability, it increases the overhead of all, except the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC.
Though the execution of a proactive strategy due to a false positive prediction is acceptable
in some circumstances, it wastes resources in large part. This is why, in general, an increase
in the probability of false positives leads to increased overhead. The extent of the overhead
increment, however, is bounded. In the replication-based RAC, as discussed in Section 7.2.4,
there are at most two copies of a given activity that are running at the same time. Thus, no
matter how many times a predictor sends a warning, which will be frequent when the proba-
bility of false positives is high, an activity will not be replicated as long as two copies of the
activity are being executed.
In the checkpointing-based RAC, with an increase in the probability of false positives, the
overhead of the generic fault tolerance support increases, but the overhead of the MR-specific
one decreases. When the probability of false positives increases, so does the probability for the
activities to be checkpointed before their impending failure. Since the generic checkpointing-
based RAC can manage the failure of checkpointed activities, including the ones whose compu-
tation depend on others, the more activities are checkpointed before their failure, the more the
overhead of the generic checkpointing-based RAC will be. In the MR-specific checkpointing-
based RAC, activity failure is managed by rollback if the activity is checkpoined, and by restart
if the activity is not checkpointed. The more activities are checkpointed, the more the failure
of activities is managed by rollback. Therefore, under the default parameter settings, since
rollback is cheaper than restart, the overhead of the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC
decreases. If the cost of a single checkpoint is very expensive, of course, the total time that
is saved by rolling-back instead of restarting a failed activity could be eclipsed by the total
checkpointing overhead.
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9.5.2 State Aware Predictors
We discuss the impact of the accuracy of a state aware predictor on the reliability-overhead
tradeoff. In a state aware predictor, the probabilities of false positives and false negatives do not
have the same relationship as they do in a state oblivious predictor. Therefore, we separately
examine how each variable affects reliability and overhead. Finally, we highlight what the
reliability of a grid computation looks like if the replication-based and the checkpointing-based
RAC are fitted with the perfect predictor. In summary:
• Result 24: As the probability of false positives in a state aware predictor increases,
the replication-based and the checkpointing-based RAC progressively increase the re-
liability of an MR application up to a limit. Nonetheless, except for the MR-specific
checkpointing-based RAC, they incur more and more overhead. Figure 9.7.
• Result 25: As the probability of false negatives in a state aware predictor increases,
the replication-based and the checkpointing-based RAC provide less and less reliable
execution of MR applications. However, except for the MR-specific checkpointing-based
RAC, they require less and less overhead. Figure 9.8.
• Result 26: With the perfect predictor, under the default parameter settings, the MR-
specific replication-based RAC achieves the highest reliable computation, followed by the
MR-specific checkpointing-based, the generic checkpointing-based, and finally the generic
replication-based RAC. Figure 9.9.
9.5.2.1 False Positives
Suppose n be the probability of false positives given failure is not impending, and m be the
probability of false negatives given failure is impending. In this evaluation, n ∈ [0, 1] and
m = 0.2. The impact of the probability of false positives of a state aware predictor is similar to
that of a state oblivious predictor. As shown in Figure 9.7, as the probability of false positives
in a state aware predictor increases, the replication-based and the checkpointing-based RAC
increase the reliability of an MR grid application up to a limit. However, these fault tolerance
support types, except for the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC, require higher and higher
overhead. See Section 9.5.1 for further discussion.
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(a) Probability of activity failure 0.195. (b) Probability of activity failure 0.195. Magnified
CHK-s, CHK-g, RST-s, RST-g.
Figure 9.7: The impact of the probability of false positives of a state aware predictor on the
reliability-overhead tradeoff.
9.5.2.2 False Negatives
Suppose n be the probability of false positives given failure is not impending, and m be the
probability of false negatives given failure is impending. In this evaluation, m ∈ [0, 1] and
n = 0.2.
As the probability of false negatives increases, as shown in Figure 9.8, the checkpointing-
based and the replication-based RAC provide less and less reliable execution of an MR appli-
cation. With an increase in the probability of false negatives, the number of impending failures
that will be predicted decreases. As the result, the number of activities whose failures should
be handled by a reactive strategy increases. If the given fault tolerance support can manage
the failure of such activities, like the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC, then its perfor-
mance with respect to reliability will not be significantly affected. Otherwise, the reliability
of the computation will significantly decrease. Due to the absence of a reactive a strategy in
the replication-based RAC, and a mechanism to recover an uncheckpointed successor activity
by the generic checkpointing-based RAC, as shown in Figure 9.8, the performance of these
fault tolerance support types with respect to reliabilty deteriorates as the probability of false
negatives increases.
As shown in Figure 9.8, an increase in the probability of false negatives decreases the
overhead of the replication-based and the generic checkpointing-based RAC, but increases the
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(a) Probability of activity failure 0.195. (b) Probability of activity failure 0.195. Magnified
CHK-s, CHK-g, RST-s, RST-g.
Figure 9.8: The impact of the probability of false negatives of a state aware predictor on the
reliability-overhead tradeoff.
overhead of the MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC. The decrease in overhead occurs due
to the fault tolerance support types not putting any effort to recover the failed activities
whose impending failure was not predicted. The increase in the overhead of the MR-specific
checkpointing-based RAC is the result of reactive handling of the failure of activities whose
impending failures are not predicted. The extent of the overhead increase depends on the
number of the failed activities. If significantly many of the activities of the application fail,
the overhead will be significantly high. For instance, as shown in Figure 9.8b, an increase in
probability of false negatives incurs up to 10% more overhead than before.
9.5.2.3 The Perfect Predictor
In an ideal prediction world, where there are no false positives and false negatives, under the
default parameter settings, the MR-specific replication-based RAC achieves the highest reliable
computation, followed by the MR-specific checkpointing-based, the MR-specific restart-based,
the generic checkpointing-based, and the generic replication-based RAC. The least reliable
computation is provided by the generic restart-based RAC.
As discussed in Section 9.1.1.4, due to the non-zero probability of unrecoverable failure,
the MR-variants of the restart-based and the checkpointing-based RAC provide less reliable
computation than their replication counterpart. If the probability of unrecoverable failure is
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(a)
(b) Magnified CHK-s, RST-s and CHK-g (c) Magnified RPL-g and RST-g
Figure 9.9: The reliability-overhead tradeoff with the perfect predictor.
zero, as discussed in Section 9.2, they do provide 100% reliable computation.
The MR-specific checkpointing-based RAC provides marginally higher reliability than its
generic counterpart, as shown in Figure 9.9b. Despite the predictor being perfect, some succes-
sor activities may fail before the first prediction is made. This makes the generic checkpointing-
based RAC not provide equally reliable computation as its MR-specific counterpart.
The generic replication-based RAC has absolutely no mechanism to handle the failure
of successor activities. As the result, even though the predictor sends a warning about the
impending failure of a successor activity, no action will be taken. As for the generic restart-
based RAC, since such fault tolerance support does not assume prediction, the accuracy of
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the predictor has no influence on its performance. This, of course, is true for the MR-specific
restart-based RAC as well.
9.6 Reflection
We demonstrated in Sections 9.1-9.5 that there is no single best reliability-overhead tradeoff
that characterises the performance of a given RAC architecture in all scenarios. Our data shows
that the choice of a good tradeoff depends on the classification of the architecture of the given
grid application, the type of the fault tolerance strategy with which the RAC architecture is
paired, the values of the parameters of the fault tolerance strategy and/or the accuracy and the
interval of predictions. A small change in the value of a parameter may significantly affect the
reliability-overhead tradeoff, for example, consider the impact of a change in the probability of
false negatives from 0 to 0.1 on the replication-based RAC (Figure 9.8a). On another scenario,
a change in the parameter value may not have a notable impact on the reliability-overhead
tradeoff, for example, consider the impact of using checkpointing mechanisms whose overheads
are 0.01% and 1% of activity execution time on the checkpointing-based RAC (Figure 9.4d).
Even for a given architecture type, there may not be a single best tradeoff of reliability and
overhead. The best tradeoff may depend on user requirements, or the cost of resources available
to the user. Hence, the results and methods presented in this thesis may be useful in making
such tradeoffs. Suppose an application programmer develops an MR application that resembles
the scenario depicted in Figure 9.1b, the probability of activity failure is roughly 0.12, and the
parameter settings of the execution environment resembles the default parameter settings of our
experiment design. As shown in the figure, six fault tolerance support types are available. Since
all of the generic ones do not improve reliability, they will not be further investigated. Now,
the choice of three MR-specific RAC rests on the requirements of the application programmer.
If the requirement is to achieve the highest reliability, then the choice is clearly the replication-
based RAC. The replication-based RAC guarantees almost 100% reliability, but increases the
cost of the computation by 100%. If the requirement is to achieve at least 80% reliability
with the least overhead possible, then the choice is the checkpointing-based RAC. Both the
checkpointing-based and the restart-based RAC guarantee the required reliability; but restart
incurs 10% overhead while checkpointing incurs only 1% overhead.
Even though checkpointing incurs the smallest computational overhead, adapting check-
pointing requires more effort than restart. In this thesis, we did not evaluate the developmental
cost of a RAC-based grid system. However, it is reasonable to expect that the developmental
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cost of the restart-based RAC will be cheaper than the checkpointing one. Developing check-
pointing requires identifying what to checkpoint, the type of checkpointing, the location for
saving the checkpointed data, how to access the data during rollback, and how to rollback. In
contrast, restart only needs access to the input data of the computation and the executable file
of the computation. Now, the question is is it worth to go through all the trouble of developing
checkpointing-based RAC to save 9% computational overhead? If not, then the best choice that
satisfies the requirement becomes the restart-based RAC.
The result of our experiments offers insight into the diversity of fault tolerance support
configurations and their respective reliability-overhead tradeoff. The results support grid ad-
ministrators, service managers, and/or grid software developers in making decisions to improve
reliability or to decrease overhead of reliability improvement or both.
9.7 Summary
In this chapter, we evaluated the reliability-overhead tradeoffs that are enabled by the generic,
the MR-specific and the CL-specific RAC architectures. We paired these architectures with
restart, replication and checkpointing-rollback fault tolerance strategies. We have shown the
tradeoff of each architecture under the default experimental settings, and then explored the
impact of unrecoverable failure, the cost of a single checkpoint, and the accuracy and the
interval of a predictor on the tradeoff. We finally reflected on what we have learnt at the end
of this project.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
“Now this is not the end.
It is not even the beginning of the end.
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
- Winston Churchill
This PhD project contributes the RAC approach, which is a fault tolerance approach that
manages failure at the component level, combines reactive and proactive fault tolerance strate-
gies, assumes runtime prediction with proactive failure management, and provides customized
fault tolerance support based on the classification of the architecture of a grid application.
Further, the project provides parameterised Markov models and testbed for reliability and
overhead analyses. We have used the testbed for evaluating the reliability-overhead tradeoff of
the RAC approach. Via simulated experiment, we have confirmed that the architecture-specific
fault tolerance support provides higher reliability improvement and incurs higher overhead to
grid applications than the architecture-unaware one. The degree of the reliability improvement
of the architecture-specific support over the architecture-unaware one depends on factors like
the type of the fault tolerance strategy selected and its parameters, and the accuracy of a pre-
dictor. In this chapter, we summarize our contributions, the key research results, and finally
future work.
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10.1 Contributions
This research project contributes the following [Yusuf et al., 2009, 2011, Yusuf, 2010]:
i. The RAC approach, a novel prediction and architecture-based fault tolerance approach
that enables grid applications to tolerate failure reactively and proactively at the com-
ponent level.
ii. A new formal Markov-chain based model that marries assumptions of the so-called Bulk-
Synchronous Parallel model with specific classes of application architectures known as
dwarfs. Specifically, the MapReduce and Combinational Logic dwarfs are modelled for-
mally in this framework for the first time.
iii. Thorough and detailed reliability-overhead analyses of the RAC approach under varying
assumptions and conditions.
iv. In-depth analyses of the impact of unrecoverable failure, checkpointing cost, prediction
interval and predictor accuracy on the reliability-overhead tradeoff of the RAC approach.
v. A parameterised experiment testbed that enables a grid fault tolerance expert to evaluate
diverse fault tolerance support configurations, and then choose the one that will satisfy
the reliability and cost requirements.
10.2 Key Results
This thesis offers insight into providing customized, but not application-specific, fault toler-
ance support to a wide range of grid applications. By considering a small set of parameters
that are shared among many grid applications, the thesis demonstrated that fine-grained and
flexible fault tolerance support leads to significant reliability improvement. We also showed
the increased overheads associated with such reliability improvement.
The thesis explored the nature of the reliability-overhead tradeoff for grid applications that
are classified under the MapReduce and the Combinational Logic dwarfs. We learnt that the
exact reliability-overhead tradeoff depends on many factors. However, one can use either the
RACS models or the experiment testbed to find out which combination of parameter values
leads to the desired level of reliability improvement, and the overhead of the improvement on
the overall computation. The key factors that determine the nature of the reliability-overhead
tradeoff, and their impact on the tradeoff, are as follows:
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• Type of RAC architecture: The architecture-specific fault tolerance support provides a
higher reliability improvement to MapReduce (MR) and Combinational Logic (CL) grid
applications than the generic one, all else being equal (Results 1 and 8). The architecture-
specific fault tolerance support incurs higher overhead to the overall computation than
the generic fault tolerance support, except when the execution time of the map activity is
significantly higher than the execution time of the reduce activity (in MR only) and when
failure is managed by checkpointing-rollback (Results 2, 3 and 9). In these situations, the
overhead of the architecture-specific and the generic fault tolerance support is similar.
• Type of fault tolerance strategy: Of the architecture-specific fault tolerance support types,
checkpointing and restart provide equally reliable grid computation (Results 4 and 11).
Furthermore, given that the failure of some activities requires reactive fault tolerance
management, these fault tolerance support types provide more reliable grid application
execution than the replication-based architecture-specific fault tolerance support (Re-
sults 5 and 12). Given that a proactive strategy can be executed prior to the failure of any
activity and the cause of the failure is a transient fault, the replication-based architecture-
specific fault tolerance support guarantees 100% reliable execution (Results 6 and 13).
Given that the probability of activity failure is non-zero, replication introduces the high-
est overhead among the architecture-specific fault tolerance support types, followed by
restart and then checkpointing (Results 7 and 14).
• Probability of unrecoverable failure: As the probability of unrecoverable failure increases,
the reliability improvement that is provided by the restart-based and the checkpointing-
based fault tolerance support types decreases, all else being equal (Result 15). Likewise
for overhead (Result 16). When the cause of the unrecoverable failure is not an internal
software fault, an increase in the probability of unrecoverable failure does not have a
notable impact on the replication-based fault tolerance support, all else being equal
(Result 17).
• Cost of single checkpoint: As the cost of a single checkpoint increases, the reliability of
the computation whose failure is managed by the checkpointing-based fault tolerance
support either stays the same or decreases, provided that the selected prediction interval
enables the checkpointing-based support to provide the most reliable computation with
the least overhead possible (Result 18). Given that reliability remains almost constant,
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an increase in the cost of a single checkpoint generally increases the overhead of the
checkpointing-based fault tolerance support (Result 19).
• Prediction interval: With an increase in the prediction interval, the reliability of a compu-
tation whose failure is managed by the replication-based fault tolerance support decreases
(Result 20). An increase in the prediction interval decreases the degree of proactive fault
tolerance support provision, and increases the reliance on reactive strategies for fail-
ure management. Since replication-based fault tolerance support manages failure only
proactively, the increasing reliance on a reactive strategy to manage failure limits its
performance. With an increase in the prediction interval, the reliability of a computation
whose failure is managed by the checkpointing-based fault tolerance support increases
(Result 21). The increase in the reliability continues until the prediction interval reaches
its optimal value. The optimal prediction interval enables the checkpointing-based fault
tolerance support to provide the highest possible reliability improvement to a grid appli-
cation, under the default parameter settings. If the prediction interval is larger than the
optimal value, the reliability of the computation remains constant in the architecture-
specific fault tolerance support, but decreases in the generic fault tolerance support.
• Prediction accuracy: As the probability of false positives increases, the replication-based
and the checkpointing-based fault tolerance support progressively increase the reliability
of a grid application up to a limit, all else being equal (Results 22 and 24). As the proba-
bility of false negatives increases, the restart-based and the checkpointing-based fault tol-
erance support provide less reliable execution of grid applications than before (Result 25).
Given a non-zero probability of unrecoverable failure, the cause of failure is a transient
fault, a relatively cheap cost of checkpointing, optimal prediction interval and the per-
fect predictor, the replication-based architecture-specific fault tolerance support achieves
the highest reliable computation, followed by checkpointing-based architecture-specific,
restart-based architecture-specific, checkpointing-based generic, and finally restart-based
generic fault tolerance support (Result 26). With an increase in the probability of posi-
tives, the replication-based and the generic checkpointing-based fault tolerance support
incur more and more overhead (Results 23 and 24); whereas an increase in the probability
of false negatives leads to less and less overhead from these fault tolerance support types
(Result 25).
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10.3 Future Work
In the future, it is interesting to explore whether the RAC approach enables similar reliability-
overhead tradeoff in grid applications other than MapReduce and Combinational Logic, and to
confirm the exact nature of reliability-overhead tradeoffs for the other typical dwarfs underlying
grid applications. Clearly, not all dwarfs are well suited to be executed on a grid infrastructure.
For example, the Finite State Machine dwarf represents applications that are embarrassingly
sequential. Thus, perhaps, a grid is not needed for such a computation. However, it is still
worthwhile to study how one might leverage the knowledge about the dwarfs to guarantee
highly reliable computations irrespective of the computing environment.
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